It Ain't Over ‘Til It's Over: The WTO Case Law of 2018

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-151
Author(s):  
Chad P. Bown ◽  
Petros C. Mavroidis
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Antidumping Duties ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Business As Usual ◽  
European University

Our annual gathering in Florence (8 and 9 July 2019), generously sponsored by the European University Institute, amidst the crisis at the WTO, was business as usual. Trading nations continue to entrust the WTO dispute settlement system with the adjudication of their disputes. The conference covered a very healthy number of disputes across different subject matter, ranging from antidumping duties to protection of public health.

scholarly journals The concept of necessity under the GATT and national regulatory autonomy

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 77
Author(s):  
Isabel Salinas Alcaraz
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Gatt 1994

The intrusive effects of the WTO on Members regulatory freedom have been a growing concern since the establishment of the WTO Dispute Settlement System (DSS). An assessment of the WTO case law exposes that the Appellate Body (AB) has introduced some elements within the<br />necessity test under GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) article XX which do not find support in the text of the agreement and are potentially invasive of countries regulatory autonomy. This paper examines the evolution of the WTO case law in relation to the necessity concept within GATT 1994. Finally, an adjustment in the application of the necessity test to make it more consistent with the GATT text and to achieve greater balance between free trade and WTO members’ regulatory autonomy is suggested.

Legalization in context: The design of the WTO’s dispute settlement system

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 304-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manfred Elsig
Keyword(s):  
Rational Design ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Multilateral Trading System ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

This article asks why the dispute settlement provisions of the multilateral trading system underwent significant reforms during the negotiations that led to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Why did the leading trading powers accept a highly legalized system that departed from established political–diplomatic forms of settling disputes? The contribution of this article is threefold. First, it complements existing accounts that exclusively focus on the United States with a novel explanation that takes account of contextual factors. Second, it offers an in-depth empirical case study based on interviews with negotiators who were involved and novel archival evidence on the creation of the new WTO dispute settlement system. Third, by unpacking the long-standing puzzle of why states designed a highly legalized system, it addresses selected blind spots of the legalization and the rational design literatures with the aim of providing a better understanding about potential paths leading toward significant changes in legalization.

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