The democratic deficit in South Korea: the democratic control of armed forces since 1993

Abstract This paper explains how South Korea's democracy has controlled the military since 1993. It reveals why the overpowered military has not faded even after the eradication of Hanahoe and the consolidation of democracy in South Korea in its aftermath. The democratic control over the military is examined focusing on: (1) budget, personnel, organization; (2) the judicial system; (3) security and defense policy; (4) personnel affairs, roles, and responsibilities; and an explanation based on laws and institutions, the strategy of key actors, and historical conditions of military confrontation. Under South Korea's democracy, the military budget, personnel, and organization are only partially controlled, leaving military commanders with jurisdiction over the military's judicial system. This is a result of legal and institutional limitations, as well as resistance from the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the military. In matters of security and defense policy, the president has taken the initiative to revitalize obsolete systems through political compromise with the military. The primary means for the president to control the military has been the personnel management of the MND and the military. The military is likely to pledge its allegiance to the regime instead of citizens because the former has control over personnel affairs, which has frequently led to unofficial private groups of military officers and their political interference. This case in South Korea shows that the way society controls the military sows the very seeds of risk and allows us to rethink the challenges in controlling the military in a democracy.

EL PLANEAMIENTO ESTRATÉGICO MILITAR EN ARGENTINA (2003-2013): REFLEXIONES EN TORNO AL GOBIERNO POLÍTICO DE LA DEFENSA

Austral Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations ◽

10.22456/2238-6912.44875 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 3 (6) ◽

Author(s):

Luciano Anzelini ◽

Iván Poczynok

Keyword(s):

Armed Forces ◽

Defense Policy ◽

Point Of View ◽

The Political ◽

National Defense ◽

Civil Military Relations ◽

Military Relations ◽

The Military ◽

First Time ◽

Core Problem

The national defense policy of Argentina has experienced advances and regressions since the democratic return in 1983. This result has been connected to the dynamics that civil-military relations have inherited from the dictatorial period. The necessity to subordinate the Armed Forces dominated the defense agenda during most part of the democratic period, constituting the core problem of this jurisdiction.The democratic governments implemented various initiatives that underpinned the civil control of the Armed Forces and that also caused, from a normative point of view, what has been characterised as a “basic consensus”. These measures restricted the autonomy of the men in uniform, whether through the demilitarization of civil functions or through the specific delimitation of the martial responsibilities.The habilitation of the spaces required for the exercise of the political administration of the jurisdiction did not necessarily implied, however, that civilians have fully developed this task. The performance of the democratic authorities in the area of defense had its ups-and-downs. At times, these deficiencies were associated to the very restraints of the domestic political conjuncture; at others, they resulted from the planning of the specific agenda of the sector, though.This paper studies the performances of the Ministry of Defense demarches during 2003-2013. The analysis focuses on the conduction of the strategic dimension of the sector; punctually, on the relative responsibilities of the military strategic planning. In this frame, the demarches of ministers José Pampuro (2003-05), Nilda Garré (2005-10) and Arturo Puricelli (2010-13) are resorted to.The temporal cutout of the study object assumes that a battery of unprecedented measures were implemented. For the first time since the return of democracy, for example, an effective debate on the conduction of the strategic dimension of the defense policy was addressed. Nevertheless, for reasons that are object of analysis during this article, the empowerment process of the political conduction survived along with ambiguities and retrogressions that, during the same period, made the absence of solid consensus regarding the results of the sectorial agenda evident.

Rwanda: Civil–Military Relations

10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1900 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Marco Jowell

Keyword(s):

Central Africa ◽

Armed Forces ◽

National Defense ◽

Mass Violence ◽

Early 21St Century ◽

Civil Military Relations ◽

Practical Experiences ◽

The One ◽

Military Relations ◽

The army has been a central part of Rwanda’s political system from the precolonial period until the early 21st century and is intrinsically part of the construction and politics of the state. Civil–military relations in Rwanda demonstrate not only the central features of transitioning a rebel group to a national defense sector but also how some states construct their armed forces after a period of mass violence. Since the civil war and genocide in the early 1990s, the Rwandan military has been the primary actor in politics, the economy, and state building as well as in regional wars in central Africa and the Great Lakes region. Practical experiences of guerrilla insurgency and conflict in Uganda and Rwanda, postconflict military integration, and the intertwining of political and economic agendas with the ruling party have shaped civil–military relations in Rwanda and have been central to how the Rwandan defense sector functions. Contemporary Rwandan civil–military relations center around the two elements of service delivery and control, which has resulted in the development of an effective and technocratic military in terms of remit and responsibilities on the one hand, and the creation of a politicized force of coercion on the other hand. The military in Rwanda therefore reflects the pressures and dynamics of the wider state and cannot be separated from it. The Rwandan army is thus a “political army” and is part and parcel of the political structures that oversee and govern the Rwandan state.

The Military and Democracy in the Philippines in the Age of Terror: Toward Democratic Control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines*

Philippine Security in the Age of Terror ◽

10.1201/9781439815519-10 ◽

2009 ◽

pp. 121-136

Keyword(s):

Armed Forces ◽

The Philippines ◽

Democratic Control ◽

Respect for gender equality as a component of civilian democratic control over the military organisation of the state

Journal of the National Academy of Legal Sciences of Ukraine ◽

10.37635/jnalsu.28(1).2021.52-60 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 28 (1) ◽

pp. 52-60

Author(s):

Yuliia Yu. Bobrova ◽

Yuriy O. Bobrov

Keyword(s):

Gender Equality ◽

Social Relations ◽

Armed Forces ◽

The State ◽

Public Attention ◽

Men And Women ◽

Gender Balance ◽

Democratic Control ◽

The Military ◽

The Impact

The analysis of numerous scientific publications demonstrates the great relevance of gender studies at the current stage of Ukrainian social development, in almost all spheres of social relations. As for ensuring equal participation of men and women in the functioning of the military organisation of the state, the implementation of such a gender balance contributes to improving civilian control over it through the possibility of developing the capacity of regulatory bodies in gender issues, promoting dialogue between the community and control bodies, and drawing public attention to the problems of accountability of institutions of this organisation. The main purpose of this study is to highlight the state of gender equality in the military organisation of the state through the lens of civilian democratic control. The study determined the state of legislative regulation of the concept of military organisation of the state and civil democratic control. The study analysed the introduction of a gender perspective in Ukraine in the subject matter and the dynamics of establishing a gender balance in the military organisation of the state; the impact on existing trends of legislative initiatives. It is stated that the modern Ukrainian army is mostly “male”. Despite the fact that women are allowed to serve in the military, they do not take part in making socially important decisions, they do not hold high military positions, and career growth is challenging for them. The study identified the main problems of implementing gender equality in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other structures of the Defence Forces of Ukraine, which are more based on social stereotypes of pre-defined roles for men and women. Civil control over the Armed Forces is described as a socio-political process in this area

The National Defence College

10.1093/oso/9780190130220.003.0005 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 162-198

Author(s):

Vipul Dutta

Keyword(s):

Paradigm Shift ◽

Prime Minister ◽

Armed Forces ◽

Military Officers ◽

Roles And Responsibilities ◽

Fresh Perspective ◽

The Military ◽

Jawaharlal Nehru ◽

National Defence

The final chapter looks at the National Defence College (NDC) in Delhi that was inaugurated by India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1960. It is the last of the military institutional creations designed to meet the training needs of senior ranking Indian officers. This chapter will contextualise the emergence of the NDC in the changing perceptions, roles and responsibilities of the Indian Armed forces. It will dwell at length on the post-independence cohort of senior Indian military officers that represented the ‘constituency’ of the NDC, and re-look at their subsequent assignments which symbolised a paradigm shift in the mandate of the armed forces, thereby offering a fresh perspective on the post-independence phase of the military institutional ‘Indianisation’.

Georgia: Warlords, Generals, and Politicians

10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1891 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

David Darchiashvili ◽

Stephen Jones

Keyword(s):

Armed Forces ◽

The United States ◽

Russian Revolution ◽

Prime Ministers ◽

Civil Military Relations ◽

Executive Authority ◽

Democratic Control ◽

Military Relations ◽

The Military ◽

The Relationship

The balance between civil and military structures is central to understanding the development of Georgian statehood since the beginning of the 20th century. The first modern independent Georgian state was established after the 1917 Russian Revolution. The Democratic Republic of Georgia declared its independence in May 1918. In February 1921, the young republic was incorporated into the Soviet state and had no separate army of its own. Since regaining its independence in 1991, Georgia has experienced multiple administrations, and despite significantly different policies on the military, the overall pattern has been one of civilian (though not always democratic) control. Georgian militias and paramilitaries, between 1918 and 1921 and again between 1991 and 1995, played important roles in determining political power at times of revolutionary or constitutional crises. Since 1991 there have been three presidents - Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze, and Mikheil Saakashvili - with strong executive authority. In 2013, the position of president was made semi-ceremonial and a prime-ministerial system was instituted. Since 2013, there have been multiple prime ministers. Bidzina Ivanishvili was the first and the most powerful. All of Georgia’s leaders have shifted from a Soviet to pro-Western orientation. Since the second half of the 1990s, the relationship with NATO has grown closer, which has had a major impact on the structure of the Georgian armed forces and on their relationship with Georgia’s civil authorities. The 2008 war with Russia had a major impact on the Georgian military, and, since then, the level of professionalization of the Georgian armed forces has increased dramatically. Samuel Huntington, Eric Nordlinger, and other Western students of civil-military relations have pointed to the important balance required between civil and military authorities for a stable democracy. Georgia still displays continuing features of nepotism, clientelism, corruption, and dominant political personalities, which has significant consequences for the independence of the Georgian military and for civil-military relations more generally. Western states such as the United States and Germany, and international organizations like NATO continue to urge reform and provide training to the Georgian armed forces

Ecuador: Military Autonomy Under Democratic Rule

10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1813 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Maiah Jaskoski

Keyword(s):

Armed Forces ◽

Third Wave ◽

National Defense ◽

Internal Security ◽

Human Rights Abuses ◽

The North ◽

Border Dispute ◽

Southern Border ◽

Democratic Rule ◽

Under Ecuador’s “third wave” democracy that began in 1979, the armed forces have exhibited considerable autonomy vis-à-vis civilians in government, as measured by (a) military intervention in politics and (b) the armed forces’ spread into internal security. Perhaps most noteworthy, military participation in politics and internal security increased significantly during the second half of the 1990s, in a permissive environment: as a result of their rule in the 1970s, the armed forces enjoyed a positive reputation within society as an institution capable of getting things done, without committing human rights abuses. Within that context, a traumatic military role crisis prompted the armed forces to expand their political and internal security roles. The armed forces lost their traditional mission of defending Ecuador’s southern border against Peru in the late 1990s, due to the resolution of that border dispute. In its search for institutional justification, the military proactively intensified its participation in politics and internal security. That extensive internal security work not only served as an indicator of military autonomy vis-à-vis civilians but it also made the armed forces ineffective and unreliable in responding to the civilian government’s basic national defense requirements, as evinced by the military’s response to a new sovereignty threat. When Colombian guerrilla crossings into northern Ecuador became a salient border threat in the 2000s, the armed forces focused on internal security in the north and not border defense.

THE ROLE OF THE DEFENSE INSTITUTIONS IN HANDLING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Jurnal Pertahanan & Bela Negara ◽

10.33172/jpbh.v10i2.897 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 10 (2) ◽

pp. 175

Author(s):

Marina Ika Sari ◽

Yuli Ari Sulistyani ◽

Andhini Citra Pertiwi

Keyword(s):

Large Scale ◽

Armed Forces ◽

National Defense ◽

Private Companies ◽

Health Security ◽

Health Crisis ◽

Strategic Role ◽

The Military ◽

Adaptation Phase

The involvement of the military in the global health crisis has begun since the COVID-19 outbreak broke out in Indonesia, starting from the implementation of Large-Scale Social Distancing to the implementation of the new normal adaptation phase. However, the involvement has received mixed responses. Some parties consider it as natural, while others question the urgency of the military involvement. This study focuses on the role of two defense institutions, namely the Indonesian National Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense in handling the COVID-19. It employs a qualitative research method and the theory of role, the concept of national defense, and the concept of Pandemic Management to analyze the problem. This study finds that the Indonesian National Armed Forces has a strategic role in several fields such as health, security and socio-economic as part of the efforts to contain COVID-19. The Ministry of Defense also plays a strategic role both internally and externally, by cooperating with other ministries, domestic private companies, state-owned enterprises in the defense industry sector, and with other countries in containing the COVID-19 pandemic.Keywords: role, defense, military, pandemic, COVID-19.

South Korea: The Journey Toward Civilian and Democratic Control Over the Military

10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1851 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Carl J. Saxer

Keyword(s):

South Korea ◽

External Pressure ◽

Central Intelligence Agency ◽

Civilian Control ◽

Intelligence Agency ◽

Intelligence Services ◽

Democratic Control ◽

The Government ◽

The Military ◽

Chun Doo Hwan

Many have seen the establishment of civilian and democratic control over the military as a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the consolidation of a nascent democracy. The establishment of civilian and democratic control over the military in South Korea was a long and, some would argue, uncompleted process. A coup in 1961 led by Park Chung-hee, a major-general, led to the establishment of an authoritarian regime that, while going civilian, was based on the control of the military and the intelligence services. Park was assassinated by the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in October 1979; however, the hopes of moving in the direction of democracy were soon squashed when Chun Doo-hwan, and his comrades in arms from the secret Hanahoe (One Mind) club of Korean Military Academy graduates, first took power over the military through an internal coup, and then took control over the government. Under significant internal, and external, pressure Chun Doo-hwan agreed to step down from the presidency in 1987 and allow the writing of a new constitution that led to free elections to the presidency in December 1987. The opposition lost the 1987 election due to its inability to agree upon a united candidate. The winner was Roh Tae-woo, a participant in the 1979–1990 coup, who would during his presidency take important steps when it came to establishing civilian control over the military. However, it was first with the inauguration of the Kim Young-sam in 1993 that the establishment of firm civilian control was achieved. He engaged in a significant reorganization of, and moved against the power of the secret societies within, the army. He also promoted the idea of a politically neutral military. This most likely played a significant role when Kim Dae-jung, the first opposition candidate, won the presidency in December 1997, as the military remained neutral and accepted the outcome of the electoral process. There has since been a strengthening of civilian control over the military in South Korea. However, there are a number of important issues that need to be dealt with in order to ensure full democratic control over the military and the intelligence services. While the military, as an institution, has stayed neutral in politics, military and intelligence resources have been used in attempts at influencing public opinion in the lead-up to elections. In addition, comprehensive oversight by the legislature continues to be weak and the National Security Law remains on the books.

Madagascar: The Military in Politics

10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1836 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Juvence F. Ramasy

Keyword(s):

Political Influence ◽

Political Stability ◽

Armed Forces ◽

The Political ◽

Historical Period ◽

African Countries ◽

Political Transitions ◽

Democratic Control ◽

The Public Sphere ◽

In many African countries, armies played a key public role in the aftermath of independence. For this reason, no study of African politics can overlook the militarization of the state. Postcolonial Madagascar, for example, was ruled for over two decades by personnel from its army. National armies often present themselves as neutral entities that can guarantee a country’s political stability. However, there is no such thing as neutrality, whether in Africa or elsewhere. The best hope for armies to become and remain as politically neutral as possible is the demilitarization of political power. The withdrawal of the military from politics and their subordination to civilian decisions is important but does not suffice to ensure the army’s political neutrality. Such a withdrawal was widely carried out through the third wave of democratization, the historical period during which there was a sustained and significant increase in the proportion of competitive regimes. Democratization processes cannot succeed without efforts toward neutralizing the military, and thus, toward demilitarizing the political society and depoliticizing the army. Post-transition regimes striving for democracy should bring about and preserve a formal separation of power between the political and the civilian spheres. For these regimes to establish a solid mandate, the army and the security apparatus need to be placed under democratic control. In Africa, the disengagement of the military from the public sphere came about with the political transitions of the 1990s. But changes in political regimes over the past decade have challenged the democratization process, as the return of praetorianism (an excessive political influence of the armed forces in the Sahel and Madagascar) testifies. Hence, demilitarizing politics, on the one hand and depoliticizing and reprofessionalizing the army on the other remain essential issues to be addressed.