(Dis)solving the Chronological Paradox in Customary International Law: A Hartian Approach

2008 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lefkowitz

As traditionally conceived, the creation of a new rule of customary international law requires that states believe the law to already require the conduct specified in the rule. Distinguishing the process whereby a customary rule comes to exist from the process whereby that customary rule becomes law dissolves this chronological paradox. Creation of a customary rule requires only that states come to believe that there exists a normative standard to which they ought to adhere, not that this standard is law. What makes the customary rule law is adherence by officials in the international legal system to a rule of recognition that treats custom as a source of valid law. Confusion over this distinction arises because in the international legal system the same agents whose beliefs give rise to a customary rule are the legal officials whose adherence to the rule of recognition leads them to deem that rule legally valid. The proposed solution to the chronological paradox employs H.L.A. Hart’s analysis of the concepts of law and a legal system, and in particular, the idea of a rule of recognition. Yet Hart famously denies the existence of a rule of recognition for international law. Hart’s denial rests on a failure to distinguish between the ontological and authoritative resolution functions of a rule of recognition, however. Once such a distinction is drawn, it can be argued that customary international law rests on a rule of recognition that serves the ontological function of making customary norms legal, though not the authoritative resolution function of settling disputes over the alleged legality of particular norms.

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-233
Author(s):  
Kristina Daugirdas

Abstract This article argues that international organizations ‘as such’ can contribute directly to the creation of customary international law for three independent reasons. First, the states establishing an international organization may subjectively intend for that organization to be able to contribute to the creation of at least some kinds of customary international law. Second, that capacity may be an implied power of the organization. Third, that capacity may be a byproduct of other features or authorities of the international organization – specifically, the combination of international legal personality and the capacity to operate on the international plane. Affirming international organizations’ direct role in making customary international law will not dramatically change the content of customary international law or the processes by which rules of customary international law are ascertained. But recognizing that role is significant because it will reinforce other conclusions about how international organizations fit into the international legal system, including that customary international law binds international organizations. Such recognition may also shift the way lawyers within international organizations carry out their work by affecting the sources they consult when answering legal questions, the materials they make publicly available and the kinds of expertise that are understood to be necessary to discharge their responsibilities. Finally, affirming international organizations’ role in creating customary international law may make international organizations more willing to comply with those rules.


2018 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 466-484
Author(s):  
Graham Melling

Due to the nature of the international legal system, the International Court of Justice (icj) is regularly presented with new questions about which international law is unclear or to which it does not yet extend – and is thereby incomplete. The approach of the icj when faced with such gaps raises some fundamental questions about the nature of the international legal system and the judicial function of the icj. The purpose of this article is to revisit and the critically evaluate the issue of how the icj responds when faced with a gap or lacuna in the law.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Kirchner

While International Law becomes more and more specialized, a tendency towards Fragmentation becomes visible: more and more sub-regimes of International Law emerge, leading to an increased number of rules. With the creation of more sub-regimes, cases are becoming more likely in which more than one sub-regime is involved and the question arises, which sub-regime's rules take precedence. Recent examples for such collisions of regimes include the relation between Free Trade and the Protection of the Environment in theYellowfin-Tuna Casebetween the United States and Mexico which was settled only in January 2002, theTadic-Nicaragua Debateand theSwordfish Casebetween the European Community and Chile, including the need for some form of internal order or hierarchy within International Law.


2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omri Sender ◽  
Michael Wood

Offering a current reflection on Raphael Walden's 1977 article, ‘The Subjective Element in the Formation of Customary International Law’, this contribution seeks to illustrate that considerable clarity has been achieved over the decades with regard to several long-standing questions associated with customary international law, not least those surroundingopinio juris. Accumulated practice and constructive scholarship have supplied insights into, and indeed answers to several of the controversies that have bedevilled the theory of this central source of international law. While it may inherently defy exact formulations, and some theoretical questions remain, customary international law is thus today not only as present in the international legal system as it has always been but is also better understood.


2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 114-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Orakhelashvili

Over the past couple of decades, the relative growth of the human-oriented element in the international legal system has been one of the defining characteristics of the process of its evolution. Rules, instruments, practices and institutions for protecting individuals in peacetime as well as during times of war keep multiplying and becoming more imperative. How does the law respond to underlying the dilemmas this presents: through developing a system of effective remedies, or by admitting and tolerating substantial gaps in accountability? The present contribution covers the law of the responsibility of international organizations and the multiple grounds of attribution under it, mainly focusing on the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations and their applicability in practice. It also focuses on the immunities of international organizations, their sources and scope, and on the relationship between their competing or conflicting standards. There is more inter-dependence between the standards under the law of responsibility and those under the law of immunities than often meets the eye, and such inter-dependence is dictated by the orderly operation of both these branches of international law.


1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (3) ◽  
pp. 513-518 ◽  
Author(s):  
I. I. Lukashuk

The principle that treaty obligations must be fulfilled in good faith is one aspect of the fundamental rule that requires all subjects of international law to exercise in good faith their rights and duties under that law.In the sociopolitical sphere, this fundamental principle may be seen as manifesting the need perceived by states for an international legal system that can ensure international order and prevent arbitrary behavior and chaos. In the legal sphere, the principle is confirmation of the character of international law as law. Subjects of international law are legally bound under the principle to implement what the law prescribes.


2009 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulf Linderfalk

AbstractIn the international legal literature, it is commonplace to talk about the law of state responsibility as secondary rules of law. The terminology emphasises that in some way or another the law of state responsibility is different from other rules of the international legal system – what international legal scholars refer to as primary rules of law. The present essay inquires into the soundness of this language. As argued, the primary-secondary rules terminology builds on two assumptions. First, it assumes that the law of state responsibility can be described as separate from the ordinary (or primary) rules of international law. Secondly, it assumes that the two classes of rules can be described as pertaining to different stages of the judicial decision-making process. As shown in this essay, neither assumption can be defended as correct.


2021 ◽  
pp. 57-79
Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

International society is first and foremost a society of individual sovereign states. However, states are by no means the only relevant actors in international law. In fact, one of the consequences of the post-1945 expansion of international law into areas that had traditionally been of limited international interest has been the increasing legal importance of a variety of non-state actors, most notably international organizations and individuals. This chapter introduces the various actors in the international legal system that possess rights, powers and obligations in international law. It provides a thorough presentation of statehood and the criteria for the creation of new states, and briefly discusses the (limited) legal significance of recognition. It discusses the modes by which a state can acquire title to new territory; the issues of state succession and state extinction; and the legal personality of territorial entities other than states, international organizations, individuals and additional actors in the international legal system.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 307-324
Author(s):  
Michael Wood

Abstract This article looks beyond customary international law and asks whether the source of international law listed in Article 38, paragraph 1(c) of the ICJ Statute (‘the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’) might join the dance. Is there a risk that general principles of law may be too easily invoked where no applicable treaty or rule of customary international law can be identified? In emphasizing the distinction between customary international law and general principles of law, the article first recalls relevant recent work of the International Law Commission. It then addresses the term ‘general international law’ and certain problems related to it, and raises questions concerning the relationship between customary international law and general principles of law. Before drawing some conclusions, reference is also made to the place of general principles of law within the international legal system.


2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 33
Author(s):  
Roghieh Ebrahimi ◽  
Hossein Sharifi Tarazkouhi

International law as one of the human sciences which has been formed in the light of governments’ needs for regulation of relations and pertinences is a set of rules which based on the increasing complexity of international life; it has been added to its importance gradually. The international nature of rules in this science leads the main followers of international system namely government to be identified as drafters of aforementioned rules. In this research we will discussed about the status of human thoughts as the smallest subjects of international system and we try to prove this hypothesis that human thoughts had been an essential component in the formation of rules in the international legal system.


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