Power Sharing After Civil Wars: Matching Problems to Solutions

2022 ◽  
pp. 407-425
Author(s):  
Timothy D. Sisk
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Matching Problems

Bargaining Models of War and the Stability of Peace in Post-Conflict Societies

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margit Bussmann
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Theoretical Work ◽  
Time Inconsistency ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
Distribution Of Power ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Security Guarantees ◽  
Commitment Problems

A major challenge for countries that emerge from civil war is the stabilization of the post-conflict order in a way that fighting does not break out again. Recent empirical and theoretical work on the resolution of civil wars and on the duration of peace strongly rely on the bargaining framework of war emphasizing information asymmetries and commitment problems as main reasons for why in some states civil wars recur repeatedly, whereas in other societies a conflict ends and a transition to a peaceful society is successful. The length of peace spells depends partly on information about the distribution of power that became available during the conflict, captured by the duration and intensity of the fighting as well as the type of conflict ending. Information problems are more relevant at earlier stages and with regard to the initiation of negotiations. In finding bargaining deals and securing their implementation, the conflict parties have to overcome commitment problems. The literature has investigated in more detail third-party security guarantees and power-sharing arrangements as mechanisms to get conflict parties to credibly commit to and adhere to a negotiated agreement. Recently, empirical research moved beyond the conclusion of peace agreements to the study of their implementation. Particular challenges for a peaceful order are the demobilization of ex-combatants, which is aggravated by time-inconsistency problems, the timing of elections, and the redistribution of economic resources. Finally, solutions become more difficult in multiparty conflicts and if the armed groups are fragmented.

The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993

1995 ◽  
Vol 89 (3) ◽  
pp. 681-690 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roy Licklider
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Negotiated Settlements

We know very little about how civil wars end. Harrison Wagner has argued that negotiated settlements of civil wars are likely to break down because segments of power-sharing governments retain the capacity for resorting to civil war while victory destroys the losers' organization, making it very difficult to resume the war. An analysis of a data set of 91 post-1945 civil wars generally supports this hypothesis but only in wars over identity issues. Moreover, while military victories may be less likely to break down than negotiated settlements of identity civil wars, they are also more likely to be followed by acts of genocide. Outsiders concerned with minimizing violence thus face a dilemma.

scholarly journals Rethinking Conflict Resolution: Matching Problems and Solutions

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Talentino
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Traditional Methods ◽  
Regional Stability ◽  
Matching Problems ◽  
Problems And Solutions ◽  
Local Actors ◽  
State Actors

This paper addresses international conflict resolution and the disparity between the number of attempts at resolution and the number of successes. It argues that one flaw in efforts thus far has been a lack of understanding of local actors and motivations, leading to ineffective strategies for resolution. In regions where conflict crosses borders, contributes to the trend of politics, and involves mercenary sub-state actors, traditional methods of resolution may be ineffective. Purveyors of violence have little interest in the power-sharing and consensual politics that international actors often try to promote. They also have significant and negative effects on regional stability. This paper further addresses the need to reconsider approaches to conflict resolution, and the significance of taking better account of local circumstances in an effort to construct strategies to address them.

Part 4 Constitutionalism and Separation of Powers, 4.3 The Separation of Powers in a Fragmented State: The Case of Lebanon

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koch Cordelia
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Political System ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Religious Groups ◽  
Constitutional Development ◽  
Consociational Democracy ◽  
Traditional Family ◽  
Feudal Lord ◽  
Family Based

This chapter analyzes the Lebanese Constitution in the light of consociational democracy. It begins with an overview on the political system to highlight the formal consensus requirements based on affiliation with one of the main religious groups in the country. It examines the evolution of confessional power-sharing, which is supplemented by the traditional family-based feudal lord system. It then explores the historical interplay of state-building, civil wars, and existing political frictions which still contribute to what the Lebanese Constitution is about today. Next, the chapter outlines the constitutional development regarding consociational democracy, emphasizing the different consensus-mechanisms now incorporated in the written constitution. This shows how the Lebanese political system diverges from the classical Montesquieu system and creates its own separation of powers through consensus mechanisms.

Committing to Peace: Soft Guarantees and Alternative Approaches to Power Sharing in Angola and Mozambique

2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Brown ◽  
Marie-Joëlle Zahar
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Common Method ◽  
Credible Commitment ◽  
Material Resources ◽  
Commitment Problem ◽  
Alternative Power ◽  
Alternative Approaches ◽  
Peace And Development

This article analyses how alternative power-sharing mechanisms can be used to secure peace in countries where warring parties fail to reach a traditional power-sharing agreement, the most common method of solving the ‘credible commitment’ problem. By examining the cases of Angola and Mozambique, it demonstrates how ‘soft’ guarantees — in these cases, on the integration of armed forces and access to financial and material resources for rebel leaders — can help end civil wars. The non-binding nature of these pledges, however, also facilitated the ruling parties' progressive withdrawal from them, which has set back the democratisation process in both countries. This in turn may put at risk future peace and development.

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