Consistent Conjectural Variations Equilibrium in a Semi-mixed Duopoly

2020 ◽  
pp. 13-27
Author(s):  
José Guadalupe Flores Muñiz ◽  
Nataliya Kalashnykova ◽  
Viacheslav V. Kalashnikov ◽  
Vladik Kreinovich
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Conjectural Variations ◽  
Conjectural Variations Equilibrium

Conjectural variations equilibrium in a mixed duopoly

2009 ◽  
Vol 192 (3) ◽  
pp. 717-729 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vyacheslav Kalashnikov ◽  
Claudia Kemfert ◽  
Vitaly Kalashnikov
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Conjectural Variations ◽  
Conjectural Variations Equilibrium

scholarly journals Consistent Conjectural Variations Equilibrium in a Mixed Duopoly

2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 425-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nataliya I. Kalashnykova ◽  
◽  
Vladimir A. Bulavsky ◽  
Vyacheslav V. Kalashnikov ◽  
Felipe J. Castillo Pérez ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Demand Function ◽  
Market Price ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Demand Functions ◽  
Interior Equilibrium ◽  
Existence And Uniqueness Results ◽  
Uniqueness Results ◽  
Influence Coefficients ◽  
Conjectural Variations ◽  
Conjectural Variations Equilibrium

In this paper, we consider a model of mixed duopoly with Conjectured Variations Equilibrium (CVE). The agents’ conjectures concern the price variations depending on the increase or decrease in their production outputs. We establish existence and uniqueness results for the conjectured variations equilibrium (called an exterior equilibrium) for any set of feasible conjectures. To introduce the notion of an interior equilibrium, we develop a consistency criterion for the conjectures (referred to as influence coefficients) and prove the existence theorem for the interior equilibrium (understood as a CVE with consistent conjectures). To prepare the base for the extension of our results to the case of non-differentiable demand functions, we also investigate the behavior of the consistent conjectures in dependence upon a parameter representing the demand function derivative with respect to the market price.

Consistent Conjectural Variations Equilibrium in a Semi-Mixed Duopoly

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (7) ◽  
pp. 1125-A-17
Author(s):  
Vitaliy V. Kalashnikov ◽  
José G. Flores-Muñiz ◽  
Vyacheslav V. Kalashnikov ◽  
Nataliya I. Kalashnykova ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Convex Combination ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Private Company ◽  
Interior Equilibrium ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Optimal Value ◽  
Conjectural Variations ◽  
Social Surplus ◽  
The One ◽  
Conjectural Variations Equilibrium

This paper considers conjectural variations equilibrium (CVE) in the one item market with a mixed duopoly of competitors. The duopoly is calledsemi-mixedbecause one (semi-public) company’s objective is to maximize a convex combination of her net profit and domestic social surplus (DSS). The two agents make conjectures about fluctuations of the equilibrium price occurring after their supplies having been varied. Based on the concepts of theexteriorandinterior equilibrium, as well as the existence theorem for the interior equilibrium (a.k.a. the consistent CVE, or the exterior equilibrium withconsistent conjectures) demonstrated in the authors’ previous papers, we analyze the behavior of the interior equilibrium as a function of the semi-public firm’s level of socialization. When this parameter reflected by the convex combination coefficient tends to 1, thus transforming the semi-public company into a completely public one, and the considered model into the classical mixed duopoly, two trends are apparent. First, for the private company, the equilibrium with consistent conjectures (CCVE) becomes more attractive (lucrative) than the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Second, there exists a (unique in the case of an affine demand function) value of the convex combination coefficient such that the private agent’s profit is the same in both of the above-mentioned equilibrium types, thus making no subsidy to the producer or to the consumers necessary. Numerical experiments with various mixed duopoly models confirm the robustness of the proposed algorithm for finding the optimal value of the above-mentioned combination coefficient (a.k.a. the semi-public company’s socialization level).

scholarly journals Finding Consistent Conjectural Variations Equilibrium in a Human Migration Model

2015 ◽  
Vol 55 ◽  
pp. 1348-1353
Author(s):  
Vyacheslav Kalashnikov ◽  
Nataliya Kalashnykova ◽  
Felipe J. Castillo-Pérez
Keyword(s):  
Human Migration ◽  
Migration Model ◽  
Conjectural Variations ◽  
Conjectural Variations Equilibrium

Structure of demand and consistent conjectural variations equilibrium (CCVE) in a mixed oligopoly model

2014 ◽  
Vol 217 (1) ◽  
pp. 281-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vyacheslav V. Kalashnikov ◽  
Vladimir A. Bulavsky ◽  
Vitaliy V. Kalashnikov ◽  
Nataliya I. Kalashnykova
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Oligopoly ◽  
Oligopoly Model ◽  
Conjectural Variations ◽  
Conjectural Variations Equilibrium

scholarly journals Consistent Conjectural Variations Equilibrium In A Bilevel Human Migration Model

2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vyacheslav V. Kalashnikov ◽  
Nataliya I. Kalashnykova ◽  
M. Aracelia Alcorta Garcia ◽  
Yazmin G. Acosta Sanchez ◽  
Vitaly V. Kalashnikov
Keyword(s):  
Programming Model ◽  
Human Migration ◽  
Special Technique ◽  
Migration Model ◽  
Existence And Uniqueness Results ◽  
Uniqueness Results ◽  
Influence Coefficients ◽  
Conjectural Variations ◽  
Upper Level ◽  
Conjectural Variations Equilibrium

In this paper, we develop a bi-level human migration model using the concept of conjectural variations equilibrium (CVE). In contrast to previous works, here we construct a bi-level programming model. The upper level agents are municipalities of competing locations, whose strategies are investments into infrastructures of the locations (cities, towns, etc.). These investments aim at making the locations more attractive for both the residents and potential migrants from other locations. At the lower level of the model, the present residents (grouped into professional communities) are also considered as potential migrants to other locations. They make their decision where to migrate (if at all) comparing the expected values of the utility functions of the destinations and original locations, which are estimated by taking into account their group's conjectures concerning equilibrium migration flows between the involved locations. Applying a special technique to verify the consistency of the conjectures (influence coefficients), the existence and uniqueness results for the consistent conjectural variations equilibrium (CCVE) are established.

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