The Containment Problem and the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality

2016 ◽  
pp. 113-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tyler Millhouse ◽  
Lance S. Bush ◽  
David Moss
Keyword(s):  
Containment Problem ◽  
Evolutionary Debunking

The Containment Problem

2020 ◽  
pp. 77-80
Author(s):  
Enrico Carlini ◽  
Huy Tài Hà ◽  
Brian Harbourne ◽  
Adam Van Tuyl
Keyword(s):  
Containment Problem

The Containment Problem: Background

2020 ◽  
pp. 71-75
Author(s):  
Enrico Carlini ◽  
Huy Tài Hà ◽  
Brian Harbourne ◽  
Adam Van Tuyl
Keyword(s):  
Containment Problem

scholarly journals Belief Pills and the Possibility of Moral Epistemology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Sinclair
Keyword(s):  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Truth ◽  
Recent Attempt ◽  
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Moral Judgements ◽  
Evolutionary Debunking ◽  
Evolutionary Explanations ◽  
Moral Facts

This chapter argues that evolutionary debunking arguments are dialectically ineffective. Such arguments rely on the premise that moral judgements can be given evolutionary explanations which do not invoke their truth. The challenge for the debunker is to bridge the gap between this premise and the conclusion that moral judgements are unjustified. After discussing older attempts to bridge this gap, this chapter focuses on Joyce’s recent attempt, which claims that ‘we do not have a believable account of how moral facts could explain the mechanisms…which give rise to moral judgements’. It argues that whether there is such an account depends on what it is permissible to assume about moral truth and that it is reasonable to make assumptions which allow for the possibility of at least partial moral epistemologies. The challenge for the debunker is to show that these assumptions are unreasonable in a way which does not render their debunking argument superfluous.

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