Incentives for green retrofits: An evolutionary game analysis on Public-Private-Partnership reconstruction of buildings

2019 ◽  
Vol 232 ◽  
pp. 1076-1092 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Yang ◽  
Jiayu Zhang ◽  
Geoffrey Qiping Shen ◽  
Yingying Yan
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Game Analysis

An evolutionary game analysis of user-pay public–private partnership projects

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Danrong Song ◽  
Jinbo Song ◽  
Hehui Yuan ◽  
Yu Fan
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Public

PurposeWith the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the payment for use and the private sector is concerned with its return on investment, the public sector pays more attention to the efficient utilization of public funds. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to join PPP-UP, an evolutionary game model involving the three parties is constructed.Design/methodology/approachAn evolutionary game model is established that considers the users and the public and private sectors in user-pay public-private-partnership projects (PPP-UP). Eight scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. A situation where all three players are willing to cooperate in theory is also examined. The key influencing parameters that affect cooperation behaviors are further discussed.FindingsFirst, the results illustrate that by properly adjusting the influencing factors, the cooperation status among the three parties can be changed along with certain evolutionary trends. Second, it is hard to modify unsatisfactory evolutionary stability by small changes in both the price compensation of and the construction and operation compensation. Third, it is necessary to involve the users in the decision-making process in PPP-UP and take their demands regarding benefits and payments into account.Originality/valueIn this paper, we focus on PPP-UP to research interactions among the public and private sectors and the users. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, to facilitate the successful implementation and development of a project, several conditions are needed to ensure tripartite cooperation. Several recommendations are then proposed for decision-makers in PPP-UP.

System Dynamics Modeling for a Public–Private Partnership Program to Promote Bicycle–Metro Integration Based on Evolutionary Game

2021 ◽  
pp. 036119812110124
Author(s):  
Jianming Cai ◽  
Yue Liang
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Dynamics Simulation ◽  
Rail Transit ◽  
Long Distance ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Bike Sharing ◽  
Integration Mode ◽  
Partnership Program

A marriage between dockless bike-sharing systems and rail transit presents new opportunities for sustainable transportation in Chinese cities. However, how to promote the bicycle–metro integration mode remains largely unstudied. This paper designs a public–private partnership program to promote bicycle–metro integration. We consider the cooperation between bike-sharing companies and rail transit companies to improve both services and attract long-distance travelers to choose the bicycle–metro integration mode, with government subsidies. To analyze the proportion of each population participating in this public–private partnership program, we establish an evolutionary game model considering bike-sharing companies, rail transit companies, and long-distance travelers, and obtain eight scenarios of equilibriums and corresponding stable conditions. To prove the evolutionary game analysis, we construct a system dynamics simulation model and confirm that the public–private partnership project can be achieved in reality. We discuss key parameters that affect the final stable state through sensitivity analysis. The results demonstrate that by reasonably adjusting the values of parameters, each equilibrium can be changed into an optimal evolutionary stable strategy. This study can provide useful policy implications and operational recommendations for government agencies, bike-sharing companies, and transit authorities to promote bicycle–metro integration.

scholarly journals Policy solution and game analysis for addressing the challenge of developing public–private partnership energy project

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 044019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bowen Tang ◽  
Jian Xu ◽  
Yuanzhang Sun ◽  
Nan Zhou ◽  
Bo Shen ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Game Analysis

scholarly journals System Dynamics Analysis of Evolutionary Game Strategies between the Government and Investors Based on New Energy Power Construction Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) Project

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 2533 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Gao ◽  
Zhen-Yu Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
System Evolution ◽  
Power Construction ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Government

The public-private-partnership (PPP) is a new mode for the government and social capital to jointly invest in public infrastructure projects. In particular, PPP projects for new energy power construction have been strongly supported in some countries in recent years, because it can not only reduce financial pressure on the government, but also promote the development of new energy. Current scholars study the economic benefits of PPP projects for new energy power construction from a macro perspective, and they rarely study behavioral strategies of the government and social capital as a game process of project construction from a micro perspective. This paper will fill this gap. This study firstly built an evolutionary game model of the government and investors based on new energy power construction PPP projects. Secondly, taking China’s typical new energy power construction PPP project–waste incineration power generation as an example, the system dynamics (SD) model was proposed to simulate the evolutionary process of game players’ behavioral strategies. Finally, the effects of key factors in the construction of PPP project on the strategies’ stability were studied. The results show that: (1) there is no evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the game system between the government and investors, and system evolution is characterized by periodic behavior. (2) When the government implements dynamic bounty measures, the system evolution process is still a closed loop with periodic motion. However, when the government implements dynamic punishment measures, there is a stable ESS in the hybrid strategy of the game system. (3) The government can increase unit fines when making dynamic strategic adjustments, which will not only promote the active cooperation of investors, but also reduce the probability of government supervision, thereby reducing costs.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game of Trust in Public-Private Partnership Project Networks

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Xiangtian Nie ◽  
Kai Feng ◽  
Guoxiang Zhao ◽  
Tianyu Fan ◽  
Shengnan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Management Practice ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Trust Model ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Project Networks ◽  
The Government

In public-private partnership (PPP) projects, the government plays a role as both regulator and participant. Trust between the government and the private sector is important as it may affect project performance and even cause the problem of a breach of contract, which may lead to project failure. Little is known, however, about the formation and evolution mechanisms of trust in this context. This study analyses the complex evolution of trust in PPP project networks. An evolutionary game of trust model between government and the private sector is established and analysed, the strategic equilibrium points are obtained by solving the replication dynamic equation, and the Jacobian matrix and differential equation stability theory are introduced to analyse the stability of the equilibrium points. The results reveal the relationships among the stable state of trust, the initial state of trust, and the payment matrix, indicating that the payment matrix can effectively shape the evolution process and stable state of trust to influence performance. This study provides a novel contribution in solving the complex trust problem in PPP project networks and it provides a new analytical tool for PPP project management practice.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Supervision Behavior for Public-Private Partnership Projects with Public Participation

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Congdong Li ◽  
Xiaoli Li ◽  
Yu Wang
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Public Participation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
The Public ◽  
Private Behavior ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Participation Level ◽  
The Government

The public can directly or indirectly participate in the PPP (public-private partnership) projects and then has an impact on the project profit and public or private behavior. To explore the influence of the public participation of the PPP projects supervision behavior, this paper analyzes the mutual evolutionary regularity of the private sector and government supervision department and the influence of public participation level on public and private behavior based on evolutionary game theory. The results show that the supervision strategy is not chosen when the supervision cost of government supervision department is greater than the supervision benefit; it can make private sector consciously provide the high-quality public products/services with the improvement of public participation level. Therefore, the government should reduce the cost of public participation and improve the public participation level and influence through the application of the Internet, big data, and other advanced technologies, in order to restrain the behavior of the private sector and improve the supervision efficiency.

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