I. Diplomatic Representations and Diplomatic Protection

2002 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 723-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Warbrick ◽  
Dominic McGoldrick

The European Court of Human Rights has decided in the last three years five cases dealing with state or international immunities.1 Although the facts differed, the arguments of the applicants were much the same. They contended that allowing a foreign State or an international organisation to claim immunity in a civil action in proceedings in the defendant State violated the applicants' rights to access to a court for the determination of a civil right.2 The European Court accepted the claims in principle but concluded in each case that the limitation imposed on the right of access was for a legitimate reason (the protection of State or international immunities, a condition for effective co-operation between States or with international organisations) and was proportionate to this aim, because in each case, the grant of immunity was required by international law and that in each case there was the possibility of the applicant using another procedure to try to assert his rights, action in the courts of the foreign State or under the special staff regime of the international organisation.

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 407-446
Author(s):  
Clemens Treichl

Although formally provided for in particular statutes, certain international administrative tribunals continue to hold oral hearings—if at all—only on the rarest of occasions. With specific attention to the International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal, the present paper aims 1) at recapitulating essential holdings of the European Court of Human Rights with regard to the right to access to a court in the context of employment-related claims against international organizations; and 2) at examining the relevance of oral hearings in the determination of proportionality of organizational immunity. The analysis shows that, in principle, the denial of oral hearings by international administrative tribunals results in the duty of states to afford individuals access to a court. In the realm of international law, a conflict with the obligation to grant immunity ensues. As yet, domestic courts have remained reluctant to overrule immunity on human rights grounds.


Author(s):  
Shai Dothan

There is a consensus about the existence of an international right to vote in democratic elections. Yet states disagree about the limits of this right when it comes to the case of prisoners’ disenfranchisement. Some states allow all prisoners to vote, some disenfranchise all prisoners, and others allow only some prisoners to vote. This chapter argues that national courts view the international right to vote in three fundamentally different ways: some view it as an inalienable right that cannot be taken away, some view it merely as a privilege that doesn’t belong to the citizens, and others view it as a revocable right that can be taken away under certain conditions. The differences in the way states conceive the right to vote imply that attempts by the European Court of Human Rights to follow the policies of the majority of European states by using the Emerging Consensus doctrine are problematic.


Author(s):  
Carla Ferstman

This chapter considers the consequences of breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law for the responsible international organizations. It concentrates on the obligations owed to injured individuals. The obligation to make reparation arises automatically from a finding of responsibility and is an obligation of result. I analyse who has this obligation, to whom it is owed, and what it entails. I also consider the right of individuals to procedures by which they may vindicate their right to a remedy and the right of access to a court that may be implied from certain human rights treaties. In tandem, I consider the relationship between those obligations and individuals’ rights under international law. An overarching issue is how the law of responsibility intersects with the specialized regimes of human rights and international humanitarian law and particularly, their application to individuals.


Author(s):  
Philippa Webb

The last 50 years have seen significant changes in the law of immunity. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has, over the past 15 years in particular, played an influential role in the law applicable to this ‘moving target’. This chapter examines three approaches of the ECtHR to the identification of general international law: (i) the ECtHR looking to the International Court of Justice; (ii) the ECtHR looking to national practice; and (iii) the ECtHR looking to the work of the International Law Commission and the provisional application of treaties. Although the ECtHR strives to locate itself within general international law, it necessarily approaches the immunities of States, officials, and international organizations through the lens of Article 6 ECHR and whether the immunity in question constitutes a legitimate and proportionate restriction on the right of access to court. This has, at times, taken the Court down a different path to other judicial bodies and we can identify the emergence of a ‘European approach’ to the role of immunity in employment disputes.


ICL Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-105
Author(s):  
Markku Suksi

Abstract New Caledonia is a colonial territory of France. Since the adoption of the Nouméa Accord in 1998, a period of transition towards the exercise of self-determination has been going on. New Caledonia is currently a strong autonomy, well entrenched in the legal order of France from 1999 on. The legislative powers have been distributed between the Congress of New Caledonia and the Parliament of France on the basis of a double enumeration of legislative powers, an arrangement that has given New Caledonia control over many material fields of self-determination. At the same time as this autonomy has been well embedded in the constitutional fabric of France. The Nouméa Accord was constitutionalized in the provisions of the Constitution of France and also in an Institutional Act. This normative framework created a multi-layered electorate that has presented several challenges to the autonomy arrangement and the procedure of self-determination, but the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee have resolved the issues regarding the right to vote in manners that take into account the local circumstances and the fact that the aim of the legislation is to facilitate the self-determination of the colonized people, the indigenous Kanak people. The self-determination process consists potentially of a series of referendums, the first of which was held in 2018 and the second one in 2020. In both referendums, those entitled to vote returned a No-vote to the question of ‘Do you want New Caledonia to attain full sovereignty and become independent?’ A third referendum is to be expected before October 2022, and if that one also results in a no to independence, a further process of negotiations starts, with the potential of a fourth referendum that will decide the mode of self-determination New Caledonia will opt for, independence or autonomy.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 303-332
Author(s):  
Salvatore Fabio Nicolosi

Over the past few years the issue of asylum has progressively become interrelated with human rights. Asylum-related stresses, including refugee flows and mass displacements, have mitigated the traditional idea of asylum as an absolute state right, in so far as international human rights standards of protection require that states may have the responsibility to provide asylum seekers with protection. Following this premise, the article argues that the triggering factor of such overturning is significantly represented by the judicial approach to the institution of asylum by regional human rights courts. After setting the background on the interrelation of asylum with human rights, this article conceptualises the right to asylum as derived from the principle of non-refoulement and to this extent it delves into the role of the two regional human rights courts, notably the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), in order to explore whether an emerging judicial cross-fertilisation may contribute to re-conceptualisation of the right to asylum from a human rights perspective.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 342-362
Author(s):  
Ergul Celiksoy

In November 2018, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Beuze v Belgium. Relying on Ibrahim and Others v the United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber held that the Salduz principles require a two-stage test of analysis, and hence, ruled out that systematic statutory restriction of a general and mandatory nature would in itself constitute an automatic violation of Article 6 § 3(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the Beuze judgment appears to be very controversial, since the Grand Chamber failed to put forward any convincing reason why it departed from previous case law, particularly Dayanan v Turkey and other judgments against Turkey. In their separate opinion, the concurring Judges in Beuze were concerned that the Beuze judgment overruled ‘ Salduz itself and all other cases that have applied the Salduz test’, and thus, ‘actually distorts and changes the Salduz principle and devalues the right that the Court established previously’. This article analyses the Beuze judgment in the light of the Court’s recent jurisprudence in order to examine whether it contradicts and dilutes the principles previously set out. Further, it discusses the implications of the new standards established in Ibrahim and Others and in subsequent cases, particularly Beuze. Particular attention is paid to the questions of how ‘fair’ is the application of overall fairness assessment in every case, how may the Court’s changing direction of approach concerning the right to access to a lawyer affect the increasing trend of recognition thereof, as a rule, by the contracting states, and finally, to what extent the new principles, especially those established in Beuze, comply with Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer.


2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (89) ◽  
pp. 65-82
Author(s):  
Dušica Palačković ◽  
Jelena Čanović

The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia explicitly regulates that free legal aid shall be stipulated by the law. In a series of reports on the progress of the Republic of Serbia in the process of joining the EU, there are warnings about the unacceptably low quality level and efficiency of the judiciary, and indications that there is a need to regulate the legal aid system. Finally, this matter was regulated by enacting the Legal Aid Act of the Republic of Serbia, which came into force on 1st October 2019. In addition to the conceptual definition of legal aid, the paper analyzes the right of access to court as a constituent element of the right to a fair trial prescribed in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which entails the right to legal aid. The regulation of legal aid at the national level has to meet the standards formulated at the European Union level as well as the standards formulated through the practice of the European Court of Human Rights. In that context, the paper analyzes the regulations and decisions, i.e. the widely recognized and accepted standards. The Legal Aid Act of the Republic of Serbia has been analyzed in the context of meeting these standards, especially in relation to the conditions for granting the right to legal aid and the circle of beneficiaries and providers of certain types of legal aid.


Author(s):  
Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen

Chapter 4 discusses international claims, that is, claims arising out of injury inflicted upon an individual by a foreign State in violation of international law. Such claims may be enforced either through diplomatic protection or by granting the injured individual himself the right to bring a case against the foreign State before an international dispute settlement body. The common idea is that claims of individuals against foreign States were solely asserted through diplomatic protection before the Second World War, whereas the right of individuals to petition international courts independently is a post-1945 phenomenon. By studying international claims practice in three historical periods (before the First World War, the interwar period, and after the Second World War), the present chapter tests this account against positive international law, and inquires whether the concept of international legal personality played a role in the contracting States’ choice of one method of dispute resolution over the other.


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