The First Trial of Former Members of the Kosovo Liberation Army: Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala, and Isak Musliu

2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 459-476
Author(s):  
PASCALE CHIFFLET

In its Judgement issued on 30 November 2005 in Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Trial Chamber II of the ICTY found that an armed conflict existed in Kosovo between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Serbian forces as of the end of May 1998. It held, however, that the evidence did not establish that there was a widespread or systematic attack by the KLA directed against a civilian population at the relevant time. The first trial of former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army also gave rise to a number of significant developments in the ICTY's jurisprudence relating to issues of international criminal law and procedure, such as the treatment of hostile witnesses and of eyewitness identification evidence, as well as the proof of the existence of a joint criminal enterprise.

2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-138
Author(s):  
Lyal S. Sunga

The Čelebići Trial Judgment, rendered by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia – the first ever to involve the joint trial of more than one accused – considers numerous important issues, from the method of interpreting international criminal law, the meaning and interrelationship between Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute, the character of the armed conflict and the status of “protected persons”, to many difficult questions surrounding the heinous acts perpetrated in Čelebići Camp. This comment analyzes the reasoning of the Trial Chambers to critically evaluate the significance of this fascinating case for the future development of international criminal law doctrine.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 118-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chile Eboe-Osuji

AbstractIn international criminal law, to sustain a charge of crimes against humanity, the Prosecution must prove, among other elements, that the perpetrator was involved in an attack directed against a civilian population. In Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa, the Special Court for Sierra Leone found that the Prosecution failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the civilian population was the 'primary object' of the attack and acquitted the accused on the counts of murder and other inhumane acts as crimes against humanity. The Appeals Chamber accepted this view. However, it reversed Trial Chamber I on the ground that the Prosecution evidence did establish that the civilian population had been the primary, as opposed to incidental, target of the attack. The author suggests that this is an error resulting from the undue jurisprudential pre-occupation with the meaning of 'primary' in relation to the notion of attack against a civilian population. Instead, the inquiry should focus on whether the civilian population was 'intentionally' targeted in the attack, notwithstanding that it may not have been the primary object of the attack. He submits that this approach would be consistent with the classic theory of mens rea in criminal law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-233
Author(s):  
Pedro Caeiro ◽  
Joana Costa

This article uses the legal construct ‘joint criminal enterprise’ (jce) as a focal point of the tensions between international criminal law (icl) and common criminal law. Drawing on the assumption that an over-arching concept of the criminal law in genere is plausible, and that icl is a special branch stemming therefrom, the authors start by characterising jce and by assessing the possible incompatibility of some of its forms with the principles of legality, voluntary act and guilt. The authors then question whether jce could be validated under a different understanding of icl (as an autonomous legal branch, or, at least, as a special branch within criminal law abiding by different principles). Finally, it is argued that the apparent decline of jce might be another instance where icl becomes itself ‘more wholly’.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 761-795
Author(s):  
Natalia Perova

Joint criminal enterprise (jce) has caused a lot of concern amongst international criminal law practitioners and academics since its first appearance at the ad hoc Tribunals. A recent landmark decision, by the uk Supreme Court in Jogee, that overruled 30 years of common law development on joint enterprise, stimulates further discussions on whether jce in its current form fairly reflects the balance between culpability and corresponding liability of the defendant. This article explores this issue by suggesting that the level of culpability of defendants does not match the degree of liability they incur under jce iii. The article dissects the jce iii mode of liability by considering it a ‘two-crime liability’: a common purpose crime and a foreseeable crime, and compares it with aiding/abetting. This article argues that the level of culpability of defendants under jce iii is much lower than their liability for the crimes they are convicted of.


wisdom ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 140-146
Author(s):  
Hayk GRIGORYAN

The article analyzes the mechanisms of bringing the military and political leadership of the opposing party of the armed conflict to criminal liability through the doctrine of "joint criminal enterprise", which is used in International criminal law, considering that the acts committed by this category of individuals, as a rule, are subject to investigation by international criminal tribunals on the basis of definitions developed by international practice. The analysis carried out by the Author also  enables to propose scientifically substantiated recommendations on the qualification of the acts conducted by the military and political leadership of the opposing party, which form  corpus delicti of various military and international crimes according to the rules of complicity provided for by the national legislation of the Republic of Armenia.


Crimen ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-99
Author(s):  
Irena Čučilović

Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) is the institute first applied by the International criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadić case, and thereafter further shaped through the practice of the ICTY despite the fact that JCE as a form of individual responsibility is not mentioned anywhere in the Statute of ICTY, neither implicitly nor explicitly. Although today there is no doubt that the Joint criminal enterprise is an institute of international criminal law, which was very often applied in the practice by both ICTY and other international ad hoc tribunals, the serious remarks to this institute do not abate. It's pointed out that this is an institute that "was created" to ensure the conviction of the defendants, which procedurally affects the prosecution, which is relieved of the burden of proving criminal responsibilities and the specific roles of each of the participants in the JCE. Besides that, at the time when this doctrine was formulated, it was not entirely clear whether it was a form of commission or a form of complicity. Only a couple of years later, in the Milutinović et al. case, the ICTY stands out that the liability based on the JCE doctrine, in fact, is a responsibility for the commission, which further compromised this doctrine. Questionless, the application of the Joint criminal enterprise doctrine in practice leads to serious violation of the fundamental principles of contemporary criminal law. With general review of the Joint criminal enterprise doctrine, in this piece of work, the author considers one case of conviction under the third (often referred to as "extended") form of JCE, in order to point out the key problems which this doctrine produces in practice.


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