scholarly journals The Emperor's New Markov Blankets

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-63
Author(s):  
Jelle Bruineberg ◽  
Krzysztof Dolega ◽  
Joe Dewhurst ◽  
Manuel Baltieri

Abstract The free energy principle, an influential framework in computational neuroscience and theoretical neurobiology, starts from the assumption that living systems ensure adaptive exchanges with their environment by minimizing the objective function of variational free energy. Following this premise, it claims to deliver a promising integration of the life sciences. In recent work, Markov Blankets, one of the central constructs of the free energy principle, have been applied to resolve debates central to philosophy (such as demarcating the boundaries of the mind). The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we trace the development of Markov blankets starting from their standard application in Bayesian networks, via variational inference, to their use in the literature on active inference. We then identify a persistent confusion in the literature between the formal use of Markov blankets as an epistemic tool for Bayesian inference, and their novel metaphysical use in the free energy framework to demarcate the physical boundary between an agent and its environment. Consequently, we propose to distinguish between ‘Pearl blankets’ to refer to the original epistemic use of Markov blankets and ‘Friston blankets’ to refer to the new metaphysical construct. Second, we use this distinction to critically assess claims resting on the application of Markov blankets to philosophical problems. We suggest that this literature would do well in differentiating between two different research programs: ‘inference with a model’ and ‘inference within a model’. Only the latter is capable of doing metaphysical work with Markov blankets, but requires additional philosophical premises and cannot be justified by an appeal to the success of the mathematical framework alone.

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (138) ◽  
pp. 20170792 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kirchhoff ◽  
Thomas Parr ◽  
Ensor Palacios ◽  
Karl Friston ◽  
Julian Kiverstein

This work addresses the autonomous organization of biological systems. It does so by considering the boundaries of biological systems, from individual cells to Home sapiens , in terms of the presence of Markov blankets under the active inference scheme—a corollary of the free energy principle. A Markov blanket defines the boundaries of a system in a statistical sense. Here we consider how a collective of Markov blankets can self-assemble into a global system that itself has a Markov blanket; thereby providing an illustration of how autonomous systems can be understood as having layers of nested and self-sustaining boundaries. This allows us to show that: (i) any living system is a Markov blanketed system and (ii) the boundaries of such systems need not be co-extensive with the biophysical boundaries of a living organism. In other words, autonomous systems are hierarchically composed of Markov blankets of Markov blankets—all the way down to individual cells, all the way up to you and me, and all the way out to include elements of the local environment.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dimitris Bolis ◽  
Leonhard Schilbach

Thinking Through Other Minds (TTOM) creatively situates the free energy principle within real-life cultural processes, thereby enriching both sociocultural theories and Bayesian accounts of cognition. Here, shifting the attention from thinking to becoming, we suggest complementing such an account by focusing on the empirical, computational and conceptual investigation of the multiscale dynamics of social interaction.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elliot Murphy ◽  
Emma Holmes ◽  
Karl Friston

Natural language syntax yields an unbounded array of hierarchically structured expressions. We claim that these are used in the service of active inference in accord with the free-energy principle (FEP). While conceptual advances alongside modelling and simulation work have attempted to connect speech segmentation and linguistic communication with the FEP, we extend this program to the underlying computations responsible for generating elementary syntactic objects. We argue that recently proposed principles of economy in language design—such as “minimal search” and “least effort” criteria from theoretical syntax—adhere to the FEP. This permits a greater degree of explanatory power to the FEP—with respect to higher language functions—and presents linguists with a grounding in first principles of notions pertaining to computability. More generally, we explore the possibility of migrating certain topics in linguistics over to the domain of fields that investigate the FEP, such as complex polysemy. We aim to align concerns of linguists with the normative model for organic self-organisation associated with the FEP, marshalling evidence from theoretical linguistics and psycholinguistics to ground core principles of efficient syntactic computation within active inference.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Safron

Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) is a synthetic model that attempts to unify theories of consciousness within the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference framework, with particular emphasis on Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT). IWMT further suggests predictive processing in sensory hierarchies may be well-modeled as (folded, sparse, partially disentangled) variational autoencoders, with beliefs discretely-updated via the formation of synchronous complexes—as self-organizing harmonic modes (SOHMs)—potentially entailing maximal a posteriori (MAP) estimation via turbo coding. In this account, alpha-synchronized SOHMs across posterior cortices may constitute the kinds of maximal complexes described by IIT, as well as samples (or MAP estimates) from multimodal shared latent space, organized according to egocentric reference frames, entailing phenomenal consciousness as mid-level perceptual inference. When these posterior SOHMs couple with frontal complexes, this may enable various forms of conscious access as a kind of mental act(ive inference), affording higher order cognition/control, including the kinds of attentional/intentional processing and reportability described by GNWT. Across this autoencoding heterarchy, intermediate-level beliefs may be organized into spatiotemporal trajectories by the entorhinal/hippocampal system, so affording episodic memory, counterfactual imaginings, and planning.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beren Millidge

This paper combines the active inference formulation of action (Friston, 2009) with hierarchical predictive coding models (Friston, 2003) to provide a proof-of-concept implementation of an active inference agent able to solve a common reinforcement learning baseline -- the cart-pole environment in OpenAI gym. It demonstrates empirically that predictive coding and active inference approaches can be successfully scaled up to tasks more challenging than the mountain car (Friston 2009, 2012). We show that hierarchical predictive coding models can be learned from scratch during the task, and can successfully drive action selection via active inference. To our knowledge, it is the first implemented active inference agent to combine active inference with a hierarchical predictive coding perceptual model. We also provide a tutorial walk-through of the free-energy principle, hierarchical predictive coding, and active inference, including an in-depth derivation of our agent.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Safron

In introducing a model of “relaxed beliefs under psychedelics” (REBUS), Carhart-Harris and Friston (2019) have presented a compelling account of the effects of psychedelics on brain and mind. This model is contextualized within the Free Energy Principle (Friston et al., 2006; Friston, 2010), which may represent the first unified paradigm in the mind and life sciences. By this view, mental systems adaptively regulate their actions and interactions with the world via predictive models, whose dynamics are governed by a singular objective of minimizing prediction-error, or “free energy.” According to REBUS, psychedelics flatten the depth of free energy landscapes, or the differential attracting forces associated with various (Bayesian) beliefs, so promoting flexibility in inference and learning. Here, I would like to propose an alternative account of the effects of psychedelics that is in many ways compatible with REBUS, albeit with some important differences. Based on considerations of the distributions of 5-HT2a receptors within cortical laminae and canonical microcircuits for predictive coding, I propose that 5-HT2a agonism may also involve a strengthening of beliefs, particularly at intermediate levels of abstraction associated with conscious experience (Safron, 2020).


Author(s):  
El Hassan Bezzazi

The free energy principle and its corollary, active inference, were introduced by Karl Friston as an explanation embodied perception and action in neuroscience, and since, it has been used to address many other issues in different fields mainly related to cognitive science like learning, optimal decision, or interpersonal inference. Negotiation is a process where each negotiator has conflicting motivation is aiming to maximize his utility and where agreement is reached when the opposing interests are balanced. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how the free energy principle might be used through active inference in modeling a negotiation process based on an example of real life. The work is an attempt to bring together a dynamic logic framework with appropriate operators to consider motivation among agents on one hand and the active inference framework on the other hand.


Entropy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (8) ◽  
pp. 889 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maxwell J. D. Ramstead ◽  
Karl J. Friston ◽  
Inês Hipólito

The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to assess whether the construct of neural representations plays an explanatory role under the variational free-energy principle and its corollary process theory, active inference; and (2) if so, to assess which philosophical stance—in relation to the ontological and epistemological status of representations—is most appropriate. We focus on non-realist (deflationary and fictionalist-instrumentalist) approaches. We consider a deflationary account of mental representation, according to which the explanatorily relevant contents of neural representations are mathematical, rather than cognitive, and a fictionalist or instrumentalist account, according to which representations are scientifically useful fictions that serve explanatory (and other) aims. After reviewing the free-energy principle and active inference, we argue that the model of adaptive phenotypes under the free-energy principle can be used to furnish a formal semantics, enabling us to assign semantic content to specific phenotypic states (the internal states of a Markovian system that exists far from equilibrium). We propose a modified fictionalist account—an organism-centered fictionalism or instrumentalism. We argue that, under the free-energy principle, pursuing even a deflationary account of the content of neural representations licenses the appeal to the kind of semantic content involved in the ‘aboutness’ or intentionality of cognitive systems; our position is thus coherent with, but rests on distinct assumptions from, the realist position. We argue that the free-energy principle thereby explains the aboutness or intentionality in living systems and hence their capacity to parse their sensory stream using an ontology or set of semantic factors.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dimitris Bolis ◽  
Leonhard Schilbach

Abstract Thinking through other minds creatively situates the free-energy principle within real-life cultural processes, thereby enriching both sociocultural theories and Bayesian accounts of cognition. Here, shifting the attention from thinking-through to becoming-with, we suggest complementing such an account by focusing on the empirical, computational, and conceptual investigation of the multiscale dynamics of social interaction.


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