More on Equilibrium Credit Rationing and Interest Rates: A Theory with New Evidence

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Ying Wu
Author(s):  
David Stasavage

This chapter examines why access to credit was important for European states and provides extensive new evidence on the evolution of public credit across five centuries, from 1250 to 1750. The ability to borrow was critical in medieval and early modern Europe because it allowed states to participate in wars, either defensive or offensive. In order to better understand this fact, the chapter analyzes the movement that took place from compulsory to paid service for soldiers, along with opportunities to finance wars through current taxation. It also explains when states first borrowed long-term and measures the cost of borrowing, focusing on interest rates based on nominal rates at issue when these are available, and based on the fiscal proxy when they are not. The chapter highlights the difference between city-states and territorial states, with the former enjoying an apparent financial advantage that allowed them to begin borrowing earlier and to obtain access to lower-cost finance.


1995 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 405-420 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jo Anna Gray ◽  
Ying Wu

Author(s):  
Peter Winker

SummaryCredit rationing is often considered as the outcome of asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. The paper combines this aspect with a marginal price setting behavior of the banks. The resulting model describes adjustment processes between interbank rates, interest rates on deposits and on loans. Due to the non stationarity of the data, the model is estimated in error correction form allowing for distinguishing between short run dynamics and long run equilibrium. The derived hypothesis of a delayed adjustment of loan rates to changes in the interbank rates cannot be rejected with monthly data covering the sample 1975 to 1989.


1988 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Havrilesky

Abstract No abstract available.


2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 2719-2729 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahmoud Sami Nabi ◽  
Mohamed Osman Suliman

2004 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
FORREST CAPIE ◽  
MARK BILLINGS

Many commentators have contended that British banking lacked competition for much of the twentieth century. This article examines a range of evidence relating to English clearing banks in the middle decades of the century, when the banking ‘cartel’ was believed to be at its strongest. Data on interest rates charged and paid, rate spreads, profitability and expenses ratios, including new evidence from archival sources, are considered. Some propositions about cartels are supported, others contradicted, and some left unresolved. We conclude that the banking ‘cartel’ can be described as ‘soft’, rather than ‘hard’ – that is, one which agreed strict output quotas and profits shares among its members.


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