Medicaid Not Required to Fund Medically Necessary Abortions

1980 ◽  
Vol 1 (8) ◽  
pp. 3-6
Author(s):  
George J. Annas

In an extraordinary and highly controversial 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court decided on June 30, 1980, that the United States Constitution does not require either the federal government or the individual states to fund medically necessary abortions for poor women who qualify for Medicaid.At issue in this case is the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment. The applicable 1980 version provides:|N]one of the funds provided by this joint resolution shall be used to perform abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for the victims of rape or incest when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or public health service, (emphasis supplied)

Author(s):  
Joseph R. Budd ◽  
Michael W. Littrell

Intelligence gathering by law enforcement officers has been used in the conviction of criminals for many years in the United States. Law enforcement officers must ensure that the information gathered and seized does not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. However, officers, even though acting in the spirit of the law, may not be in legal compliance. This chapter identifies and discusses the requirements of a search warrant, the legally accepted exceptions to the search warrant requirements in the United States, and reviews several historical and modern United States Supreme Court cases on the gathering of intelligence by officers.


2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 218-242
Author(s):  
Mark Berger

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no person may be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. The Boyd decision in 1886 recognised an intimate relation between the privilege against self-incrimination and the restrictions on search and seizure in the Fourth Amendment and created a virtually impenetrable barrier to government demands that a suspect or defendant be compelled to produce evidence against himself. However, since that time the Supreme Court has progressively restricted the scope of Fifth Amendment protection in relation to the compelled production of evidence. This has been achieved by requiring all citizens to appear before grand juries; by denying Fifth Amendment protection to entities; by holding that the compelled production of evidence does not breach the Fifth Amendment unless the very act of production is self-incriminatory; and by denying the privilege in relation to required records. The Supreme Court's stance reflects a recognition of the complexity of contemporary law enforcement problems and may be seen as an attempt to balance the state's interest in the successful prosecution of crime against the citizen's interest in being free from state intrusion. The effect of the Supreme Court's reforms has been to broaden government authority to compel offenders to assist in their own prosecutions whilst limiting Fifth Amendment protection to incrimination through the accused's own testimony or its equivalent.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (11) ◽  
pp. 1193-1205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Libby Adler

On the same day that the United States Supreme Court handed down its much anticipated decisions on affirmative action in higher education, holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution permits a degree of race-consciousness in public university admissions, it also issued a far less heralded decision with implications for the ability of the states to address historical injustice. In American Insurance Association v. Garamendi (Garamendi), five members of the Court, led by Justice Souter, found that California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 (HVIRA) “interferes with the National Government's conduct of foreign relations” and is therefore preempted.


Author(s):  
Patrick J. Reville ◽  
William A. Bottiglieri

The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution gave the federal government power over foreign trade, trade with the Indian tribes and trade “among several states.”  By lack of further enumeration and the passage of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, it would be reasonable to conclude that commerce that is truly intrastate would, therefore, be within the regulatory province of the states.  In fact, that was the interpretation initially reached and subsequently followed by the United States Supreme Court.  But in 1942, that changed and, over the course of the following 60+ years, to date the Court has concluded, by an expansive interpretation of that federal power granted, that Congress and the federal government have virtually unbridled power to regulate not only those areas that would traditionally be considered “commerce” or “interstate commerce”, but, moreover, in areas that seemingly have nothing to do with commerce, interstate, or otherwise.  This paper will trace the journey that the justices have taken down this judicial interstate highway and the methods that the federal government has employed to achieve its objectives.  Hence, the subtitle of this paper:  From Expansion to Extortion.


Author(s):  
Martin A. Goldberg ◽  
James Murdy

The United States Supreme Court recently considered challenges to two state laws regarding direct shipment of wine and spirits from out-of-state. Michigan law banned these direct shipments completely, requiring sales from out-of-state to be made through a Michigan wholesaler, even though it permitted direct shipments from within the state. New York law similarly banned direct shipments, although it created a narrow exception for out-of-state wine producers who maintained a place of business within New York. In Granholm v. Heald, the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of these laws in light of the constitutional prohibition against state laws that unreasonably burden interstate commerce. The Court held that these laws did in fact impermissibly discriminate against interstate commerce, and were unconstitutional. It held that a state may permit direct shipments or prohibit them, but it could not create a discriminatory system where in-state direct shipment were permitted but out-of-state shipments were prohibited or burdened with additional costs. This decision left it to the individual state governments to fashion whatever direct shipment laws they wished, as long as the laws did not treat shipments from out of state differently from shipments within the state. As the individual states respond to this mandate, we can see how these new laws will impact wine tourism, actual and Internet travel for the purpose of experiencing and purchasing regional wines.


This chapter presents the conclusions to the book. It discusses ideas for the future of the off-campus student-speech jurisprudence. This discussion includes guidance for school officials and students on how to navigate the jurisprudence. The discussion urges school officials to exercise censorship restraint when confronted with off-campus student speech unless the speech constitutes a true threat. It also implores school officials and lower courts to treat students as citizens entitled to the right to free speech under the United States Constitution. Consonantly, the chapter recommends that school officials leave censorship of off-campus speech to law enforcement as well as the civil and criminal judicial processes as obtains for the citizenry at large. The goal of the chapter is to recommend ideas that students, school officials and lower courts can consider in order to minimize the abridgement of students' right to speech in off-campus settings.


1997 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael S. Vaughn ◽  
Rolando V. del Carmen

This article applies the concept of actuarial justice to the “special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements. According to the United States Supreme Court, the “special needs” exception should only apply when the routine interests of law enforcement are not implicated. Lower courts, however, have been instrumental in extending the administrative search doctrine of “special needs” into the realm of criminal law enforcement. The article concludes that as part of the broader movement in criminal justice toward managerial efficiency, the “special needs” exception serves as a tool of actuarial justice by diminishing Fourth Amendment rights.


PMLA ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 124 (5) ◽  
pp. 1714-1718
Author(s):  
Ian Baucom

Let me take as my point of departure a question of genre, one raised in the realm of jurisprudence by the amicus brief—that is, the brief of the amicus curiae, or friend of the court: one who is not a party to a case but holds a pressing interest in it. I was drawn to the genre, most immediately, by a reading of the amicus briefs filed in the case of Lakhdar Boumediene et al. v. George W. Bush, which came before the United States Supreme Court on 5 December 2007 and raised the question of whether the detainees held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, possessed the habeas corpus rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.


1987 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 249-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aviam Soifer

In 1898, the year Americans first sailed forth to fight in other countries to protect purported victims of imperialism, A. V. Dicey steamed into Harvard University to deliver his lectures on Law and Public Opinion in England. Like William Blackstone, Vinerian Professor before him, Dicey deployed a number of memorable epigrams to capture what seemed basic truths of his day. Dicey's assertion that ‘protection invariably involves disability’ appeared to state the obvious to Americans at the turn of the century.In this essay I will consider how the United States Supreme Court embraced Dicey's epigram and translated it into decisions during the tenures of Chief Justices Fuller and White about the capacity of the individual in the United States to contract and care for himself.


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