Conflicts of interest in tobacco industry-funded research

Author(s):  
Talha Khan Burki
Author(s):  
June YY Leung ◽  
Sally Casswell

Background The World Health Organization (WHO) has engaged in consultations with the alcohol industry in global alcohol policy development, including currently a draft action plan to strengthen implementation of the Global strategy to reduce the harmful use of alcohol. WHO’s Framework for Engagement with Non-State Actors (FENSA) is an organization-wide policy that aims to manage potential conflicts of interest in WHO’s interactions with private sector entities, non-governmental institutions, philanthropic foundations and academic institutions. Methods We analysed the alignment of WHO’s consultative processes with non-state actors on "the way forward" for alcohol policy and a global alcohol action plan with FENSA. We referred to publicly accessible WHO documents, including the Alcohol, Drugs and Addictive Behaviours Unit website, records of relevant meetings, and other documents relevant to FENSA. We documented submissions to two web-based consultations held in 2019 and 2020 by type of organization and links to the alcohol industry. Results WHO’s processes to conduct due diligence, risk assessment and risk management as required by FENSA appeared to be inadequate. Limited information was published on nonstate actors, primarily the alcohol industry, that participated in the consultations, including their potential conflicts of interest. No minutes were published for WHO’s virtual meeting with the alcohol industry, suggesting a lack of transparency. Organizations with known links to the tobacco industry participated in both web-based consultations, despite FENSA’s principle of non-engagement with tobacco industry actors. Conclusion WHO’s consultative processes have not been adequate to address conflicts of interest in relation to the alcohol industry, violating the principles of FENSA. Member states must ensure that WHO has the resources to implement and is held accountable for appropriate and consistent safeguards against industry interference in the development of global alcohol policy.


2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Caulfield ◽  
Trudo Lemmens ◽  
Douglas Kinsella ◽  
Michael McDonald

An increasing number of community physicians are involved in clinical research.Indeed, 60 of industry-funded research is now spent on community based trials. This surge in community based clinical trials has increased the number of clinical trials applications submitted to the drug regulatory agencies by pharmaceutical sponsors. Many have argued that the commercial interests connected to the conduct and outcome of these trials also increases the potential for conflicts of interest for participating physicians. The context in which these trials take place increases the potential for a host of practices that infringe on ethical, legal and clinical obligations of physicians For example, financial recruitment incentives may lead to violations of the inclusion criteria and the consent process. It may result in inappropriate recruitment of patient participants and a blurring of the ethically significant distinctions between treatment and research. In some cases, it may be hard to distinguish research from the marketing of new products and attempts to influencing prescribing patterns.


The Lancet ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 384 (9939) ◽  
pp. 233-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashok Kaul ◽  
Michael Wolf

The Lancet ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 383 (9926) ◽  
pp. 1384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony A Laverty ◽  
Hilary C Watt ◽  
Deborah Arnott ◽  
Nicholas S Hopkinson

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