Compensation to the Divorced Woman in the Israeli Druze Family

1977 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 330-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aharon Layish

Neither under Ottoman rule nor under the Mandate—nor even under Israel law until 1957—were the Druzes recognised as a religious community. Until quite recently, they resorted to the Sharī'a Courts in matters of personal status although under the Palestine Order-in-Council of 1922 these courts had no jurisdiction over non-Muslims. But in 1957, the Druzes gained recognition as a religious community within the meaning of the Religious Communities (Organisation) Ordinance, 1926, and the Druze Spiritual Leadership was given the status of a religious council within the meaning of the Religious Communities (Organisation) (Druze Community) Regulations, 1957. In 1963, by virtue of the Druze Religious Courts Law, 1962, a court of first instance and a court of appeal were established for the community. These have exclusive jurisdiction in matters of marriage and divorce of Druzes in Israel who are nationals or residents of the State. In other matters of personal status they have concurrent jurisdiction. In the absence of agreement to the jurisdiction of the religious court, jurisdiction vests in the District Court. The Druze courts also have exclusive jurisdiction in matters relating to the creation or internal administration of waqfs (endowments) established before a Druze court under Druze law or established, prior to the coming into force of the Druze Religious Courts Law, in accordance with Druze custom and not before any judicial authority.

1979 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-30
Author(s):  
Aharon Layish

The Druzes have never been recognised as a religious community under Muslim rule. During the Ottoman period such recognition was only granted to the members of the tolerated religions — Christians and Jews — within the institutionalised framework of the millet system. The Druze religion, though originating from the Ismā'īliyya, an extreme branch of the Shī'a, seceded completely from Islam and has, therefore, experienced periods of persecution by the latter. The Druzes were theoretically amenable to the sharī'a courts in matters of personal status and succession, yet not as Muslims (as is usually assumed owing to the custom of taqiyya, simulation, prevailing among them) but as persons not belonging to a recognised religion. At the same time, they seem in practice to have enjoyed a certain autonomy in these matters under their own religious and customary law. There is documentary evidence of this for the Lebanese Druzes, of the late 19th and early 20th century, but this autonomy should not be construed as the status of a recognised religious community.All attempts of the Druzes to achieve such a status in the era of British rule in Palestine were unsuccessful. They were not included in the list of recognised communities in the Palestine Order-in-Council, 1922–1947, nor the Succession Ordinance, 1923, probably due to a desire of the British Mandate to maintain the status quo in religious matters with only such modifications as the new political situation required. At the same time, the Government recognised Druze autonomy in matters of marriage, while other matters of personal status, and those of succession, were referred to district courts, since the Order-in-Council restricted the personal jurisdiction of the sharī'a courts to Muslim litigants.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-285
Author(s):  
Jaclyn L. Neo

Abstract The administration or recognition of religious courts is a form of religious accommodation present in many constitutional states today commonly analysed in legal pluralism terms. This article contributes to the further analysis of the relationship between legal pluralism and rights in religiously diverse societies by examining the status of state religious courts and their interaction with state non-religious (secular) courts. In particular, I examine what Cover calls “jurisdictional redundancies” between the courts and conceptualize the allocation of power between religious and non-religious courts as a potentially productive site of interlegality. In doing so, I support concurrent jurisdictional allocations, arguing that exclusive jurisdiction could result in what I call an interlegal gap, whereby instead of inter-penetration of norms and production of reconciliatory principles, there is a justice gap whereby litigants may find themselves unable to obtain appropriate legal recourse including when neither court is willing to assume jurisdiction over the matter. This requires us to see the relationship between religious courts and non-religious courts through the more mundane but more practical lens of jurisdictional overlaps and competition, rather than through the more abstract framing of normative or even civilizational clashes. Accordingly, I argue that concurrent jurisdiction and interlegality have greater potential to strike a balance between individual and group rights and could be more protective of religious diversity. In other words, I argue for a closer, rather than a more separate, relationship between religious and non-religious courts, while denying that a hierarchical relationship where religious courts are subordinated to non-religious courts is the only way to protect rights.


2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (88) ◽  
pp. 111-133
Author(s):  
Sanja Arežina

The entry into force of the Act on Freedom of Religion or Belief and the Legal Status of Religious Communities (hereinafter: the Freedom of Religion Act) in January 2020 provoked reactions and protests from the Orthodox population of Serbian descent in Montenegro because some provisions of this Act allow for the confiscation of centuries-old real-estate property of the Serbian Orthodox Church dioceses in Montenegro. It should be noted that the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) is the only religious community in Montenegro with which the Montenegrin authorities have not concluded a Fundamental Agreement on the Regulation of Mutual Relations. In order to reach a compromise solution, negotiations have begun between the dioceses of the SOC in Montenegro and the Montenegrin authorities. In this article, the author discusses the history of relations between the SOC and the Montenegrin state in the period from the beginnings of Montenegrin statehood in the 15th century to the enactment of the the Freedom of Religion Act in early 2020. In particular, the paper focuses on the regulation of real-estate property issue in that period, the factors that influenced the adoption of this Act, the adoption process, the analysis of provisions related to real-estate property issues, and the recommendations of the Venice Commission. The author uses the structural-functional analysis, induction and deduction methods to prove the basic hypothesis that the Montenegrin authorities will not be able to ignore the legitimate rights of the SOC's dioceses in Montenegro regarding the regulation of real-estate property issues, and that the two sides will find an interest to reach a compromise during the negotiations on the disputed Act and conclude the Fundamental Agreement in order to permanently resolve the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro.


Author(s):  
Adrian Ward ◽  
Gledhill Kris

New Zealand is a common law country. The judicial structure is the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, which are appellate courts only; the High Court, which hears appeals from District Courts in some situations but is also a court of first instance; the District Court, which is principally a court of first instance but also hears appeals from some Tribunals; and various Tribunals. There is also a Family Court, in which warranted District Court judges sit, and which—along with the High Court—deals with adult protection matters.


Author(s):  
Juriyana Megawati Hasibuan Dan Fatahuddin Aziz Siregar

Marriage is a sacred bond which is ideally only held once in a lifetime. Both Islamic law and positive law require an eternal happy marriage. To support this the Koran proclaims marriage as mitsaqan galiza. The marriage is then registered in the state administration. In line with this, the laws and regulations are formulated in such a way as to make divorce more difficult. However, when there are acceptable reasons and due to coercive conditions, divorce can be done through a judicial process. The divorce must then be registered by taking certain procedures. The court delivered the notice and sent a copy of the decision to the marriage registrar to file the divorce properly. The implementation of this divorce record was not effective. The separation of the Religious Courts Institution from the Ministry of Religion has become a factor that causes the registration task not to be carried out. The loss of the obligation to submit a copy of the decision on the judge's ruling caused the recording to be constrained. The unavailability of shipping costs also contributed to the failure to register divorce. Even though there is a threat to the Registrar who neglects to deliver a copy of the verdict, unclear sanctions make this ineffective. As a result of the lack of recording of divorce, the status of husband and wife becomes unclear and opens opportunities for abuse of that status.


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 367
Author(s):  
Raymond Detrez

Premodern Ottoman society consisted of four major religious communities—Muslims, Orthodox Christians, Armenian Christians, and Jews; the Muslim and Christian communities also included various ethnic groups, as did Muslim Arabs and Turks, Orthodox Christian Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs who identified, in the first place, with their religious community and considered ethnic identity of secondary importance. Having lived together, albeit segregated within the borders of the Ottoman Empire, for centuries, Bulgarians and Turks to a large extent shared the same world view and moral value system and tended to react in a like manner to various events. The Bulgarian attitudes to natural disasters, on which this contribution focuses, apparently did not differ essentially from that of their Turkish neighbors. Both proceeded from the basic idea of God’s providence lying behind these disasters. In spite of the (overwhelmingly Western) perception of Muslims being passive and fatalistic, the problem whether it was permitted to attempt to escape “God’s wrath” was coped with in a similar way as well. However, in addition to a comparable religious mental make-up, social circumstances and administrative measures determining equally the life conditions of both religious communities seem to provide a more plausible explanation for these similarities than cross-cultural influences.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. Christopher-Vajda
Author(s):  
Christopher Vajda

Following the expiry on 31 December 2020 of the ‘transition period’ under the UK/EU Withdrawal Agreement, the relationship between UK and EU law had changed. Whilst much EU legislation at that date will continue to apply in UK law as ‘retained EU law’ and judgments of the EU courts handed down before that date will remain binding on UK courts as ‘retained EU case law’, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court can depart from that case law. Whilst EU court judgments handed down after that date are not binding on UK courts, they may be taken into account. This article considers both the status of EU retained case law and when the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal may depart from it, and the future of EU law that is not ‘retained EU case law’ and how judgments of the European Courts and national courts of its Member States may influence UK judges in the future.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 42-48
Author(s):  
E. Yu. Boyko

The article is devoted to the directions of improvement of appeal proceedings in the civil process, identified in the analysis of legislation and practice of its application, in connection with the reform of the judicial system. The author not only considers the questions of implementation of the court of appeal of its powers, justifies the need for disclosure of criteria allowing the direction of the court of appeal the case for a new trial in the court of first instance, the limits of choice in the exercise of judicial discretion outside of the petition of appeal, the improvement of term of making a petition of appeal, eliminate of the term “appeal determination”, enshrined in the law of procedure of familiarization with the act court of appeal and its further complaints, but also indicates ways of solving them.


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