Towards a computational theory of social groups: A finite set of cognitive primitives for representing any and all social groups in the context of conflict

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-62
Author(s):  
David Pietraszewski

Abstract We don't yet have adequate theories of what the human mind is representing when it represents a social group. Worse still, many people think we do. This mistaken belief is a consequence of the state of play: Until now, researchers have relied on their own intuitions to link up the concept social group on the one hand, and the results of particular studies or models on the other. While necessary, this reliance on intuition has been purchased at considerable cost. When looked at soberly, existing theories of social groups are either (i) literal, but not remotely adequate (such as models built atop economic games), or (ii) simply metaphorical (typically a subsumption or containment metaphor). Intuition is filling in the gaps of an explicit theory. This paper presents a computational theory of what, literally, a group representation is in the context of conflict: it is the assignment of agents to specific roles within a small number of triadic interaction types. This “mental definition” of a group paves the way for a computational theory of social groups—in that it provides a theory of what exactly the information-processing problem of representing and reasoning about a group is. For psychologists, this paper offers a different way to conceptualize and study groups, and suggests that a non-tautological definition of a social group is possible. For cognitive scientists, this paper provides a computational benchmark against which natural and artificial intelligences can be held.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ursula Renz

Spinoza's ethics is grounded by a conviction which is as simple as it is programmatic: Subjective experience can be explained, and its successful explanation is of ethical relevance. For it makes us smarter, freer and happier. This is the programmatic conviction behind Spinoza's ethics and motivates many of the theses it puts forward. Ursula Renz shows which kind of a theory of the human mind informs this program. The systematic differentiation of theory parts in the architecture of ethics proves to be a decisive move: A theory part that deals with questions of the ontology of the mental is followed by a definition of the human mind as a kind of subject theory, which in turn is separated from a theory part dealing with the constitution of content. This structure makes it possible to deal separately with different problems that arise in the course of the explanation of experience. In the end, Spinoza succeeds in avoiding both reductionisms and skepticisms right from the start. In this way, two intuitions are brought together that are often considered incompatible: on the one hand, the view that experience is something irreducibly subjective, and on the other hand, the assumption that there are better and worse explanations of experience.


1971 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 15-27
Author(s):  
P. T. Geach

On the very first page of Spinoza's Ethics we find the perplexing definition of ‘attribute’: ‘By an attribute I mean what the understanding perceives in regard to a substance as constituting its essence’. Each attribute of a substance by itself thus constitutes the essence of a substance; if there are many attributes of the same substance, it does not take all of them together to constitute its essence. Spinoza, as we all know, in fact held that there is only one substance, God, but there are infinitely many attributes, of which only two, Thought and Extension, are accessible to the human mind. Each attribute, we further learn, has to be conceived on its own account (I, prop. 10); being conceived on its own account is, however, a distinguishing mark of the one substance, so how is it that the many attributes, which Spinoza says are really distinct, are not so many distinct substances, so many gods?That is the ontological side of the puzzle. Now for the logical or grammatical side — about which writers on Spinoza have, I think, said a great deal less, though it has been much discussed as regards less deviant theology than Spinoza's. Each attribute is clearly meant to be a concrete, active, individual entity; yet the attributes are designated by abstract nouns — ‘Thought’ and ‘Extension’. Now can we make sense of such a sentence as ‘God is Thought’ or ‘God is Extension’, as opposed to ‘God thinks’ or ‘God is extended’? What does it mean to predicate an abstract noun of a concrete individual? And if this ‘is’ here is not a bare copula of predication but an identity sign, then how can we avoid passing from ‘God is Thought’ and ‘God is Extension’ to ‘Thought is Extension’? Spinoza would deny the conclusion, and it is quite essential to his system to do so. For if Thought just is Extension, identically so, then any mode of the attribute Thought is a mode of the attribute Extension and vice versa. But for Spinoza, the last is diametrically opposite to the truth: no mode is a mode of more than one attribute, and indeed no causal relations link modes of different attributes — a causal linkage is always confined to one attribute.


1971 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 15-27
Author(s):  
P. T. Geach

On the very first page of Spinoza's Ethics we find the perplexing definition of ‘attribute’: ‘By an attribute I mean what the understanding perceives in regard to a substance as constituting its essence’. Each attribute of a substance by itself thus constitutes the essence of a substance; if there are many attributes of the same substance, it does not take all of them together to constitute its essence. Spinoza, as we all know, in fact held that there is only one substance, God, but there are infinitely many attributes, of which only two, Thought and Extension, are accessible to the human mind. Each attribute, we further learn, has to be conceived on its own account (I, prop. 10); being conceived on its own account is, however, a distinguishing mark of the one substance, so how is it that the many attributes, which Spinoza says are really distinct, are not so many distinct substances, so many gods?That is the ontological side of the puzzle. Now for the logical or grammatical side — about which writers on Spinoza have, I think, said a great deal less, though it has been much discussed as regards less deviant theology than Spinoza's. Each attribute is clearly meant to be a concrete, active, individual entity; yet the attributes are designated by abstract nouns — ‘Thought’ and ‘Extension’. Now can we make sense of such a sentence as ‘God is Thought’ or ‘God is Extension’, as opposed to ‘God thinks’ or ‘God is extended’? What does it mean to predicate an abstract noun of a concrete individual? And if this ‘is’ here is not a bare copula of predication but an identity sign, then how can we avoid passing from ‘God is Thought’ and ‘God is Extension’ to ‘Thought is Extension’? Spinoza would deny the conclusion, and it is quite essential to his system to do so. For if Thought just is Extension, identically so, then any mode of the attribute Thought is a mode of the attribute Extension and vice versa. But for Spinoza, the last is diametrically opposite to the truth: no mode is a mode of more than one attribute, and indeed no causal relations link modes of different attributes — a causal linkage is always confined to one attribute.


Author(s):  
Sh.V. Nafikov ◽  

The article is devoted to showing various etymological connections of the Turkic names of the heart (somatism) as part of the anatomical vocabulary of the Turkic and Altaic languages in the context of the nostratic macrofamily. Somatisms as a lexico-semantic group belongs to the oldest layer of vocabulary, in which, on the one hand, the features of categorization and conceptualization of the world in the human mind are manifested clearly, on the other hand, the historical stability of the semantics of words and their phonomorphological appearance is demonstrated. Based on the methodology of comparative reconstruction of proto-forms, the article reveals the etymology of the word köηül, gives its direct and figurative meanings in the Proto-Turkic language. The root proto- form of somatism, according to the author, goes back not to the substantive, but to the verbal basis of көң – “wait”. Also significant in the article is the identification of semantic parallels of somatism in the ancient Turkic and Bashkir languages, the definition of direct and figurative meanings of köηül from syntagmatic connections in phraseological combinations and derived words. In addition, the author establishes historical links between könül and other Turkic somatisms, as well as with lexemes denoting kinship relations. It is important in the article to identify on the basis of this somatism the semantic connections of the Turkic languages, in particular, the Altai family of languages, as a whole with other languages of the world, which confirms the verification of the nostratic theory of languages. A more thorough examination and search for probable isoglosses gives a picture of a very wide distribution of single-root words with the base *QVN / KVN also within the (hypothetical) superfamilies of Indo-European, Sino-Caucasian, Austric and Amerindian languages.


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-122
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Bulajić ◽  
Miomir Despotović ◽  
Thomas Lachmann

Abstract. The article discusses the emergence of a functional literacy construct and the rediscovery of illiteracy in industrialized countries during the second half of the 20th century. It offers a short explanation of how the construct evolved over time. In addition, it explores how functional (il)literacy is conceived differently by research discourses of cognitive and neural studies, on the one hand, and by prescriptive and normative international policy documents and adult education, on the other hand. Furthermore, it analyses how literacy skills surveys such as the Level One Study (leo.) or the PIAAC may help to bridge the gap between cognitive and more practical and educational approaches to literacy, the goal being to place the functional illiteracy (FI) construct within its existing scale levels. It also sheds more light on the way in which FI can be perceived in terms of different cognitive processes and underlying components of reading. By building on the previous work of other authors and previous definitions, the article brings together different views of FI and offers a perspective for a needed operational definition of the concept, which would be an appropriate reference point for future educational, political, and scientific utilization.


Author(s):  
Ross McKibbin

This book is an examination of Britain as a democratic society; what it means to describe it as such; and how we can attempt such an examination. The book does this via a number of ‘case-studies’ which approach the subject in different ways: J.M. Keynes and his analysis of British social structures; the political career of Harold Nicolson and his understanding of democratic politics; the novels of A.J. Cronin, especially The Citadel, and what they tell us about the definition of democracy in the interwar years. The book also investigates the evolution of the British party political system until the present day and attempts to suggest why it has become so apparently unstable. There are also two chapters on sport as representative of the British social system as a whole as well as the ways in which the British influenced the sporting systems of other countries. The book has a marked comparative theme, including one chapter which compares British and Australian political cultures and which shows British democracy in a somewhat different light from the one usually shone on it. The concluding chapter brings together the overall argument.


1996 ◽  
Vol 118 (3) ◽  
pp. 482-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergio Bittanti ◽  
Fabrizio Lorito ◽  
Silvia Strada

In this paper, Linear Quadratic (LQ) optimal control concepts are applied for the active control of vibrations in helicopters. The study is based on an identified dynamic model of the rotor. The vibration effect is captured by suitably augmenting the state vector of the rotor model. Then, Kalman filtering concepts can be used to obtain a real-time estimate of the vibration, which is then fed back to form a suitable compensation signal. This design rationale is derived here starting from a rigorous problem position in an optimal control context. Among other things, this calls for a suitable definition of the performance index, of nonstandard type. The application of these ideas to a test helicopter, by means of computer simulations, shows good performances both in terms of disturbance rejection effectiveness and control effort limitation. The performance of the obtained controller is compared with the one achievable by the so called Higher Harmonic Control (HHC) approach, well known within the helicopter community.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario S. Staller ◽  
Swen Koerner

AbstractGamification is regularly defined as the use of game elements in non-gaming contexts. However, discussions in the context of the pedagogical value of gamification suggest controversies on various levels. While on the one hand, the potential is seen in the design of joyful learning environments, critics point out the pedagogical dangers or the problems related to optimizing working life. It becomes apparent that the assumptions guiding action on the subject matter of gamification in educational contexts differ, which leads to different derivations for pedagogical practice—but also allows for different perspectives on initially controversial positions. Being aware of these assumptions is the claim of a reflexive pedagogy. With regard to the pedagogical use of gamifying elements and their empirical investigation, there are three main anchor points to consider from a reflexive stance: (a) the high context-specificity of the teaching undertaken and (b) the (non-)visibility of the design elements and (c) the (non-)acceptance of the gamified elements by the students. We start by providing a discussion of the definitional discourse on what is understood as gamification leading to our argument for a non-definition of gamification. We describe the potential of this non-definition of gamification and exemplify its use in a gamified concept of teaching police recruits professional reflexivity. The concept features the narrative of a potential crime that has been undertaken and that students decide for themselves if they want to engage with it.


Author(s):  
Maria J. Perez-Villadóniga ◽  
Ana Rodriguez-Alvarez ◽  
David Roibas

AbstractResident physicians play a double role in hospital activity. They participate in medical practices and thus, on the one hand, they should be considered as an input. Also, they are medical staff in training and, on the other hand, must be considered as an output. The net effect on hospital activities should therefore be empirically determined. Additionally, when considering their role as active physicians, a natural hypothesis is that resident physicians are not more productive than senior ones. This is a property that standard logarithmic production functions (including Cobb–Douglas and Translog functional forms) cannot verify for the whole technology set. Our main contribution is the development of a Translog modification, which implies the definition of the input “doctors” as a weighted sum of senior and resident physicians, where the weights are estimated from the empirical application. This modification of the standard Translog is able, under suitable parameter restrictions, to verify our main hypothesis across the whole technology set while determining if the net effect of resident physicians in hospitals’ production should be associated to an output or to an input. We estimate the resulting output distance function frontier with a sample of Spanish hospitals. Our findings show that the overall contribution of resident physicians to hospitals’ production allows considering them as an input in most cases. In particular, their average productivity is around 37% of that corresponding to senior physicians.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-150
Author(s):  
Eleonora Rai

AbstractThis article retraces the intra-Jesuit theological debates on the theology of salvation, including the relationship between the elements of predestination, God’s foreknowledge, Grace, and free will, in the delicate passage between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, and within the debates on Augustine’s theological legacy. Specifically, it explores the Flemish Jesuit Leonard Lessius’ theology and the discussions raised by it within the Society of Jesus, in order to show how soteriology has been central in the process of self-definition of the Jesuit identity in the Early Modern Age. This is particularly clear from the internal debates developed between Lessius, on the one hand, and General Claudio Acquaviva and curial theologian Roberto Bellarmino, on the other hand. Not only does the article investigate little known aspects of intra-Catholic theological debate in the post Tridentine period, but it also shows how deep pastoral and moral concerns strongly contributed to the rise of Lessius’ open-minded theology of salvation, which seemed to deprive God’s sovereign authority in favour of humankind’s free will, and human agency in the process of salvation.


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