Cognitive Confidence and Inferential Confusion in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder: Differences Across Subtypes

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 358-378
Author(s):  
Catherine Ouellet-Courtois ◽  
Frederick Aardema ◽  
Kieron O’Connor
2003 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 227-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kieron O'Connor ◽  
Frederick Aardema

Inferential confusion occurs when a person mistakes an imagined possibility for a real probability and might account for some types of thought-action and other fusions reported in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Inferential confusion could account for the ego-dystonic nature of obsessions and their recurrent nature, since the person acts “as if” an imagined aversive inference is probable and tries unsuccessfully to modify this imaginary probability in reality. The clinical implications of the inferential confusion model focus primarily on the role of the imagination in obsessive-compulsive disorder rather than on cognitive beliefs.


2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 293-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Aardema ◽  
Kieron P. O’Connor ◽  
Paul M.G. Emmelkamp ◽  
André Marchand ◽  
Christo Todorov

2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Aardema ◽  
Kieron O’Connor

Meta-cognition refers to the notion of thoughts about one’s own thoughts and has been defined as knowledge and cognition about cognitive phenomena (Flavell, 1979). In recent years, meta-cognitive models have provided accounts of the maintenance of anxiety disorders (e.g., Wells, 2000). Meta-cognitive models would argue that the thoughts about the appearance and utility of otherwise normal thoughts generate anxiety. In this article we apply a meta-cognitive approach to understanding obsessions but, rather than thoughts about thoughts, we suggest that the ruminations in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) without overt compulsions result largely from thoughts about thoughts that do not actually occur. Persons with obsessions thinks they might have or might have had the thoughts, and through a meta-cognitive process termed “inferential confusion,” confuse these imagined thoughts with actual thoughts. This account would explain the repetitive, compulsive yet ego-dystonic nature of obsessions. The justification, provided by patients with OCD, for treating imaginary thoughts as actual thoughts appears to be an imaginary narrative, which produces and maintains the obsessional preoccupation, and seems imposed on reality by a distorted inductive reasoning process.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document