Hospital quality choice and market structure in a regulated duopoly

2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 1011-1036 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arantza Beitia
Keyword(s):  
Market Structure ◽  
Hospital Quality ◽  
Quality Choice

Too Much of a Good Thing: Quality-Differentiated Demand and Monopoly Bias

2021 ◽  
pp. 056943452199998
Author(s):  
Charles F. Adams
Keyword(s):  
Market Structure ◽  
Consumer Choice ◽  
Good Thing ◽  
Potential Bias ◽  
Demand Structure ◽  
Monopoly Market ◽  
Linear Demand ◽  
Quality Choice ◽  
Jel Classifications

Previous teaching notes focused on the logic and mechanics of a quality-differentiated linear demand structure. This note takes up the question of potential bias in how markets respond to quality-related aspects of consumer choice. Earlier examples demonstrated instances where monopoly interests might conflict with those of consumers in matters of quality choice. This article points to a more general propensity toward excessively high levels of quality under a monopoly market structure. JEL Classifications: D4, D41, D42

Survey of Hospital Quality

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. D. Bonacasa ◽  
E. Rosa ◽  
C. Camps ◽  
D. Martínez-Rubio
Keyword(s):  
Hospital Quality

Contract institutions in the Russian economy: The sphere of state, municipal, and regulated procurement

2017 ◽  
pp. 93-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
O. Anchishkina
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Market Structure ◽  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Statistical Evidence ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Market Behavior ◽  
Database Analysis ◽  
Russian Economy ◽  
Contracting Model

The article synthesizes information on database analysis of state, municipal, and regulated procurement through which Russian contract institutions and the market model are investigated. The inherent uncertainty of quantity indicators on contracting activities and process is identified and explained. The article provides statistical evidence for heterogeneous market structure in state and municipal procurement, and big player’s dominance. A theoretical model for market behavior, noncooperative competition and collusion is proposed, through which the major trends are explained. The intrinsic flaws and failure of the current contracting model are revealed and described. This ineffectiveness is regarded to be not a limitation, but a challenge to be met. If responded to, drivers for economic growth and market equilibrium will be switched on.

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