scholarly journals Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games

2006 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 336-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Gale ◽  
Hamid Sabourian
2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (2) ◽  
pp. 663-689 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephan Lauermann

Dynamic matching and bargaining games are models of decentralized markets with trading frictions. A central objective is to investigate how equilibrium outcomes depend on the level of frictions. In particular, does the trading outcome become Walrasian when frictions become small? Existing specifications of such games provide divergent answers. This paper presents a new characterization result for competitive allocations in quasilinear economies. The characterization result is used to investigate what causes these differences and to generalize insights from the analysis of specific matching and bargaining games. (JEL C73, C78, D82, D83)


2021 ◽  
pp. 126998
Author(s):  
Yuntao Wang ◽  
Lei Chen ◽  
Chenhui Hu ◽  
Zhengyu Zhang ◽  
Jia Chen ◽  
...  

1978 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
J W Byler ◽  
S Gale

A conception of the housing market as a lagged, dynamic matching process is presented as an alternative to the conventional microeconomic formulation. Various components of changes in occupancy patterns are identified, in a general multidimensional accounting framework, as a means for the structuring of observations of household and dwelling-unit characteristics of urban populations. Parameters for several stochastic models of housing-market phenomena are derived from the account-based representation. Finally, potential planning applications of these accounting frameworks are explored together with conditions for their adoption.


2002 ◽  
Vol 308 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 391-401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward W. Piotrowski ◽  
Jan Sładkowski
Keyword(s):  

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