Belief First

2021 ◽  
pp. 20-34
Author(s):  
Franz Huber

This chapter first discusses which agents this book focuses on and which ends they are assumed to have. Then it briefly describes how this relates to conditional belief and belief revision.

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 861-891 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERIC RAIDL

AbstractStandard conditionals $\varphi > \psi$, by which I roughly mean variably strict conditionals à la Stalnaker and Lewis, are trivially true for impossible antecedents. This article investigates three modifications in a doxastic setting. For the neutral conditional, all impossible-antecedent conditionals are false, for the doxastic conditional they are only true if the consequent is absolutely necessary, and for the metaphysical conditional only if the consequent is ‘model-implied’ by the antecedent. I motivate these conditionals logically, and also doxastically by properties of conditional belief and belief revision. For this I show that the Lewisian hierarchy of conditional logics can be reproduced within ranking semantics, provided we slightly stretch the notion of a ranking function. Given this, acceptance of a conditional can be interpreted as a conditional belief. The epistemic and the neutral conditional deviate from Lewis’ weakest system $V$, in that ID ($\varphi > \varphi$) or even CN ($\varphi > \top$) are dropped, and new axioms appear. The logic of the metaphysical conditional is completely axiomatised by $V$ to which we add the known Kripke axioms T5 for the outer modality. Related completeness results for variations of the ranking semantics are obtained as corollaries.


Author(s):  
Gabriele Kern-Isberner ◽  
Christoph Beierle ◽  
Gerhard Brewka

Syntax splitting, first introduced by Parikh in 1999, is a natural and desirable property of KR systems. Syntax splitting combines two aspects: it requires that the outcome of a certain epistemic operation should only depend on relevant parts of the underlying knowledge base, where relevance is given a syntactic interpretation (relevance). It also requires that strengthening antecedents by irrelevant information should have no influence on the obtained conclusions (independence). In the context of belief revision the study of syntax splitting already proved useful and led to numerous new insights. In this paper we analyse syntax splitting in a different setting, namely nonmonotonic reasoning based on conditional knowledge bases. More precisely, we analyse inductive inference operators which, like system P, system Z, or the more recent c-inference, generate an inference relation from a conditional knowledge base. We axiomatize the two aforementioned aspects of syntax splitting, relevance and independence, as properties of such inductive inference operators. Our main results show that system P and system Z, whilst satisfying relevance, fail to satisfy independence. C-inference, in contrast, turns out to satisfy both relevance and independence and thus fully complies with syntax splitting.


2020 ◽  
pp. 155-179
Author(s):  
Scott Sturgeon

Chapter 5 is an introduction to the AGM model of belief revision. It begins with an explanation of belief and how sets of sentences are used to model psychological states of an agent. The model’s norms are shown to flow directly from Jamesian ideas that inquiry targets truth and the avoidance of error. Suspended judgement and disbelief are discussed, and the model’s treatment of them is used to spell out its transition rules. Slowly and carefully the main technical idea in the model’s transition theory—known as ‘partial meet contraction’—is explained for the beginner. The model’s postulates are then listed, its revision theorem is explained, and its approach to conditional belief is spelled out. The chapter closes by describing a notionally possible agent, Bella, whose psychology matches the Belief Model.


Author(s):  
Franz Huber

This book is the first of two volumes on belief and counterfactuals. It consists of six of a total of eleven chapters. The first volume is concerned primarily with questions in epistemology and is expository in parts. Among other theories, it provides an accessible introduction to belief revision and ranking theory. Ranking theory specifies how conditional beliefs should behave. It does not tell us why they should do so nor what they are. This book fills these two gaps. The consistency argument tells us why conditional beliefs should obey the laws of ranking theory by showing them to be the means to attaining the end of holding true and informative beliefs. The conditional theory of conditional belief tells us what conditional beliefs are by specifying their nature in terms of non-conditional belief and counterfactuals. In addition, the book contains several novel arguments, accounts, and applications. These include an argument for the thesis that there are only hypothetical imperatives and no categorical imperatives; an account of the instrumentalist understanding of normativity, or rationality, according to which one ought to take the means to one’s ends; as well as solutions to the problems of conceptual belief change, logical learning, and learning conditionals. A distinctive feature of the book is its unifying methodological approach: means-end philosophy. Means-end philosophy takes serious that philosophy is a normative discipline, and that philosophical problems are entangled with each other. It also explains the importance of logic to philosophy, without being a technical theory itself.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Bonawitz ◽  
Patrick Shafto ◽  
Yue Yu ◽  
Sophie Elizabeth Colby Bridgers ◽  
Aaron Gonzalez

Burgeoning evidence suggests that when children observe data, they use knowledge of the demonstrator’s intent to augment learning. We propose that the effects of social learning may go beyond cases where children observe data, to cases where they receive no new information at all. We present a model of how simply asking a question a second time may lead to belief revision, when the questioner is expected to know the correct answer. We provide an analysis of the CHILDES corpus to show that these neutral follow-up questions are used in parent-child conversations. We then present three experiments investigating 4- and 5-year-old children’s reactions to neutral follow-up questions posed by ignorant or knowledgeable questioners. Children were more likely to change their answers in response to a neutral follow-up question from a knowledgeable questioner than an ignorant one. We discuss the implications of these results in the context of common practices in legal, educational, and experimental psychological settings.


Noûs ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilbert Harman
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