Railway access charges in China: a comparison with Europe and Japan

SummaryCompanies active in electricity generation or supply that also own transmission or distribution network assets are generally presumed to have an economic interest in using its monopoly position as network owner to prevent or hinder competition in other areas of the value chain. This can happen in many ways such as raising rivals’ costs, price squeezes or by providing essential information only to affiliated companies. All of these practices distort a level playing field. In order to limit the risk of such behavior from occurring Member States of the European Union introduced a “regulated third party access” regime under which third parties have a right to access the network in a non-discriminatory manner. It is the purpose of the paper to derive the welfare implications of a regulation of access charges for electricity grids taking the costs of transmission as a benchmark. It shows that a cost-based regulation is second-best optimal only if the gap between the incumbent’s and the downstream entrant’s efficiency is sufficiently large. In all other cases an access charge deviating from the transmission costs is second-best optimal. There is no simple and generally applicable rule for the determination of second-best optimal access charges.

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Asymmetric Networks and Access Charges

Journal of International Commerce Economics and Policy ◽

10.1142/s1793993319500054 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 10 (01) ◽

pp. 1950005

Author(s):

Alexander Correa

Keyword(s):

Mathematical Model ◽

Social Welfare ◽

Market Entry ◽

Low Cost ◽

Regulatory Regime ◽

Marginal Costs ◽

Asymmetric Networks ◽

Access Charges ◽

Firm Asymmetry ◽

Asymmetric Regulation

In order to suggest an appropriate regulatory regime in the context of firm asymmetry, this study has developed a mathematical model that allows to elucidate comparisons of three different regulatory scenarios. In the unregulated market, the low-cost firm is more likely to become dominant in the market. Symmetric regulation has an immediate effect on off-net prices, which fall to the level of its marginal costs. Finally, asymmetric regulation is a highly effective way of promoting market entry. Asymmetric regulation can generate higher social welfare.

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Competition law constraints on access charges in the England and Wales water industry

Utilities Policy ◽

10.1016/s0957-1787(02)00035-8 ◽

2001 ◽

Vol 10 (3-4) ◽

pp. 129-136 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

D Aitman

Keyword(s):

Competition Law ◽

Water Industry ◽

England And Wales ◽

Access Charges

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IN THE NEWS

The Bottom Line Managing Library Finances ◽

10.1108/eb025137 ◽

1988 ◽

Vol 1 (4) ◽

pp. 10-14

Author(s):

Bernard Margolis

Keyword(s):

Service Providers ◽

Federal Communications Commission ◽

Library Services ◽

Access Charges

ALA Fights Proposed Access Charges. Library services could be seriously harmed by a new Federal Communications Commission (FCC) proposal to charge networks such as Telenet. Tymnet, CompuServe, and other “enhanced service providers” access charges to local phone lines.

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