The Supervision Strategy Based on Evolutionary Game Between Government and Sharing Economy Enterprises of Beijing

LISS 2020 ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 351-360
Author(s):  
Dandan Li ◽  
Xiaochuan Li
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Sharing Economy

scholarly journals Dynamic Evolution of Safety Regulation of the Ridesharing Industry under Social Media Participation

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 560
Author(s):  
Qipeng Sun ◽  
Tingzhen Li ◽  
Fei Ma ◽  
Xiaozhuang Guo ◽  
Sijie Wang
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Sharing Economy ◽  
Model Solution ◽  
Social Regulation ◽  
Safety Regulation ◽  
Regulatory Issues ◽  
Safety Regulations

The emergence of ridesharing has spread against the background of the sharing economy. There have been a lot of controversies since the emergence of ridesharing, particularly regarding regulatory issues. The safety regulation of the ridesharing industry involves many parties, including governments, platform companies, and society at large. Currently, because of the influence of information asymmetry, it increases the uncertainty of governments’ regulation effect and the difficulty of making regulation measures. Meanwhile, social media, one of the most important forces of social regulation, has not paid enough attention to playing an appropriate role in the safety regulation of the ridesharing industry. Therefore, this study constructs an evolutionary game model between governments and platform companies that concerns the safety regulations of ridesharing passengers under social media participation. The influence path of social media is explored by model solution and numerical simulation. Our results indicate that social media participation has a positive impact on this safety regulation. Specifically, social media participation could reduce governments’ regulatory costs and encourage it to strictly regulate. The exposure of social media could bring losses to platform companies involved and promote platform companies’ investments in improving passengers’ safety. This study provides a decision basis for governments to introduce social media in the safety regulation of the ridesharing industry.

scholarly journals Exploring the Quantity Change Pattern of Environment-Friendly Products in the Sharing Economy

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Tianjian Yang ◽  
Ye Li ◽  
Yu Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Sharing Economy ◽  
Consumer Experience ◽  
Environment Friendly ◽  
Discrete Dynamic System ◽  
Change Pattern ◽  
The Relationship

In the practice of various Internet-based sharing economies, environmental issues of shared products become more prominent and urgent. By analysing the relationship among government, enterprises, and consumers, this paper develops a system dynamics model based on the evolutionary game theory to explore the quantity change pattern of environment-friendly products in a sharing industry. A discrete dynamic system simulation of the quantity change process takes shared bikes in Beijing as a case study. The simulation results are consistent with the analysis of evolutionary game theory. The results show that government subsidies to both enterprises and consumers can lead to higher quantities of environment-friendly shared products, while consumer subsidy is better than enterprise subsidy. In addition, governments and enterprises need to ensure moderate investments to improve consumer experience and environmental awareness.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Model with Punishment and Protection to Promote Trust in the Sharing Economy

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Chica ◽  
Raymond Chiong ◽  
Marc T. P. Adam ◽  
Timm Teubner
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Sharing Economy ◽  
Trust Model ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Initial Population ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Simulation Experiments

AbstractIn this paper, we present an evolutionary trust game, taking punishment and protection into consideration, to investigate the formation of trust in the so-called sharing economy from a population perspective. This sharing economy trust model comprises four types of players: a trustworthy provider, an untrustworthy provider, a trustworthy consumer, and an untrustworthy consumer. Punishment in the form of penalty for untrustworthy providers and protection in the form of insurance for consumers are mechanisms adopted to prevent untrustworthy behaviour. Through comprehensive simulation experiments, we evaluate dynamics of the population for different initial population setups and effects of having penalty and insurance in place. Our results show that each player type influences the ‘existence’ and ‘survival’ of other types of players, and untrustworthy players do not necessarily dominate the population even when the temptation to defect (i.e., to be untrustworthy) is high. Additionally, we observe that imposing a heavier penalty or having insurance for all consumers (trustworthy and untrustworthy) can be counterproductive for promoting trustworthiness in the population and increasing the global net wealth. Our findings have important implications for understanding trust in the context of the sharing economy, and for clarifying the usefulness of protection policies within it.

Conflicts between business and government in bike sharing system

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 463-487 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Yang ◽  
Yimei Hu ◽  
Han Qiao ◽  
Shouyang Wang ◽  
Feng Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Sharing Economy ◽  
Research Field ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Evolutionary Conflict ◽  
Bike Sharing ◽  
Conflict Handling ◽  
Conflict Outcomes

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the interactive conflicts between business and governmental authorities in the regulatory process of an emerging business model: sharing economy. Focusing on bike sharing system, the study also investigates the conflict-handling strategy of bike sharing companies and government regulation. Design/methodology/approach An evolutionary game model is introduced to illustrate the interactive conflict between bike sharing companies and government regulation, combined with system dynamics (SD) to simulate the evolutionary conflict-handling strategies between the two players. Findings The dynamic strategies of the two players are observed, and under five conditions the conflict outcomes are evolutionary stable states. Simulations show that each party sacrifices part of its interest and adjust its strategy according to that of the other, indicating the conflict-handling strategy as a compromising mode. Furthermore, the strategies of bike sharing companies are sensitive to additional operation and maintenance costs for producing low-quality bicycles and costs of positive regulation, which provides theoretical guidance for regulatory authorities. Originality/value The station-less bike sharing come up in China recently, and it is an important research field of entrepreneurship. Owing to the uniqueness and novelty of the phenomenon, conflicts and challenges exist during the regulation process. Thus, the study practically contributes to the conflict-handling strategies of businesses and government under the context of sharing economy. Methodologically, as a novel issue with less available data to carry out empirical research, this study combines evolutionary game theory with SD to shed light on the complex interactions between businesses and government. The research method can be applied to other entrepreneurial studies.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game between Government and Ride-Hailing Platform: Evidence from China

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qipeng Sun ◽  
Yuqi He ◽  
Yongjie Wang ◽  
Fei Ma
Keyword(s):  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Sharing Economy ◽  
Parameter Analysis ◽  
Internet Technology ◽  
Market Regulation ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
New Business ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability

The ride-hailing industry is a new business form that combines traditional taxi services with Internet technology and a sharing economy. However, after its emergence, countries have focused on finding ways to regulate this industry. The regulation of ride-hailing has gone through three stages: from denial of negation to laissez-faire and prudential supervision. This study focuses on the market regulation of the ride-hailing industry, discusses whether ride-hailing platforms require strict regulation under the current Internet setting, and provides evidence for this problem from the perspective of evolutionary game theory between the behavior of the government and the platforms. This study argues that both ride-hailing platforms and the government are evolutionary game players with bounded rationality, constantly adjusting their strategies through confrontation, dependence, and restriction. Therefore, this study constructs a two-dimensional game model between the government and ride-hailing platforms and analyzes the stability strategies of the two participants in different scenarios, to clarify the game behavior and the game return matrix. Assuming that loose government regulation and the standard operation of the ride-hailing platforms are the optimal Pareto equilibrium of the game system, the study concludes that this optimal equilibrium cannot be achieved under the current conditions. Through parameter analysis and sample simulation calculations, the system can be directed toward this equilibrium by reducing government supervision cost and increasing government punishment. This provides a theoretical basis for the government to regulate the ride-hailing industry from the perspective of quantitative analysis. Related implications are finally proposed, which can help the decision-makers better understand the regulation countermeasures of the government and ride-hailing platforms.

scholarly journals Social Energy as the Driving Force behind Crowdfunding—Analysis and Classification of Selected Attributes

Energies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (19) ◽  
pp. 6062
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Szewczyk ◽  
Zbigniew Stempnakowski
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Sharing Economy ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Cereal Products ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Original Algorithm ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

Crowdfunding has been part of sharing economy for a few decades. Research into crowdfunding usually concerns its relation to sustainable development and corporate social responsibility, influencing investment decisions, psychological, organizational and financial aspects or the success evaluation of individual campaigns or platforms. Recent research includes empirical case studies, e.g., evaluation of the crowdfunding for minor coarse cereal products through evolutionary game analysis, or the impact of crowdfunding on the willingness to visit local festivals. There is, however, no comprehensive cross-sectional approach to crowdfunding attributes that considers data from various categories. The authors aimed to analyze selected attributes of crowdfunding, namely project categories, the number of backers, campaign duration and profitability, and to classify these attributes. A novelty is the use of the term “social energy” in a different sense than previously found in the scientific literature. An original algorithm for analyzing and classifying selected crowdfunding attributes and measuring the relationship between them was also used. The value of the article is also the practical application of its results. The findings have a practical outcome: they can be used by project creators, potential backers, investors and owners of crowdfunding platforms.

Sharing Economy Questionnaire

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanna Lee ◽  
Sung-Byung Yang ◽  
Chulmo Koob
Keyword(s):  
Sharing Economy
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