scholarly journals DSurvey: A Blockchain-Enhanced Survey Platform for the Data Economy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessio Bonti ◽  
Akanksha Saini ◽  
Thien Pham ◽  
Mohamed Abdelrazek ◽  
Lorenzo Pinto
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Application Framework ◽  
Distributed Ledger ◽  
Central Piece ◽  
Key Features ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Gathering Data ◽  
Central Data

The data economy is predicted to boom and become a 156B dollars business by 2025. In this demo we introduce the use of distributed ledger technologies (DLT) applied to digital surveys in order to create an ecosystem where data becomes a central piece of a complex economy. Our system allows for interesting key features; ownership, traceability, secure profiles, and anonymity where required. Also, the most important feature, is the incentive mechanism that rewards all participants, both users creating surveys and those answering the surveys. DSurvey (decentralized survey) is a novel application framework that aims at moving away from the large commercial data sink paradigm whose business is restricted to gathering data and reselling it. Our solution makes so that no central data sink exists, and it always belongs to the creator, who are able to know who is using it, and receive royalties.

scholarly journals A Game Model for Incentive Mechanism of Distributed Nodes in Supply Chains

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Jingjing Jiang ◽  
Aobo Lyu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Operation Mode ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Public ◽  
Digital Currency ◽  
Distributed Ledger ◽  
Distributed Ledger Technology ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Reward Mechanism

This study aims to solve the credit problems in the supply chain commodity and currency circulation links from the perspective of the ledger, while the game model method has been adopted. The research firstly reviews the relationship between distributed ledger technology and the essential functions of currency. Then, by constructing two-agent single-period and multi-period game models in the entire supply chain, the researchers analysed the incentive mechanism and equilibrium solution of distributed nodes of Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). The results of this study include the incentive mechanism and optimization of distributed nodes based on licensed distributed ledger technology, which is an important issue that CBDC faces when performing currency functions. The implications of this study mainly cover the limitations of the underlying technology of the public chain and its reward mechanism in the supply chain management and provide support for the rationality of the CBDC issuance mechanism based on state-owned commercial banks, which provides a reference for the CBDC practice. The main value of the research not only serves the decision-making department of the CBDC issuance but also provides ideas on the operation mode of digital currency for the field of digital currency research.

scholarly journals Cooperation Promotion from the Perspective of Behavioral Economics: An Incentive Mechanism Based on Loss Aversion in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks

Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiaqi Liu ◽  
Shiyue Huang ◽  
Hucheng Xu ◽  
Deng Li ◽  
Nan Zhong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Ad Hoc Networks ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
High Speed ◽  
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Mobile Ad Hoc Network ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Hoc Networks

As a special mobile ad-hoc network, Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) have the characteristics of high-speed movement, frequent topology changes, multi-hop routing, a lack of energy, storage space limitations, and the possible selfishness of the nodes. These characteristics bring challenges to the design of the incentive mechanism in VANETs. In the current research on the incentive mechanism of VANETs, the mainstream is the reward-based incentive mechanism. Most of these mechanisms are designed based on the expected utility theory of traditional economics and assume that the positive and negative effects produced by an equal amount of gain and loss are equal in absolute value. However, the theory of loss aversion points out that the above effects are not equal. Moreover, this will lead to a deviation between the final decision-making behavior of nodes and the actual optimal situation. Therefore, this paper proposed a Loss-Aversion-based Incentive Mechanism (LAIM) to promote the comprehensive perception and sharing of information in the VANETs. This paper designs the incentive threshold and the threshold factor to motivate vehicle nodes to cooperate. Furthermore, based on the number of messages that the nodes face, the utility function of nodes is redesigned to correct the assumption that a gain and a loss of an equal amount could offset each other in traditional economics. The simulation results show that compared with the traditional incentive mechanism, the LAIM can increase the average utility of nodes by more than 34.35%, which promotes the cooperation of nodes.

scholarly journals Research on incentive mechanism of benefit distribution in collaborative innovation of industry alliance

2021 ◽  
Vol 336 ◽  
pp. 09008
Author(s):  
Yue Li ◽  
Jiepeng Huang ◽  
Hang Guo ◽  
Zhuo Wang
Keyword(s):  
Return On Investment ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Logistic Function ◽  
Distribution Model ◽  
Risk Avoidance ◽  
Benefit Distribution ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Two Stages ◽  
And Behavior

In order to improve the performance of alliance collaborative innovation and stimulate members' willingness and behavior to participate in collaborative innovation, this paper puts forward the incentive mechanism of benefit distribution. This paper divides the needs of members to participate in collaborative innovation into two stages: "risk avoidance-return on investment". Firstly, an effective benefit distribution model is established by using Logistic function. Then, by building a game model, we can get the best effort. The results show that building the benefit distribution model of alliance collaborative innovation according to the different needs of alliance members can fully stimulate members to participate in collaborative innovation and improve the performance of alliance collaborative innovation.

Study on Incentive Mechanism of MRCTM Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on the Uncertainty Quality

2010 ◽  
Vol 108-111 ◽  
pp. 341-346
Author(s):  
Huang Ling
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Conversion Factor ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Incentive Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Optimal Analysis ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Product Recycling

In this paper, the MRCTM model of closed-loop supply chain was investigated. An effective incentive mechanism that considered the uncertainty quality of product recycling was designed by the introduction of brand conversion factor. The author made an optimal analysis of the incentive mechanism. Moreover, the influence of different parameters, such as quality and brand to the fixed reward and the unit incentive payment was analyzed and some useful results were obtained.

scholarly journals Analysis of Revenue Incentive Dynamic Mechanism of Financial Supply Chain from the Perspective of the Internet of Things

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Yue Yin
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Life Cycle ◽  
Influencing Factors ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Influencing Factor ◽  
Blockchain Technology ◽  
Supply Chain Finance ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Relationship Factors ◽  
The Internet Of Things

With the rapid development of society, all walks of life need the support of the Internet of Things, and the financial industry is no exception. This article integrates blockchain technology with supply chain finance and builds a supply chain financial alliance architecture based on blockchain technology and an underlying model of the Ethereum blockchain system suitable for supply chain finance. We innovated new supply chain finance models and operating mechanisms and proposed business scenarios for supply chain finance from the perspective of blockchain. Taking into account the actual operation of the blockchain supply chain financial platform, the principal-agent model and the incentive theory are applied, and the supply chain financial accounts receivable model is taken as an example in the case of complete information and incomplete information. The incentive mechanism between the service provider of the chain supply chain financial platform and the core enterprise promotes the better implementation of blockchain technology and supply chain finance. Based on the existing theoretical research, this paper identifies the key influencing factors of the supply chain’s cross-enterprise incentive mechanism. These influencing factors system includes two dimensions: transaction factors and relationship factors. Transaction factors include resource dependence, uncertainty, and cooperation experience; relationship factors include corporate reputation, trust level, and relationship commitment. Based on the nature of the incentive mechanism, information sharing and revenue sharing are extracted as the measurement dimensions of the supply chain’s cross-enterprise incentive mechanism. On this basis, this article draws on the existing enterprise life cycle division method and constructs a hypothetical model of the influencing factors of the incentive mechanism in the incubation period, the growth period, and the maturity period. Relevant data was collected through questionnaires, and SPSS and AMOS software were used to perform statistical analysis, reliability analysis, exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, and structural equation hypothesis testing on the data. The performance of each influencing factor in different stages of the enterprise’s life cycle and the importance of each influencing factor in the same life cycle stage are obtained.

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