The volatility of a new energy output leads to bidding bias when participating in the power market competition. A pumped storage power station is an ideal method of stabilizing new energy volatility. Therefore, wind power suppliers and pumped storage power stations first form wind storage joint ventures to participate in power market competition. At the same time, middlemen are introduced, constructing an upper-level game model (considering power producers and wind storage joint ventures) that forms equilibrium results of bidding competition in the wholesale and power distribution markets. Based on the equilibrium result of the upper-level model, a lower model is constructed to distribute the profits from wind storage joint ventures. The profits of each wind storage joint venture, wind power supplier, and pumped storage power station are obtained by the Nash negotiation and the Shapely value method. Finally, a case study is conducted. The results show that the wind storage joint ventures can improve the economics of the system. Further, the middlemen can smooth the rapid fluctuation of power price in the distribution and wholesale market, maintaining a smooth and efficient operation of the electricity market. These findings provide information for the design of an electricity market competition mechanism and the promotion of new energy power generation.
Risk-averse robust interval economic dispatch for power systems with large-scale wind power integration
