scholarly journals Essay on Politica (Politics and Policy) Once Again

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 96-105
Author(s):  
Andrzej Czajowski

AbstractThough the term “policy” has already been discussed extensively before, it appears to be in need of a critical review in meaning and context. In this essay, the criticism stems from the term “policy of the law”, which was introduced into the political science literature over 120 years ago by Leon Petrażycki, the outstanding creator of psychological theory of the law and the only world-known Polish lawyer. The term itself is false and incorrect as it’s equal to the term “policy of the policy”. Law is a political phenomenon cocreating policy. In addition, the concept of policy of the law is characterised by idealism bordering on naivety. Because of the place of L. Petrażycki in Polish tradition of the theory of law, references to his concept of policy of the law are made constantly in an attempt to apply this concept in scientific and practical considerations. It is time to leave it to the domain of history of legal theory.Another criticism was brought about by the title of the third chapter of Polish Energy Law Act — “Energy Policy”. This entire act and a number of other legal acts regulating the acquisition of energy sources and energy management comprise energy policy. The energy policy also includes various types of programs, actions and decisions of the participants of energy policy. The criticism of the incompetent use of the term “energy policy” is an opportunity to stress the role of policy in the process of meeting human needs.Thirdly, the term “policy” is determined by discussing an element of its structure: political thought. The essay presents the role of political thought in relation to economy, culture, independence, systems and other domains of human activity. The understanding of political thought as a reflection on policy or views on policy is questioned here. Political thought is not a reflection about the policy. Instead, political thought is a political decision which cocreates policy. It is a postulative decision resulting from scientific or common reflection on policy.

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 513-523
Author(s):  
Leonid Yu. Kornilaev

Along with competing legal concepts of positivism and gnoseologism in the second half of the 19th century, a direction of legal psychology was formed, within which the psychological theory of law by the Russian and Polish lawyer L.I. Petrazhitsky takes a prominent place. L.I. Petrazhitsky's legal theory interprets the law as a mental phenomenon in a person's mind. The mental life forms the internal and external legal behavior. Studying the law becomes possible only by analyzing the subject's particular kind of emotional life - legal experience. Our focus on the individual's emotional world gives us reason to think of the theory as individualistic, i.e., close to the subject's mental life. At the same time, the Russian lawyer's psychological doctrine also gains explanatory potential for scrutinizing social life. It contains ideas that reveal such mechanisms of social functioning as the affirmation of the ideal of love as the ultimate goal of law-making, the priority of unofficial law in the life of society, and a specific interpretation of public and private law. The system of legal emotions is carried out on the social niveau and establishes such values as love and social order. The article reconstructs the main provisions of Petrazhitsky's psychological theory of law from the point of view of the interaction of its individual and social sides. The social potential of the Russian lawyer's theory appears capable of supplementing and explaining the ideas of socialism and sobornost discussed widely at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Petrazhitsky's individualistic doctrine appears as a flexible concept, capable of fitting organically into various philosophical and sociological contexts.


2018 ◽  
Vol 150 ◽  
pp. 05056
Author(s):  
Abdulrahman M.A.Albelahi ◽  
A. Ali ◽  
Faten Mohmed ◽  
Metwally Ali

Since the beginning, legal theory has concerned itself with the establishment of principles and precepts that govern the procedure of legal interpretation, from the initial stages of the judicial reasoning down to the promulgation of ruling and their implementation, Islam is a total way of life. Muslims are obliged to abide by the rules of Allah in every aspect of their lives, always and wherever they live. However, the actual rules of Allah as given in the Qur’an and the sunna are limited. The Qur’an contains only six hundred verses directly related to laws, and there are approximately two thousand hadiths. The function of interpretation is to discover the intention of the Lawmaker of the matter, therefore, interpretat primarily concerned with the discovery of that which is rot self-evident the objective of interpretation is to ascertain the intention c the Lawmaker with regard to what has been left unexpressed as a matter of necessary interference from the surrounding circumstances. Sometimes, the textual sources did not provide detailed guidelines in which to derive the law, and then the role of interpretation is important to determine the law. In Islamic law the role of Ijtihad undoubtedly important in order to meet new problems. But some of the Jurist contended that the role of Ijtihad had ended and we have to follow the rule that has been stated. An explanation given to this trend is that a point had been reached at which all essential question of law had been thoroughly discussed and further deliberation was deemed unnecessary. In Common law, man-made law and legislation are related to one another within a philosophy of law. Parliament makes law and it is the duty of the courts to give effect to them if properly enacted. While courts may rule that a particular statute or section is invalid for various reasons such as unconstitutionality, they cannot say, "We shall change this Act because it is not appropriate". That function belongs to Parliament (Wu Min Aun 1990: 120). So as in Islamic law, the Lawmaker is Allah S.w.t and the sacred text (Quran) is legislated due to His intention whereas Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad is enacted due to the Prophet's intention. Therefore, Ulama of Usul Fiqh, in making any Ijtihad, they are du y bound to be guided by Quran and Sunnah.


2021 ◽  
Vol specjalny (XXI) ◽  
pp. 729-740
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Szlachta-Kisiel

Determining the protective function of the norms of the pre-trial procedure in cases of pension and retirement benefits based on the aim and scope of the norms is not only possible but also necessary for a wider understanding of social insurance. The legal and teleological context plays the role of a determinant of the aim of a legal norm desired by the legislator and allows for the indication of exemplary institutions which, established by the legislator, perform a protective function. When norms are being examined through the prism of the psychological theory of law they show that social security law is a psychological phenomenon and should be subjected to a multidimensional study that will reveal the intended aim of the legislator. The protective function is also performed by a specific procedure model with the precisely defined boundaries of the function. From the sociological perspective, an undesirable goal is also important, unintended by the legislator, which is caused by the norms fulfilling the protective function, and which is visible from the conducted analysis.


Author(s):  
Paul Kelly

This chapter examines Jeremy Bentham's political thought. Bentham is both an advocate of laissez-faire and an interventionist, a liberal rationalist and an equivocally liberal thinker prepared to sacrifice the rights of individuals to the well-being of the multitude. His ideas remain contested from all quarters, yet the outline of his actual political thought remains obscure. This chapter defends an interpretation of Bentham as an important liberal thinker with a commitment to the role of government in defending personal security and well-being, but also with a strong scepticism about government as a vehicle for harm as well as good. It first provides a short biography of Bentham before discussing his psychological theory as well as his account of value and duty. It also explores Bentham's views on psychological hedonism, obligations and rules, sovereignty and law, and representative democracy. It concludes with an assessment of Bentham's complex relationship with liberalism.


1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (4) ◽  
pp. 613-645 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hilary Charlesworth ◽  
Christine Chinkin ◽  
Shelley Wright

The development of feminist jurisprudence in recent years has made a rich and fruitful contribution to legal theory. Few areas of domestic law have avoided the scrutiny of feminist writers, who have exposed the gender bias of apparently neutral systems of rules. A central feature of many western theories about law is that the law is an autonomous entity, distinct from the society it regulates. A legal system is regarded as different from a political or economic system, for example, because it operates on the basis of abstract rationality, and is thus universally applicable and capable of achieving neutrality and objectivity. These attributes are held to give the law its special authority. More radical theories have challenged this abstract rationalism, arguing that legal analysis cannot be separated from the political, economic, historical and cultural context in which people live. Some theorists argue that the law functions as a system of beliefs that make social, political and economic inequalities appear natural. Feminist jurisprudence builds on certain aspects of this critical strain in legal thought. It is much more focused and concrete, however, and derives its theoretical force from immediate experience of the role of the legal system in creating and perpetuating the unequal position of women.


wisdom ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 223-231
Author(s):  
Sergey ZAKHARTSEV ◽  
Viktor SALNIKOV

The article is devoted to the clarification of the essence of the law. The article examines the ontology of law, and the epistemology of law reflects the philosophical problems of law. The conclusion about the law as a contradictory social phenomenon is formulated. The article substantiates the theory of the comprehensive (all-encompassing) study of law as a philosophical and philosophical-legal theory, the purpose of which is characterized not in the justification of any one theory of law but in the comprehensive study of law, taking into account all available theories. The comprehensive theory allows us to look at the law philosophically, stating the different properties of the object, their manifestations and contradictions. The article argues that it is the philosophical attitude to the law that many scientists lack.


Author(s):  
Nimer Sultany

This chapter critiques the binary dichotomy between the concepts of “continuity” and “rupture” within theoretical conceptualizations of the law. Whereas legal theories such as Kelsen’s emphasize rupture, theories such as Dworkin’s emphasize continuity. These theories fail to account for legal continuity and rupture because the law is neither a gapless system nor a coherent whole. Building on the comparative study of the role of law during revolutions, the chapter shows that a revolution maintains varying levels of legal rupture and continuity with the pre-existing legal order. Building on critical legal theory and social theory, it argues that the relation between revolution and legality cannot be represented systematically because law—whether prior to or after the revolution—is incoherent and thus generates a plurality of voices.


2021 ◽  
Vol 118 ◽  
pp. 02019
Author(s):  
Aelita Mikhailovna Mongush

The purpose of the study is to determine the essence and role of the norms of customary law (customs) through a comprehensive historical-legal and comparative-legal analysis. The methodological basis of the research was such methods of scientific knowledge as: description and comparative-legal method, which enabled to reveal certain types of social norms, their particularities and characteristic features, as well as the historical-legal method and methods of analysis and synthesis. The result of the work was the conclusion that through the prism of customary law norms, the level of development of the state, the degree of independence of society from the state, as well as the state of legal culture is seen on the largest scale. In addition, the author considers a well-reasoned and proven conclusion that it is required to study customary law and customs to modernize legal theory. The work also gives the author’s definition of the category of “custom”: a custom is the established models of human behavior in society, which have developed in the course of their multifold repetition. The novelty of the research lies in the author’s approach to examining the relationship between customs and the theory of law, as well as in the fact that the norms of customary law and the custom appear to be independent and fundamental methods of social regulation in the system of social norms.


Author(s):  
Paul O'Connell

Law is crucial to the maintenance and reproduction of capitalism. While Marx never produced a comprehensive theory of law, state and rights, there is much in his work, and in the broader Marxist tradition, that can help us understand the nature and role of law in contemporary capitalism. This paper sketches out some of the key resources from within the Marxist tradition that can assist us in developing Marxist understandings of law, state and rights today. Specifically, the focus is on the question of method, drawing out three key strands from Marx's own work: (i) the importance of dialectical materialist analysis; (ii) the historically specific and transitory nature of capitalism and (iii) the centrality of class antagonism and class struggle. The argument advanced here, in sum, is that Marxist explanations of law, state and rights should foreground these analytical reference points, in order to make the role of law intelligible, and to begin to sketch how movements for fundamental social change might understand and engage with the law.


Author(s):  
Dmitry Aleksandrovich Savenkov

This article examines the nature and specificity of the criticism of psychologism as a theoretical-methodological orientation towards studying law and its interpretation, which in particular was associated with such version of interpretation of law as the “Pure Theory of Law” of Hans Kelsen. More in-depth representations of modern legal theory in understanding the patterns of law and its essential aspects requires the due coverage of the history of psychological and anti-psychological approaches towards law that form of the major oppositions in the development of legal though at the turn of the XIX – XX centuries. Multiple aspects of H. Kelsen's legal views are yet to be examined, including the correlation of his doctrine with other doctrines, as well as the nature of substantiation of law and the analysis of legal phenomena. The scientific novelty of lies in the fact that based on the analysis of legal views of the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen wirh his pronounced claim to exclude all “non-legal’ elements, it is revealed that a significant part of conceptual-logical apparatus of Kelsen’s teaching and the approaches towards substantiation of law were psychological in nature. Unlike the objective-idealistic positions of H. Kelsen, legal Neo-Kantianism was methodologically more accurate in elucidation of interrelation between the actual legal phenomenon and the role of gnoseological methods of perception and comprehension of law. The assessment of H. Kelsen’s doctrine as the theory of law is subject to criticism in this article, since in reality it is limited to the issues of legal methodology.


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