A carbon tax or a subsidy? Policy choice when a green firm competes with a high carbon emitter

Author(s):  
Jeff Guo ◽  
Rongbing Huang
2018 ◽  
Vol 118 (1) ◽  
pp. 262-282
Author(s):  
Qing Liu ◽  
Senlin Zhao ◽  
Qinghua Zhu

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to extend game analysis to explore decision-making mechanisms for promoting a specific type of products, low energy consumption for individual one while the total energy consumption is huge due to the high quantity of sales, that is, low for individual and high for total (LIHT) in terms of energy consumption. Design/methodology/approach Game models are developed to compare decisions of optimal prices for newly developed and environmentally friendly (NDEF) and regular products as well as associated sales quantity, profits, carbon emissions under different governmental policies, along with a case of low energy-intensive broadband terminal products in the Chinese telecommunication industry under the carbon tax and subsidy policies. Findings For both NDEF and regular products, optimal prices decrease under the subsidy policy while both increase under the tax policy. Manufacturers’ decision of optimal prices is highly relevant with unit carbon tax/subsidy and the consumers’ preference. Both the tax and subsidy policies can improve consumption of NDEF products while the subsidy policy can be more effective at the current initial stage. Research limitations/implications This paper provides decision support for manufacturers to promote sustainable consumption of LIHT products. Research ideas on models development and solutions for optimal prices can be applied to other LIHT products. Practical implications The results provide insights for governments on how to effectively evaluate and motivate sustainable consumption for LIHT products. Originality/value This paper first explores how to motivate sustainable consumption of LIHT products by developing models, examining effectiveness of potential governmental policies as well as associated carbon emissions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Yang ◽  
Jingna Ji ◽  
Chenshi Zheng

Through the establishment of the leading manufacturer Stackelberg game model under asymmetric carbon information, this paper investigates the misreporting behaviors of the supply chain members and their influences on supply chain performance. Based on “Benchmarking” allocation mechanism, three policies are considered: carbon emission trading, carbon tax, and a new policy which combined carbon quota and carbon tax mechanism. The results show that, in the three models, the leader in the supply chain, even if he has advantages of carbon information, will not lie about his information. That is because the manufacturer’s misreporting behavior has no effect on supply chain members’ performance. But the retailer will lie about the information when he has carbon information advantage. The high-carbon-emission retailers under the carbon trading policy, all the retailers under the carbon tax policy, and the high-carbon-emission retailers under combined quotas and tax policy would like to understate their carbon emissions. Coordination of revenue sharing contract is studied in supply chain to induce the retailer to declare his real carbon information. Optimal contractual parameters are deduced in the three models, under which the profit of the supply chain can be maximized.


2020 ◽  
Vol 55 (6) ◽  
pp. 364-365
Author(s):  
Matilda Gettins

AbstractClimate communication is an essential step towards changing the rules. Policies with a large-scale impact on the economy and individuals, such as a high carbon tax, must be justified in terms of their proportionality.


Author(s):  
Dingzhong Feng ◽  
Lei Ma ◽  
Yangke Ding ◽  
Guanghua Wu ◽  
Ye Zhang

Considering the preference of green consumers for remanufactured products, a dual-sale-channel supply chain model with government non-intervention, government remanufacturing subsidy policy, and carbon tax policy is constructed, respectively. The difference of the optimal decision between the firm and the government under the two policies is discussed in this paper. Meanwhile, we analyze the influence of green consumers on the government’s optimal decision, based on social welfare maximization. It is found that without government intervention, social welfare is the lowest. The carbon tax policy is better when the proportion of green consumers and the environmental coefficient are extreme or moderate at the same time. Otherwise, the subsidy policy is better. The carbon tax policy is more effective than the subsidy policy in controlling carbon emissions. Profit-sharing contracts should be established by enterprises and governments to achieve win–win results.


Author(s):  
Biao Li ◽  
Yong Geng ◽  
Xiqiang Xia ◽  
Dan Qiao ◽  
Hao Wang

Authorized remanufacturing is an important means to achieve green manufacturing and carbon neutrality. In this study, a game theory model between a manufacturer and a remanufacturer was constructed to analyze the impact of government subsidies and carbon tax policies on authorized remanufacturing. Based on the game theory model, the effects of two government policies on the optimal solution, namely, the unit cost of remanufacturing product authorization and the waste product recovery rate, were compared and analyzed. This analysis could provide a reference for the government to improve and formulate relevant remanufacturing policies. The main results are as follows: government subsidy policies may increase the unit cost of remanufacturing product authorization and the rates of waste product recovery; government carbon tax policies may not affect the unit cost of remanufacturing product authorization, and increase the rates of waste product recovery; the government subsidy policy may not affect the unit retail price of new products, and reduces the unit retail price of remanufactured products; the government subsidy and carbon tax policies may reduce sales of new products and increase sales of remanufactured products; the government subsidies may increase the revenue of the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and the remanufacturer; and the government carbon tax policies may increase the revenue of the remanufacturer. However, government carbon tax policies increase the revenue of the OEM only when the new product carbon tax amount is higher than a certain threshold. The impact of the two policies on the environment is related to the ratio of the two products’ impact on the environment, i.e., the quota ratio between the unit government carbon tax of the new product and the unit government subsidy of the remanufactured product. Finally, the consumer surplus is maximized when the government adopts the subsidy policy and lowest when the government adopts the carbon tax policy.


Author(s):  
F. A. Khalid ◽  
D. V. Edmonds

The austenite/pearlite growth interface in a model alloy steel (Fe-1lMn-0.8C-0.5V nominal wt%) is being studied in an attempt to characterise the morphology and mechanism of VC precipitation at the growth interface. In this alloy pearlite nodules can be grown isothermally in austenite that remains stable at room temperature thus facilitating examination of the transformation interfaces. This study presents preliminary results of thin foil TEM of the precipitation of VC at the austenite/ferrite interface, which reaction, termed interphase precipitation, occurs in a number of low- carbon HSLA and microalloyed medium- and high- carbon steels. Some observations of interphase precipitation in microalloyed low- and medium- carbon commercial steels are also reported for comparison as this reaction can be responsible for a significant increase in strength in a wide range of commercial steels.The experimental alloy was made as 50 g argon arc melts using high purity materials and homogenised. Samples were solution treated at 1300 °C for 1 hr and WQ. Specimens were then solutionised at 1300 °C for 15 min. and isothermally transformed at 620 °C for 10-18hrs. and WQ. Specimens of microalloyed commercial steels were studied in either as-rolled or as- forged conditions. Detailed procedures of thin foil preparation for TEM are given elsewhere.


2001 ◽  
Vol 81 (12) ◽  
pp. 2797-2808
Author(s):  
Rustem Bagramov, Daniele Mari, Willy Benoi

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document