Responding to Critics of Emotions and Collectives

Author(s):  
Sarah E. Fredericks

Chapter 6 explore three questions: why other climate ethicists including Dale Jamieson, Stephen M. Gardiner, and Tracy Lynn Isaacs have not examined moral emotions or the negative emotions of guilt and shame; why their philosophical assumptions prevent them from doing so; and what the advantages are of taking guilt and shame seriously in environmental and climate ethics. Philosophical climate ethics generally prioritizes rational, individual analyses and direct linear causality. These commitments are challenged by the complex layers of agency causing climate change and lead scholars to overlook (1) the contributions of guilt and shame to moral development and (2) how such moral emotions can help agents recognize their as-yet unacknowledged moral commitments––particularly critical tasks in rapidly developing moral circumstances such as that of climate change. Additionally, philosophical commitments of most climate ethicists hinder their recognition of important ethical questions: What are the ethical ramifications of environmental guilt and shame? Should agents intentionally induce them? Regardless of how these emotions come to exist, how should agents respond to them? A more capacious vision of ethics as outlined in this project—which draws on insights of laypeople as well as academics in multiple disciplines; includes rationality, emotion, relationships; acknowledges the agency of individuals and collectives; and recognizes human limits—can address a broader scope of ethical questions including but not limited to those sparked by environmental guilt and shame.

Author(s):  
Stephen M. Gardiner ◽  
Simon Caney ◽  
Dale Jamieson ◽  
Henry Shue

This collection gathers a set of seminal papers from the emerging area of ethics and climate change. Topics covered include human rights, international justice, intergenerational ethics, individual responsibility, climate economics, and the ethics of geoengineering. Climate Ethics is intended to serve as a source book for general reference, and for university courses that include a focus on the human dimensions of climate change. It should be of broad interest to all those concerned with global justice, environmental science and policy, and the future of humanity.


Utilitas ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Lukas Tank

Abstract What is the practical relevance of the Non-Identity Problem (NIP) for our climate change-related duties? Climate change and the NIP are often discussed together, but there is surprisingly little work on the practical relevance of the NIP for the ethics of climate change. The central claim of this article is that the NIP makes a relatively minor difference to our climate change-related duties even if we pursue what has become known as the ‘bite the bullet’ strategy: endorse a person-affecting view threatened by the NIP and not modify it in such a way as to evade the NIP. In particular I will argue that a harm-based view can justify the big-picture call for action emerging from the field of climate ethics. The key to reaching this conclusion is pointing out the consequences of our climate change-related decisions for people whose existence does not depend on these very decisions.


Author(s):  
Sarah E. Fredericks

A vignette about environmentalist Colin Beavan’s experience of and reflection on environmental guilt and shame introduces the texture of these moral emotions experienced by many everyday environmentalists and sets the stage for the ensuing analysis. Taking this moral experience seriously reveals underexplored motivations and hindrances to environmental action, guilt, and shame. Reflection on these moral emotions challenges many modern ethical assumptions and forms the basis of the three main ethical arguments of the book: that collectives as well as individuals have guilt, shame, and responsibility; that some individuals and collectives should feel guilt and shame for environmental degradation including climate change; and that, given the consequences of guilt and shame, they should not be intentionally induced unless a number of conditions, which can be fostered through rituals, are met. These conditions are also necessary to respond to unintentionally elicited guilt and shame. To set the stage for these theoretical and practical arguments, the Introduction names the ethical values which influence the text and the disciplinary resources from social psychology; ethical pragmatism; virtue ethics; and religious studies, especially ritual theory, used in the project. It also delineates the scope of the book as the Western developed world, particularly the United States, and environmental guilt and shame, of which climate change is the main example.


2019 ◽  
Vol 158 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 345-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heidi Hendersson ◽  
Christine Wamsler

AbstractSustainability philosophers claim that we are at an impasse of stories, finding ourselves in a blank chapter between the old and the new. The old story, characterized by separation, technological dominance and human superiority over nature, is unfolding in an ecological crisis giving space for a new narrative defined by inter-being, cooperation and balance. It has been put forward that this crisis is climate change, a phenomenon that epitomizes the old, while holding the potential to act as a bridge to the new. Our study shows the benefits of framing climate change as a problem of story and how the dominant story we have told about climate change can be changed. Based on an approach called “Rising strong”, we address the question of how sustainability students relate to the story on climate change, how they conceptualize and situate it within a bigger narrative, and identify barriers and catalysts for authorship. The results show a clear lack of personal authorship, a feeling of disconnection to the climate story and a disbelief in any revolutionary endings, yet still a slight belief in co-authorship. Catalysts that can help to claim back authorship were identified to be positive emotions (e.g., empathy and hope), integral thinking, creation of space for creativity and co-creation. Barriers were scientific rationality and complexity alongside perceived negative emotions, such as shame and self-doubt. One of the most crucial findings was the re-occurring theme of joint engagement for story-transitioning. This point to the urgent need for both increased co-creation as well as the creation of conditions needed to enable people to engage in such processes.


2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 283-296
Author(s):  
J. Spencer Atkins ◽  

Much of the climate ethics discussion centers on considerations of compensatory justice and historical accountability. However, little attention is given to supporting and defending the Beneficiary Pays Principle as a guide for policymaking. This principle states that those who have benefitted from an instance of harm have an obligation to compensate those who have been harmed. Thus, this principle implies that those benefitted by industrialization and carbon emission owe compensation to those who have been harmed by climate change. Beneficiary Pays is commonly juxtaposed with Polluter Pays Principle and the Ability to Pay Principle in the relevant literature. Beneficiary Pays withstands objections that raise suspicion for the latter two.


2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 448-453 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Zahn ◽  
K.E. Lythe ◽  
J.A. Gethin ◽  
S. Green ◽  
J.F.W. Deakin ◽  
...  

AbstractBackground:One influential view is that vulnerability to major depressive disorder (MDD) is associated with a proneness to experience negative emotions in general. In contrast, blame attribution theories emphasise the importance of blaming oneself rather than others for negative events. Our previous exploratory study provided support for the attributional hypothesis that patients with remitted MDD show no overall bias towards negative emotions, but a selective bias towards emotions entailing self-blame relative to emotions that entail blaming others. More specifically, we found a decreased proneness for contempt/disgust towards others relative to oneself (i.e. self-contempt bias). Here, we report a definitive test of the competing general negative versus specific attributional bias theories of MDD.Methods:We compared a medication-free remitted MDD (n = 101) and a control group (n = 70) with no family or personal history of MDD on a previously validated experimental test of moral emotions. The task measures proneness to specific emotions associated with different types of self-blame (guilt, shame, self-contempt/disgust, self-indignation/anger) and blame of others (other-indignation/anger, other-contempt/disgust) whilst controlling for the intensity of unpleasantness.Results:We confirmed the hypothesis that patients with MDD exhibit an increased self-contempt bias with a reduction in contempt/disgust towards others. Furthermore, they also showed a decreased proneness for indignation/anger towards others.Conclusions:This corroborates the prediction that vulnerability to MDD is associated with an imbalance of specific self- and other-blaming emotions rather than a general increase in negative emotions. This has important implications for neurocognitive models and calls for novel focussed interventions to rebalance blame in MDD.


2020 ◽  
pp. 155-160
Author(s):  
Paniel Reyes Cárdenas

I propose in this critical note to reintegrate the place of moral emotions in the space of reasons by establishing a conception of moral conscience as a high degree of consciousness following Hegel’s ideas on consciousness. The space is significantly enlarged by the emotions of empathy, guilt, shame and compassion, these emotions allow us to bring to consciousness reflective control without jettisoning away negative emotions contrary to these, and, then, in such space we increase reflective control relative to our moral lives.


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-84
Author(s):  
W Kelbessa

In this article, I use case studies from some African countries to determine whether or not African climate management policies have been guided by ethical principles. I argue that although climate change is fundamentally an ethical issue, African policymakers have not paid sufficient attention to ethical principles in this regard. I argue that the major ethical principles embodied in different African traditions can assist African and non-African countries to address the challenges occasioned by climate change. Finally, I suggest that technological societies whose current emissions most exceed their fair share of emissions ought to give attention to justice, and play their respective roles in averting the most extreme effects of climate change. KeywordsAfrican ethics, climate ethics, climate change, climate policy, inter-generational justice


Author(s):  
Casey Rentmeester

Anthropogenic climate change has become a hot button issue in the scientific, economic, political, and ethical sectors. While the science behind climate change is clear, responses in the economic and political realms have been unfulfilling. On the economic front, companies have marketed themselves as pioneers in the quest to go green while simultaneously engaging in environmentally destructive practices and on the political front, politicians have failed to make any significant global progress. I argue that climate change needs to be framed as an ethical issue to make serious progress towards the path to a sustainable human civilization. In an effort to motivate the urgency needed to confront climate change, I argue that climate change seriously affects human beings living here and now, and if one cares about unnecessarily harming fellow innocent living human beings, then one should care about one’s own environmental impact related to climate change. Since this argument does not depend upon any specific philosophical, religious, or ethical tradition but applies regardless of one’s particular background, I hope to induce genuine concern among all human beings regarding this issue.


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