Simplicity as a criterion of theory choice in metaphysics

2016 ◽  
Vol 174 (11) ◽  
pp. 2687-2707 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Brenner
Keyword(s):  
Theory Choice

scholarly journals Realism and the Epistemic Objectivity of Science

2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-20
Author(s):  
Howard Sankey
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Theory Choice ◽  
Relative Significance

Abstract The paper presents a realist account of the epistemic objectivity of science. Epistemic objectivity is distinguished from ontological objectivity and the objectivity of truth. As background, T.S. Kuhn’s idea that scientific theory-choice is based on shared scientific values with a role for both objective and subjective factors is discussed. Kuhn’s values are epistemologically ungrounded, hence provide a minimal sense of objectivity. A robust account of epistemic objectivity on which methodological norms are reliable means of arriving at the truth is presented. The problem remains that deliberative judgement is required to determine the relevance and relative significance of a range of methodological norms. A role is sketched for cognitive virtues which may be exercised in the course of the deliberative judgement.

scholarly journals Epistemology without guidance

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Hughes
Keyword(s):  
Normative Theory ◽  
Bayesian Epistemology ◽  
Theory Choice ◽  
Normative Epistemology

AbstractEpistemologists often appeal to the idea that a normative theory must provide useful, usable, guidance to argue for one normative epistemology over another. I argue that this is a mistake. Guidance considerations have no role to play in theory choice in epistemology. I show how this has implications for debates about the possibility and scope of epistemic dilemmas, the legitimacy of idealisation in Bayesian epistemology, uniqueness versus permissivism, sharp versus mushy credences, and internalism versus externalism.

Confirmational Holism and Theory Choice: Arrow Meets Duhem

Mind ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 129 (513) ◽  
pp. 71-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonora Cresto ◽  
Diego Tajer
Keyword(s):  
Theory Choice ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Arrow’S Theorem ◽  
Epistemic Virtues ◽  
Evidence Amalgamation ◽  
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Arrow's Theorem ◽  
The One ◽  
Different Sources ◽  
Positive Light

Abstract In a recent paper Samir Okasha has suggested an application of Arrow’s impossibility theorem to theory choice. When epistemic virtues are interpreted as ‘voters’ in charge of ranking competing theories, and there are more than two theories at stake, the final ordering is bound to coincide with the one proposed by one of the voters (the dictator), provided a number of seemingly reasonable conditions are in place. In a similar spirit, Jacob Stegenga has shown that Arrow’s theorem applies to the amalgamation of evidence; the ‘voters’ here are the different sources of evidence. As with Okasha’s proposal, it is not clear how to avoid Arrow’s pessimistic conclusion. In this paper we develop a novel argument that purports to show that, in typical examples, Arrow’s result does not obtain when dealing with evidence amalgamation. The reason is that we cannot escape the well-known Duhem problem: the evidence actually confirms (or disconfirms) complex conjunctions that include various auxiliary hypotheses. We argue that confirmational holism induces us to restrict the domain of a reasonable amalgamation function, thus violating one of Arrow’s conditions. The upshot is that we are now able to see the Duhem problem under a different, positive light – namely, as a phenomenon that makes the aggregation of the evidence possible in the first place, when there are at least three options on the table.

Theory Programs and Theoretical Problems

2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Berger ◽  
David Willer ◽  
Morris Zelditch
Keyword(s):  
Sociological Theory ◽  
Empirical Models ◽  
Theory Choice ◽  
Theoretical Research ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Research Programs ◽  
Is Theory ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Right

Some sociologists argue that sociological theory does not grow and the reason why it does not grow is that the discipline lacks a core of highly developed, almost universally accepted, paradigms; even worse, because it is reflexive, its criteria of problem and theory choice are so noncognitive that there are no paradigms, hence no progress, in its future. We do not question that sociology lacks a core of almost universally accepted paradigms, nor that highly developed paradigms may be a sufficient condition of theory growth, but we question both that universal acceptance of them is necessary and that sociology has nothing like them. We argue that theoretical research programs—sets of strategies, sets of interrelated theories embodying these strategies, and empirical models interpreting these theories—are sufficient for theoretical growth. An examination of three theoretical research programs in this article shows that they perform some of the same functions for theory growth as, in Kuhn, are performed by paradigms. Sociology may lack a universally accepted core, but there are theoretical research programs in sociology, and therefore already there is theory growth if it is looked for in the right place. Nor is there any warrant for the view that because its criteria of problem and theory choice are inescapably noncognitive, there are no paradigms, hence no progress, in sociology's future. If that were true, not only would sociology lack paradigms, but also theoretical research programs. We conclude from our study that sociology need not wait on the emergence of a universally accepted core. It is sufficient for the growth of theory that it develops further its existing theoretical research programs and that it encourages the creation of new programs.

Probability

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antony Eagle
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Evidence ◽  
Theory Choice ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Full Understanding ◽  
Probabilistic Judgment

Rather than entailing that a particular outcome will occur, many scientific theories only entail that an outcome will occur with a certain probability. Because scientific evidence inevitably falls short of conclusive proof, when choosing between different theories it is standard to make reference to how probable the various options are in light of the evidence. A full understanding of probability in science needs to address both the role of probabilities in theories, or chances, as well as the role of probabilistic judgment in theory choice. In this chapter, the author introduces and distinguishes the two sorts of probability from one another and attempt to offer a satisfactory characterization of how the different uses for probability in science are to be understood. A closing section turns to the question of how views about the chance of some outcome should guide our confidence in that outcome.

What Humeans should say about tied best systems

Analysis ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 80 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-282
Author(s):  
Christian Loew ◽  
Siegfried Jaag
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Theory Choice ◽  
Multiple Systems ◽  
Pragmatic Aspects ◽  
Scientific Standards

Abstract The Humean best systems account (BSA) identifies laws of nature with the regularities in a system of truths that, as a whole, best conforms to scientific standards for theory-choice. A principled problem for the BSA is that it returns the wrong verdicts about laws in cases where multiple systems, containing different regularities, satisfy these standards equally well. This problem affects every version of the BSA because it arises regardless of which standards for theory-choice Humeans adopt. In this paper, we propose a Humean response to the problem. We invoke pragmatic aspects of Humean laws to show that the BSA, despite violating some of our intuitive judgements, can capture everything that is relevant for scientific practice.

Probability

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antony Eagle
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Evidence ◽  
Theory Choice ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Full Understanding ◽  
Probabilistic Judgment

Rather than entailing that a particular outcome will occur, many scientific theories only entail that an outcome will occur with a certain probability. Because scientific evidence inevitably falls short of conclusive proof, when choosing between different theories it is standard to make reference to how probable the various options are in light of the evidence. A full understanding of probability in science needs to address both the role of probabilities in theories, or chances, as well as the role of probabilistic judgment in theory choice. In this chapter, the author introduces and distinguishes the two sorts of probability from one another and attempt to offer a satisfactory characterization of how the different uses for probability in science are to be understood. A closing section turns to the question of how views about the chance of some outcome should guide our confidence in that outcome.

Challenger through the Eyes of Feyerabend

1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul M. Dombrowski
Keyword(s):  
Social Constructionism ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Science And Technology ◽  
Theory Choice ◽  
Raw Data ◽  
Paul Feyerabend

Paul Feyerabend elucidated the role of prior adherence to scientific theory in shaping subsequent perceptions of data. Thus one's theory choice shapes data, rather than data shaping theory, as is traditionally held. Feyerabend's philosophy also downplays the role of raw data, emphasizing instead debate among competing theories. This iconoclastic philosophy yields important new insights into the Challenger disaster, insights consonant with yet distinct from those of social constructionism. We learn from it the salience of meaning rather than raw data; the powerful role of prior conceptualizations in shaping the data of experience; and the surprising need for debate and pluralism for the wholesome pursuit of science and technology.

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