scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Promoting Industrial Internet Platforms to Empower Manufacturing SMEs through Value Cocreation Cooperation

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Dongdong Li ◽  
Chunfa Li ◽  
Runde Gu
Keyword(s):  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Network Externality ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Customer Churn ◽  
Evolutionary Equilibrium ◽  
Industrial Internet ◽  
Value Cocreation

A good partnership is conducive to promoting the empowerment of manufacturing small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) via industrial Internet platforms. By analyzing the factors influencing the cooperation motives of both parties and individual behavior, this paper puts forward the design of a cost-sharing and scale revenue-sharing mechanism and establishes an evolutionary game model. Then, the evolutionary stability strategies (ESSs) of individuals and the evolutionary equilibrium state of the system are analyzed. The results show that the key factors affecting the strategic choices of industrial Internet platforms and manufacturing SMEs are different and will change with the number of platform customers and the level of digitalization of enterprises. By sharing the access cost of SMEs and the scale revenue of the platform, mutual trust between the two parties can be enhanced, and SMEs will be more motivated to access the platform. Moreover, the platform network externality, customer churn risk, and cost-sharing ratio have different influences on the process of reaching evolutionary equilibrium in the system. Collaborative revenue expectations are critical to the behavioral strategies of both parties. In comprehensive consideration of the results of this study, it is recommended that industrial Internet platforms be subsidized in the initial stage of cooperation.

scholarly journals Game Analysis of the Multiagent Evolution of Existing Building Green Retrofitting from the Perspective of Green Credit

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Liwen Chen ◽  
Mengjia Zhang ◽  
Shiwen Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Existing Building ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Service Companies ◽  
The Government

Existing building green retrofitting can reduce building energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, which is conducive to the sustainable development of the construction industry. The financing dilemma of the existing building green retrofitting hinders the large-scale development of green retrofitting in China. This paper establishes the perceived payoff matrix and evolutionary game model of the government, Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), banks, and owners. Through simulation analysis, the primary factors affecting the choice of game strategy and the stable strategy under different conditions are discussed. The results show that the strategic choices of the government, ESCOs, banks, and owners influence each other in the two game models. Government regulations will have an impact on the strategic choices of ESCOs, banks, and owners. The owners’ strategy choice is closely related to the perceived benefits and costs of retrofitting. Based on the results, corresponding suggestions are proposed to provide theoretical support for the development of the existing building green retrofitting market.

scholarly journals Research on the Coordination Mechanism of Value Cocreation of Innovation Ecosystems: Evidence from a Chinese Artificial Intelligence Enterprise

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Yu Chen ◽  
Yantai Chen ◽  
Yanlin Guo ◽  
Yanfei Xu
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Excess Return ◽  
Return Rate ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Innovation Ecosystems ◽  
Coordination Costs ◽  
Value Cocreation ◽  
The Cost

This paper models the game process of the value cocreation of enterprises based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The factors influencing value cocreation are found through mathematical analysis. Taking iFLYTEK as an example, a representative enterprise of artificial intelligence (AI) in China, six factors affecting value cocreation are verified, which are the excess return rate, the distribution coefficient of the excess return rate, coordination costs in the system, the cost-sharing coefficient, imitation costs, and penalties. These six factors have a profound impact on value cocreation in the ecosystem. Through the case study of iFLYTEK, it is concluded that innovation ecosystems can enable small- and medium-sized AI enterprises to grow. In order to build a sound ecosystem, we need to establish a mechanism to select partners, reduce the costs of cooperation, and strengthen the protection of intellectual property. At the beginning of the cooperation, it is necessary to establish a mechanism with clear responsibilities, rights, and interests. The conclusion is of great significance to the development of AI enterprises.

scholarly journals A Tripartite Analysis of Online Healthcare Platforms: Evidence from Spring Rain Doctor in China

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xia Cao ◽  
Lanting Zhang ◽  
Dan Lv ◽  
Weijia Li ◽  
Zeyu Xing
Keyword(s):  
Medical Treatment ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Healthcare Services ◽  
Cross Infection ◽  
Time Cost ◽  
Information Protection ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
New Form ◽  
Evaluation Mechanism ◽  
The Cost

Abstract Background Online healthcare platform (OHP) is a new form of medical treatment, which solves the problems of unbalanced distribution of medical resources and expensive medical treatment in China. Especially under the epidemic of COVID-19, OHP has greatly reduced the medical pressure of the hospital and the risk of cross infection. Methods This paper uses evolutionary game theory to analyze behavioral strategies and their dynamic evolution in the promotion of OHP, and then numerical simulations are carried out with the help of program compilation. Results The results demonstrate that: (1) both the stricter qualification inspection of doctors and the more investment in information protection promote the participation of doctors and the use of patients; (2) with a higher initial probability of doctors joining, the possibility for patients in using OHP and platforms to provide standardized online healthcare services becomes higher; (3) if the initial probability of patients using is higher, the possibility for doctors to participate OHP and platforms to provide standardized online healthcare services raises; (4) the trend of doctors joining the platform is affected by factors, such as registration cost, time cost, reputation loss and so on; (5) the tendency of patients in using online healthcare is mainly decided by the cost. Conclusions Based on theoretical analysis, this article takes the Spring Rain Doctor OHP as an example to verify the game results. Therefore, OHP should attach importance to the inspection of doctors and the protection of privacy information, and strengthen the publicity in remote places. At the same time OHP can promote the active participation of grassroots doctors, and set a reasonable evaluation mechanism, so as to popularize online medical treatment among patients further.

scholarly journals Effective Boundary of Innovation Subsidy: Searching by Stochastic Evolutionary Game Model

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 1531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junqiang Li ◽  
Jingyi Yi ◽  
Yingmei Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Random Disturbance ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
The Public ◽  
Effective Boundary ◽  
Reasonable Range ◽  
Value Range ◽  
Cooperation Strategy ◽  
Multiple Variables

Relationship between innovation subsidies and corporate strategic choices has been extensively studied. Public innovation subsidies are by no means a certain value, existing in the form of an effective range instead. This means that the public innovation subsidies existing within the reasonable range can achieve the same incentive effect. So, what is the reasonable range or the effective boundaries of public innovation subsidies to promote enterprises that adopt cooperation strategies? There is no definite answer. Based on classical game theory, a stochastic evolutionary game model is proposed in this paper, which takes into account the influence of random disturbance on the strategy evolution process. An effective boundary of public innovation subsidy is provided as the main contribution based on a mature game scenario. A set of experimental data is subsequently selected as the sample for numerical simulation and result verification. The results showed that the probability of noncooperation within the effective value range will successfully converge to zero, which also means that the agents will adopt a collaborative cooperation strategy. The regulation effect of the combination of multiple variables is also discussed.

scholarly journals Effects of Informal Contracts on Innovative Cooperation among Enterprises in Industrial Clusters: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Han ◽  
Guohong Chen ◽  
Elena Poh
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Development ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Industrial Cluster ◽  
Industrial Clusters ◽  
Network Externality ◽  
Industrial Agglomeration ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Informal Contracts ◽  
Credit Network

Industrial cluster theory has important guiding significance for regional industrial development and industrial agglomeration advantages. Cooperation among enterprises is the corner stone of industrial clusters. The purpose of the paper is to explore the effects of cluster informal contracts on cluster enterprises and the behavior of external partners. Based on the dynamic evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a model, which incorporates several main factors influencing the innovative cooperation among local and external cluster enterprises. By calculating the replicator dynamics equations and analyzing the evolutionary stable strategies, this paper discusses the evolution process of cooperation strategies of enterprises in different situation. Furthermore, by using MATLAB software to simulate the model, this paper verifies the accuracy and reliability of the game model. Results show that, in addition to the formal market contract, effective implementations of cluster informal contracts can reduce opportunistic behavior in innovative cooperation among internal and external enterprises. Meanwhile, we should pay attention to strengthen the external innovative cooperation, increase severity of penalties, enhance the credit network externality, and avoid the relevant risks. The paper enriches our understanding about how informal contracts can help promote and cultivate good cooperative order in innovative cooperation of clusters.

Parental Self-Assessment of Behavioral Effectiveness in Young Children and Views on Corporal Punishment in an Academic Pediatric Practice

2018 ◽  
Vol 57 (10) ◽  
pp. 1183-1190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lance B. Irons ◽  
Heidi Flatin ◽  
Maya T. Harrington ◽  
Turaj Vazifedan ◽  
John W. Harrington
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Corporal Punishment ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Behavioral Management ◽  
Pediatric Practice ◽  
Self Assessment ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Parental Confidence ◽  
Behavioral Techniques ◽  
Parental Level

This article assesses parental confidence and current behavioral techniques used by mostly African American caregivers of young children in an urban Southeastern setting, including their use and attitudes toward corporal punishment (CP). Two hundred and fifty parental participants of children aged 18 months to 5 years completed a survey on factors affecting their behavioral management and views on CP. Statistical analysis included χ2 test and logistic regression with confidence interval significance determined at P <.05. Significant associations of CP usage were found in parents who were themselves exposed to CP and parental level of frustration with child disobedience. A total of 40.2% of respondents answered that they had not received any discipline strategies from pediatricians and 47.6% were interested in receiving more behavioral strategies. Clear opportunities exist for pediatricians to provide information on evidence-based disciplinary techniques, and these discussions may be facilitated through the creation of a No Hit Zone program in the pediatric practice.

scholarly journals Explanation and Analysis of the Interaction between Environmental Health Officers and Directors of Food Preparation, Supply and Distribution Centers Based on Game Theory Model in Yazd

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohsen Pakdaman ◽  
Mohammad Taghi Ghaneian ◽  
Mohammad Hassan Ehrampoush ◽  
Vahid Jafari Nodoshan ◽  
Ebrahim Gholami Zarchi
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Environmental Health ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Food Preparation ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Monitoring And Control ◽  
Distribution Centers ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Quantitative Phase ◽  
Supply And Distribution

Introduction: Health monitoring and control of food preparation, supply and distribution centers are the responsibility of environmental health officers. Therefore, the present study was conducted to explain the interaction between environmental health officers and providers of food preparation based on the game theory model. Materials and Methods: This research is a descriptive-analytical study in which after the determination of effective factors on the interaction between officers and directors, the so-called 22 games were designed and for each game four behavioral strategies determined and strategies identified as a two-choice I agree, I disagree questionnaire provided to environmental health officers and directors of food preparation, centers to select their desired strategy.. In the quantitative phase, SPSS 22 was used to analyze the data collected by questionnaires in order to determine the percentage of response frequency to each question. Gambit software was used to analyze for determination Nash equilibrium of any Games. Results: In the present study, the factors affecting the interaction between environmental health officers and directors were categorized to 24 subcategories assigned to six categories, and in the quantitative phase, finally, 22 dominant behavior strategies were identified and the final benefit percentage of each actor was determined. Conclusion: Investigating selected strategies by directors suggests that there is a good fit between the rules and health behaviors among the directors. The emphasis on health inspection based on education and counseling and lack of acceptance of the activities of health self-reported companies by the directors and officers are the most important outcomes of this study

scholarly journals The Dynamic Game of Knowledge Hiding Behavior from Organizational Members: To Hide or Not to Hide?

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Fan Yang ◽  
Long Yang ◽  
Ping Li
Keyword(s):  
Negative Correlation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Stable Equilibrium Point ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Knowledge Leakage ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Innovation Ability ◽  
Hiding Behavior ◽  
Knowledge Hiding

In the era of the knowledge economy, it is urgent for organizations to solve the problem of knowledge hiding of internal members to accelerate the speed and efficiency of knowledge dissemination and innovation and adapt to rapid changes in the market. At present, research on knowledge hiding has received extensive attention from Western countries, but there are few relevant studies in China. Based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of second-level knowledge hiding of organizational members and analyzes the main factors affecting the stable equilibrium point using MATLAB numerical simulation. The results show that knowledge leakage risk is positively correlated with knowledge hiding. The ability of knowledge absorption and transformation is positively correlated with the behavior of knowledge hiding. There is a negative correlation between collaborative innovation ability and knowledge hiding. There is a negative correlation between knowledge stock and knowledge hiding. Only when the incentive reaches a certain level can organizational members be encouraged to give up knowledge hiding. This paper provides a more comprehensive and dynamic picture of the evolutionary game of knowledge hiding among members in the organization and provides a new idea of knowledge management for organizational managers.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document