Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round SIMECK Variants

Results of Linear Cryptanalysis Using Linear Sieve Methods

IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences ◽

10.1587/transfun.e92.a.1347 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol E92-A (5) ◽

pp. 1347-1355

Author(s):

Yukiyasu TSUNOO ◽

Hiroki NAKASHIMA ◽

Hiroyasu KUBO ◽

Teruo SAITO ◽

Takeshi KAWABATA

Keyword(s):

Linear Cryptanalysis ◽

Sieve Methods

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Immunity of Lightweight DES Algorithm (DESL) Against Linear Cryptanalysis Attack

Menoufia Journal of Electronic Engineering Research ◽

10.21608/mjeer.2019.67380 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 28 (1) ◽

pp. 381-387

Author(s):

Bassam Aboshsha ◽

Mohamed Dessouky ◽

Rabie Ramadan ◽

Ayman EL-SAYED

Keyword(s):

Linear Cryptanalysis

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Non-Linear Approximations in Linear Cryptanalysis

Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’96 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science ◽

10.1007/3-540-68339-9_20 ◽

1996 ◽

pp. 224-236 ◽

Cited By ~ 44

Author(s):

Lars R. Knudsen ◽

M. J. B. Robshaw

Keyword(s):

Linear Cryptanalysis ◽

Linear Approximations ◽

Non Linear

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Zero-Correlation Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round SIMON

Journal of Computer Science and Technology ◽

10.1007/s11390-015-1603-5 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 30 (6) ◽

pp. 1358-1369 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Xiao-Li Yu ◽

Wen-Ling Wu ◽

Zhen-Qing Shi ◽

Jian Zhang ◽

Lei Zhang ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Linear Cryptanalysis ◽

Zero Correlation

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Crypto-Archaeology: unearthing design methodology of DES s-boxes

10.7287/peerj.preprints.3285v1 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Sankhanil Dey ◽

Ranjan Ghosh

Keyword(s):

Boolean Function ◽

Boolean Functions ◽

Design Methodology ◽

Block Cipher ◽

Block Ciphers ◽

Public Domain ◽

Differential Cryptanalysis ◽

Linear Cryptanalysis ◽

Strict Avalanche Criterion ◽

Independence Criterion

US defence sponsored the DES program in 1974 and released it in 1977. It remained as a well-known and well accepted block cipher until 1998. Thirty-two 4-bit DES S-Boxes are grouped in eight each with four and are put in public domain without any mention of their design methodology. S-Boxes, 4-bit, 8-bit or 32-bit, find a permanent seat in all future block ciphers. In this paper, while looking into the design methodology of DES S-Boxes, we find that S-Boxes have 128 balanced and non-linear Boolean Functions, of which 102 used once, while 13 used twice and 92 of 102 satisfy the Boolean Function-level Strict Avalanche Criterion. All the S-Boxes satisfy the Bit Independence Criterion. Their Differential Cryptanalysis exhibits better results than the Linear Cryptanalysis. However, no S-Boxes satisfy the S-Box-level SAC analyses. It seems that the designer emphasized satisfaction of Boolean-Function-level SAC and S-Box-level BIC and DC, not the S-Box-level LC and SAC.

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Multidimensional linear cryptanalysis with key difference invariant bias for block ciphers

Cybersecurity ◽

10.1186/s42400-021-00096-4 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 4 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Wenqin Cao ◽

Wentao Zhang

Keyword(s):

Time Complexity ◽

Block Ciphers ◽

Linear Cryptanalysis ◽

Compression Technique ◽

Key Recovery ◽

Linear Approximations ◽

Theoretical Advantage ◽

Multidimensional Linear ◽

Multidimensional Linear Cryptanalysis ◽

Key Recovery Attacks

AbstractFor block ciphers, Bogdanov et al. found that there are some linear approximations satisfying that their biases are deterministically invariant under key difference. This property is called key difference invariant bias. Based on this property, Bogdanov et al. proposed a related-key statistical distinguisher and turned it into key-recovery attacks on LBlock and TWINE-128. In this paper, we propose a new related-key model by combining multidimensional linear cryptanalysis with key difference invariant bias. The main theoretical advantage is that our new model does not depend on statistical independence of linear approximations. We demonstrate our cryptanalysis technique by performing key recovery attacks on LBlock and TWINE-128. By using the relations of the involved round keys to reduce the number of guessed subkey bits. Moreover, the partial-compression technique is used to reduce the time complexity. We can recover the master key of LBlock up to 25 rounds with about 260.4 distinct known plaintexts, 278.85 time complexity and 261 bytes of memory requirements. Our attack can recover the master key of TWINE-128 up to 28 rounds with about 261.5 distinct known plaintexts, 2126.15 time complexity and 261 bytes of memory requirements. The results are the currently best ones on cryptanalysis of LBlock and TWINE-128.

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