scholarly journals Two Kinds of Procedural Semantics for Privative Modification

Author(s):  
Giuseppe Primiero ◽  
Bjørn Jespersen
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Анатолий Мигунов ◽  
Anatoliy Migunov ◽  
Елена Лисанюк ◽  
Elena Lisanyuk

To overcome the crisis in the sphere of argumentation studies, the project proposes a logical-cognitive concept of argumentation which is a compound formalized theory that includes formalisms for modeling argumentation of different types, a relevant conceptual framework and a methodology for the use of scientific research in the practice. Three types of argumentation are defined: theoretical (two types) and practical. Theoretical argumentation is a critical discussion of the agents’ knowledge and opinions about facts aimed to substantiate a certain view or to change it – i.e. persuasion. Practical argumentation is a critical discussion of opinions about actions which includes, in addition to the statements about knowledge and opinions, statements of a non-descriptive nature about the agents’ values and intentions to adhere to a certain line of behavior. The study of argumentation needs to focus on the large structures that reflect specifics of the criticism and defense of the positions of the parties. An atom unit of such study is the argument as a statement of reason, while its molecular elements are the argumentative structure of a dispute (frame), a multitude of arguments that express the parties’ positions, a multitude of the agents’ knowledge and opinions that act as the bases for the formation of positions, lines of behavior, etc. Within the framework of this trend, both indefeasible (deductive) and defeasible argumentations can be studied. The argumentation effectiveness can be assessed based on the procedural semantics and using analogues of such logical notions as consistency and completeness. Modern approaches to the argumentation, including those claiming the compound status, can be classified using two methods: based on the substantive and practical criteria. Importance of the research outcomes amounts to the theoretical and methodological role of the new conception of argumentation and the general “umbrella” term argumentation that allows systematizing the manifold research and educational approaches and concepts in this field and is associated with communicative nature of modern social life where efficiency and social success rely on argumentative and narrative competences.


Author(s):  
Ned Block

According to conceptual role semantics (CRS), the meaning of a representation is the role of that representation in the cognitive life of the agent, for example, in perception, thought and decision-making. It is an extension of the well-known ‘use’ theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of a word is its use in communication and, more generally, in social interaction. CRS supplements external use by including the role of a symbol inside a computer or a brain. The uses appealed to are not just actual, but also counterfactual: not only what effects a thought does have, but what effects it would have had if stimuli or other states had differed. Of course, so defined, the functional role of a thought includes all sorts of causes and effects that are non-semantic, for example, perhaps happy thoughts can bolster one’s immunity, promoting good health. Conceptual roles are functional roles minus such non-semantic causes and effects. The view has arisen separately in philosophy (where it is sometimes called ‘inferential’ or ‘functional’ role semantics) and in cognitive science (where it is sometimes called ‘procedural semantics’).


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 (01) ◽  
pp. 3-30
Author(s):  
Signe Rix Berthelin ◽  
Kaja Borthen

AbstractThe paper proposes a refined analysis of the semantics and pragmatics of the Norwegian non-truth-conditional adverb jo ‘after all, of course’. According to the literature, jo indicates that the proposition is ‘given’ in some sense or other. Based on new empirical investigations, we argue that the Relevance-theoretic notion mutual manifestness (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995, Blass 2000) accurately captures the givenness aspect of jo, and we demonstrate through authentic examples what it means for a proposition to be mutually manifest. In addition to mutual manifestness, jo signals that the proposition is a premise for deriving a conclusion. The conclusion often – but not always – opposes someone’s view. We argue that the frequent opposition interpretations are a consequence of the nature of the procedures encoded by jo. In addition to clarifying the semantic and pragmatic properties of jo, the paper sheds light on the Relevance-theoretic notion procedural semantics as well as illustrating its usefulness in the study of pragmatic particles.


Cognition ◽  
1977 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 189-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip N. Johnson-Laird
Keyword(s):  

2001 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Powell

In this paper my aim is to approach the referential–attributive distinction in the interpretation of definite descriptions, originally discussed by Donnellan (1966), from a cognitive perspective grounded in Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95). In particular, I argue that definite descriptions encode a procedural semantics, in the sense of Blakemore (1987), which is neutral as between referential and attributive readings (among others). On this account, the distinction between referential and attributive readings arises as a result of the differing links that exist between different types of mental representation and the world, rather than as a result of the differing links between language and mental representations.


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