Rawls on Global Distributive Justice: A Defence

2005 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 193-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Heath
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Law Of Peoples ◽  
International Context ◽  
Critical Response ◽  
Global Distributive Justice ◽  
Primary Goods ◽  
The Difference

Critical response to John Rawls's The Law of Peopleshas been surprisingly harsh) Most of the complaints centre on Rawls's claim that there are no obligations of distributive justice among nations. Many of Rawls's critics evidently had been hoping for a global application of the difference principle, so that wealthier nations would be bound to assign lexical priority to the development of the poorest nations, or perhaps the primary goods endowment of the poorest citizens of any nation. Their subsequent disappointment reveals that, while the reception of Rawls's political philosophy has been very broad, it has not been especially deep. Rawls has very good reason for denying that there are obligations of distributive justice in an international context.

Are Special Education Programs Unjust to Nondisabled Children?: Justice, Equality, and the Distribution of Education

1998 ◽  
Vol 180 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Nathanson
Keyword(s):  
Special Education ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Special Needs ◽  
Children With Disabilities ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Education Programs ◽  
Social Consensus ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Philosophical Standpoint ◽  
The Difference

This article deals in depth with perhaps the most troubling education issue of the day—funding and proper distribution of educational resources. How is the money raised and how is its allocation decided? Can the ideals of both justice and equality be served? Is “extra” spending on behalf of children with special needs justified? Stephen Nathanson raises the central questions and, approaching them from a moral-philosophical standpoint, presents and evaluates the arguments of those who defend extra spending for children with disabilities and those who believe that “unequal” spending violates the principle of justice. Nathanson treats various theories of distributive justice—entitlement, utilitarianism, the “difference principle,” and the “decent level” idea. In focusing on the latter, he contends that social consensus developed around “decent level” may be the touchstone, more helpful than any rationale (or rhetoric) in satisfying the claims of justice and equality.

Stone Soup

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 869-889
Author(s):  
Mark Silcox ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Social Goods ◽  
Economic Distribution

Certain sorts of disputes about principles of distributive justice that have occupied a great deal of attention in recent political philosophy turn out to be fundamentally unresolvable, when they are conducted in ignorance of whether an important subclass of basic social goods exists within any particular society. I employ the folktale ‘Stone Soup’ to illustrate how such distributional goods might come into existence. Using the debate about John Rawls’s Difference Principle as an example, I argue that a proper appreciation for the axiological status of these goods shows that disputes about principles (at least as these have been conducted within the Rawlsian tradition) should be relegated to a subsidiary status relative to other, more fundamental concerns about the ethics of economic distribution.

Property-Owning Democracy and the Difference

2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Social System ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
System Property ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

AbstractJohn Rawls says: “The main problem of distributive justice is the choice of a social system.” Property-owning democracy is the social system that Rawls thought best realized the requirements of his principles of justice. This article discusses Rawls’s conception of property-owning democracy and how it is related to his difference principle. I explain why Rawls thought that welfare-state capitalism could not fulfill his principles: it is mainly because of the connection he perceived between capitalism and utilitarianism.

Neoliberalism versus distributional autonomy: the skipped step in rawls’s the law of peoples

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-181
Author(s):  
William A. Edmundson ◽  
Matthew R. Schrepfer
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Minimum Degree ◽  
International Justice ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Law Of Peoples ◽  
Global Distributive Justice ◽  
The Law

AbstractDebates about global distributive justice focus on the gulf between the wealthy North and the impoverished South, rather than on issues arising between liberal democracies. A review of John Rawls’s approach to international justice discloses a step Rawls skipped in his extension of his original-position procedure. The skipped step is where a need for the distributional autonomy of sovereign liberal states reveals itself. Neoliberalism denies the possibility and the desirability of distributional autonomy. A complete Rawlsian account of global justice shows the necessity and possibility of a charter between liberal states, assuring each a proper minimum degree of distributional autonomy

Rawls on Distributive Justice and the Difference Principle

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Economic Systems ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Reciprocity Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

This chapter analyzes Rawls’s complex account of distributive justice. Rawls’s difference principle requires that economic systems be organized so that the least advantaged members of society are better off than they would be in any alternative economic arrangement. The following questions are addressed here: What constraints are imposed by equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity on inequalities allowed by the difference principle? What are the difference principle’s broad and narrow requirements? Is maximizing the least advantaged position mandatory regardless of the inequalities created, or is it optional so that a society can choose to limit inequalities permitted by the difference principle? In what respect is the difference principle a reciprocity principle and not prioritarian? What measures are required to realize the difference principle under ideal conditions of a well-ordered society versus non-ideal conditions of an unjust society? Why should property-owning democracy rather than welfare-state capitalism satisfy Rawls’s principles of justice?

Liberalism and Distributive Justice

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Western World ◽  
Liberal Society ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Social ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Political Philosopher

This volume of essays addresses a wide range of issues in contemporary political philosophy, from the different branches of liberalism and their relation to capitalism, to the basic institutions of a liberal society that underwrite political and economic justice. Samuel Freeman is a leading political philosopher and one of the foremost authorities on the works of John Rawls. This volume contains nine of his essays on liberalism, Rawls, and distributive justice. Freeman organizes his chapters into a narrative arc: from liberalism as the dominant political and economic system in the Western world, to the laws governing interpersonal transactions in a liberal society, to the broad social and political structures that determine distributive justice. Freeman analyzes the primary differences between the classical and high liberal traditions; shows why libertarianism is not a liberal view; argues for the social rather than global bases of distributive justice; demonstrates why Rawls’s difference principle supports a property-owning democracy rather than welfare-state capitalism; and shows how Rawls’s liberal principles of justice and the difference principle are to be applied in both ideal and non-ideal circumstances, effectively responding to criticisms by Amartya Sen, G. A. Cohen, and others.

Rawls on Distributive Justice and the Difference Principle

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Economic Systems ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Reciprocity Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

This chapter analyzes Rawls’s complex account of distributive justice. Rawls’s difference principle requires that economic systems be organized so that the least advantaged members of society are better off than they would be in any alternative economic arrangement. The following questions are addressed here: What constraints are imposed by equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity on inequalities allowed by the difference principle? What are the difference principle’s broad and narrow requirements? Is maximizing the least advantaged position mandatory regardless of the inequalities created, or is it optional so that a society can choose to limit inequalities permitted by the difference principle? In what respect is the difference principle a reciprocity principle and not prioritarian? What measures are required to realize the difference principle under ideal conditions of a well-ordered society versus non-ideal conditions of an unjust society? Why should property-owning democracy rather than welfare-state capitalism satisfy Rawls’s principles of justice?

Partial Equality

Dialogue ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 775-798
Author(s):  
Colin M. MacLeod
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Historical Injustice ◽  
The Poor ◽  
Current Distributions ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
The World ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The Difference

Despite the diversity and important disagreement which characterizes theorizing in political philosophy, most contemporary theories of justice yield remarkably similar verdicts on the moral adequacy of current distributions of wealth, income, and opportunity. By almost any standard of justice defended today, we live in a profoundly unjust world. It is obvious, for instance, that utilitarianism, the difference principle, equality of resources, and even modest-sounding principles of equality of opportunity all condemn the yawning gulf which separates the rich and the poor of the world. Even Nozick's recommendation that the difference principle be used as a rough principle for rectifying historical injustice indicates how little immediate practical difference there is between Rawls's theory and its supposed libertarian antithesis. All this suggests that there is a surprising theoretical consensus about the immediate practical demands of justice. In short, moving toward justice requires substantially reducing the dramatic inequalities which plague our world.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document