Parties, Brokers, and Voter Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends Upon the Party’s Capacity to Monitor Brokers

2016 ◽  
Vol 110 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
HORACIO LARREGUY ◽  
JOHN MARSHALL ◽  
PABLO QUERUBÍN

Despite its prevalence, little is known about when parties buy turnout. We emphasize the problem of parties monitoring local brokers with incentives to shirk. Our model suggests that parties extract greater turnout buying effort from their brokers where they can better monitor broker performance and where favorable voters would not otherwise turn out. Exploiting exogenous variation in the number of polling stations—and thus electoral information about broker performance—in Mexican electoral precincts, we find that greater monitoring capacity increases turnout and votes for the National Action Party (PAN) and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Consistent with our theoretical predictions, the effect of monitoring capacity on PRI votes varies nonlinearly with the distance of voters to the polling station: it first increases because rural voters—facing larger costs of voting—generally favor the PRI, before declining as the cost of incentivizing brokers increases. This nonlinearity is not present for the PAN, who stand to gain less from mobilizing rural voters.

Subject Morena's election prospects. Significance On April 17, newspaper Reforma published the results of a poll (conducted between April 7-10) revealing the leader of the new, leftist Movement of National Regeneration (Morena) Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador to be the most popular candidate ahead of the 2018 presidential election. Although President Enrique Pena Nieto's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had the greater share of preferences, all its potential candidates came third after Lopez Oberador and former First Lady Margarita Zavala (2006-12) of the conservative National Action Party (PAN). Impacts While Lopez Obrador's popularity may boost Morena, conversely the party could hold him back, hindering his presidential chances in 2018. Coalitions with the PAN will boost the PRD's election hopes, but its failure to redefine itself may see it lose support to Morena. Morena's continued refusal to enter into coalitions could cripple the Mexican left for years to come.


Significance Preliminary results of the elections held on June 4 in four states indicate that President Enrique Pena Nieto’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) narrowly retained the key State of Mexico. In Coahuila state, the PRI appears to have narrowly defeated the conservative National Action Party (PAN), which won the governorship of Nayarit state comfortably, in coalition with the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Veracruz state -- which only elected municipal authorities -- saw a significant expansion of non-PRI mayors elected, though only three were independents. Impacts The PAN and PRD may struggle to be competitive alone in 2018 vis-a-vis the PRI machinery or Morena’s outsider appeal. The PRD has yet to decide whether to continue its alliance with the PAN or seek a coalition with Morena ahead of 2018. The failure of independents to perform strongly in these elections suggest that they are unlikely to be competitive ahead of 2018.


Significance A January 18 Reforma survey showed President Enrique Pena Nieto’s popular approval rating to have plummeted to 12%, from 24% in December. With US President Donald Trump’s first days in power suggesting turbulent times ahead, Pena Nieto’s government looks set to struggle. Impacts The remainder of Pena Nieto’s administration will see governability problems that could exacerbate crime and economic hardship. The outcome of June’s four state elections will have a significant impact on the presidential elections of 2018. Pena Nieto’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) is unlikely to win in 2018. The conservative National Action Party (PAN) has the potential to succeed the current government if it avoids internal strife. The radical leftist National Regeneration Movement (MORENA)’s Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador will benefit from PRI weakness.


Author(s):  
Agustina Malvido Perez Carletti ◽  
Markus Hanisch ◽  
Jens Rommel ◽  
Murray Fulton

AbstractIn this paper, we use a unique data set of the prices paid to farmers in Argentina for grapes to examine the prices paid by non-varietal wine processing cooperatives and investor-oriented firms (IOFs). Motivated by contrasting theoretical predictions of cooperative price effects generated by the yardstick of competition and property rights theories, we apply a multilevel regression model to identify price differences at the transaction level and the departmental level. On average, farmers selling to cooperatives receive a 3.4 % lower price than farmers selling to IOFs. However, we find cooperatives pay approximately 2.4 % more in departments where cooperatives have larger market shares. We suggest that the inability of cooperatives to pay a price equal to or greater than the one paid by IOFs can be explained by the market structure for non-varietal wine in Argentina. Specifically, there is evidence that cooperative members differ from other farmers in terms of size, assets and the cost of accessing the market. We conclude that the analysis of cooperative pricing cannot solely focus on the price differential between cooperatives and IOFs, but instead must consider other factors that are important to the members.


2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Teresa Sierra ◽  
Orlando Aragón

El año 2000 supuso un momento de una gran esperanza para amplios sectores sociales de México. La derrota electoral que sufrió ese año el Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), que gobernó al país durante más de setenta años, parecía augurar nuevos aires al anquilosado Estado mexicano, una supuesta apertura para la construcción de relaciones más igualitarias con sectores sociales históricamente marginados, en especial con los indígenas, y en general lo que algunos grupos veían como el florecimiento, por fin, de una cultura cívica arraigada en prácticas democráticas y en el multipartidismo.Esta expectativa, sin embargo, pronto se desvaneció; no sólo no se produjeron los cambios esperados, sino que se profundizaron y sofisticaron las prácticas anti-democráticas del viejo régimen; así como la marginación y exclusión económica a causa de la radicalización de las políticas neoliberales que comenzaron con los últimos gobiernos del PRI. En el caso de los pueblos indígenas las acotadas reformas constitucionales del 2001, que les reconocieron derechos de libredeterminaciòn y autonomía, pronto mostraron sus límites al acompañarse de reglamentaciones que redujeron los alcances de los derechos reconocidos y que se acompañaron de políticas dirigidas a fomentar la privatización de las tierras indígenas y a facilitar la incursión del capital transnacional en zonas con recursos naturales atractivos a la demanda del capitalismo mundial.---INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE CHALLENGES OF THE LAW IN NEOLIBERAL CONTEXT: Between strategic use, dispossession and criminalization.The year 2000 marked a time of great hope for many social sectors in Mexico. The electoral defeat, that happened this year, of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ruled the country for over seventy years, seemed to herald new life to the stagnant Mexican state, an alleged opening to the construction of more egalitarian relationships with historically marginalized social sectors, especially with the Indians, and in general, with what some groups saw as the flourishment of a civic culture rooted in democratic practices and in a multiparty system.These expectations soon faded, however; not only did it not produce the expected changes but it sophisticated and deepened anti-democratic practices of the old regime; as well as helped economic exclusion and marginalization because of the radicalization of neoliberal policies that began with the previous PRI governments. For indigenous peoples the bounded constitutional reforms of 2001, which recognized their rights of free self determination and autonomy, soon showed its limits accompanied by regulations that reduced the scope of rights granted and which were accompanied by policies to promote privatization of indigenous lands and to facilitate the incursion of transnational capital in areas with attractive natural resources to the demand of world capitalism.keywords: indigenous people, neoliberalism, violence.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 87-113
Author(s):  
Lisdey Espinoza Pedraza

This paper will attempt to answer what the current state of contemporary democracy in Mexico is after the return of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) to the presidency by analysing the role of Civil Society, Political Society and the Rule of Law from 2012 to 2018. This paper will also explore if the party’s return was indeed a step backwards in the process of Mexican democratisation, or whether it was simply another step on a long road in which the various political parties alternate power. In 2018, Mexico elected its new president for the next consecutive 6 years along with a fair number of congressional seats and local gubernatorial posts, an election that again put Mexican democracy through a difficult test.


2021 ◽  
pp. 217-241
Author(s):  
Graeme Gill

This chapter examines how rules have operated in two electoral authoritarian dominant party regimes, Malaysia under Mahathir (1981–2003) and Mexico under the Institutional Revolutionary Party (1929–2000). The nature of the party, one designed to participate in a competitive electoral process (even if unfair because it is tilted in favour of the ruling party), is an important factor in shaping the rules and how they worked. The fact that one is a parliamentary and the other a presidential system also provides scope to see how institutions affect rules and their performance.


Author(s):  
Stephen D. Morris

Mexico’s President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) came to power amidst crisis and controversy in 1988. Using a variety of old and new strategies and innate political skill, he largely surmounted the political crisis, gaining popularity and legitimacy for himself and support for the PRI, handing power off to his hand-picked successor six years later. During his six-year term, he implemented a series of neoliberal reforms, privatized state-owned enterprises, and overhauled and restructured the Mexican economy, turning the nation into a leading manufacturing exporter and one of the most open economies in the world. This included the historic signing of a free trade agreement with Canada and the United States in 1992. Yet many of the gains and achievements were tarnished by events in 1994. In the aftermath, Salinas would become one of the most reviled presidents in Mexican history.


2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 218-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric C. Jones ◽  
Diana Luque ◽  
Arthur D. Murphy

In the state of Sonora, the 2009 Hermosillo ABC Day Care Center fire and the 2014 Cananea copper mine spill highlighted how deregulation and divestiture of state services by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the National Action Party (PAN) served the interests of a few elites, who maintained rule through mechanisms of impunity: in other words, through actions undertaken without concern about the law or repercussions. Although impunity produces a seemingly incoherent set of policy and politics, results from dozens of semi-structured interviews by our team also suggest that exercising power through impunity is part of the culture of governance in Mexico, relying on global ties, but not necessarily requiring any specific individual or party leadership. El incendio de la Guardería ABC de la Cd. de Hermosillo, Sonora en 2009, y el derrame de la mina de cobre de Cananea, Sonora en 2014, exhibió la falta de regulación estatal, así como la ineficiencia en materia de servicios públicos durante las administraciones de los partidos políticos del Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) así como del Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), demostrando que finalmente están al servicio de los intereses de pequeñas élites que mantienen y gobiernan a través de mecanismos de impunidad. Aunque la impunidad sí produce un conjunto de programas y políticas incoherentes, los resultados de más de 100 entrevistas semi-estructuradas sugieren que, además, el ejercicio de poder mediante la impunidad es parte de una cultura de gobernanza en México, que requiere vínculos globales, pero no necesariamente requiere liderazgos específicos, ya sean individuales o de partido.


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