Exposure-Resilient One-Round Tripartite Key Exchange without Random Oracles

Author(s):  
Koutarou Suzuki ◽  
Kazuki Yoneyama
Keyword(s):  
2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 243-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zheng Yang ◽  
Junyu Lai ◽  
Wanping Liu ◽  
Chao Liu ◽  
Song Luo
Keyword(s):  

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junghyun Nam ◽  
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo ◽  
Junghwan Kim ◽  
Hyun-Kyu Kang ◽  
Jinsoo Kim ◽  
...  

Protocols for password-only authenticated key exchange (PAKE) in the three-party setting allow two clients registered with the same authentication server to derive a common secret key from their individual password shared with the server. Existing three-party PAKE protocols were proven secure under the assumption of the existence of random oracles or in a model that does not consider insider attacks. Therefore, these protocols may turn out to be insecure when the random oracle is instantiated with a particular hash function or an insider attack is mounted against the partner client. The contribution of this paper is to present the first three-party PAKE protocol whose security is proven without any idealized assumptions in a model that captures insider attacks. The proof model we use is a variant of the indistinguishability-based model of Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway (2000), which is one of the most widely accepted models for security analysis of password-based key exchange protocols. We demonstrated that our protocol achieves not only the typical indistinguishability-based security of session keys but also the password security against undetectable online dictionary attacks.


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