scholarly journals When may soldiers participate in war?

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 236-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uwe Steinhoff

I shall argue that in some wars both sides are (as a collective) justified, that is, they can both satisfy valid jus ad bellum requirements. Moreover, in some wars – but not in all – the individual soldiers on the unjustified side (i.e. on the side without jus ad bellum) may nevertheless kill soldiers (and also civilians as a side-effect) on the justified side, even if the enemy soldiers always abide by jus in bello constraints. The reason for this is that with regard to some forms of inflicting harm on others one may give special weight to one’s own interests and the interests of those to whom one has special responsibilities when assessing the proportionality of those acts. That is, the proportionality calculation may be agent-relative. This is in particular so in the case of foreseeably preventing innocent and non-threatening people from being saved (for instance, by shooting down a tactical bomber who would have saved them by destroying an ammunitions factory) but less so in the case of the intentional or foreseeable direct harming of innocent and non-threatening people (dropping bombs on people standing near an ammunitions factory). In the light of these considerations, I will then answer the question as to when soldiers may justifiably participate in war (and when not).

2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raphaël van Steenberghe

Proportionality is a condition provided under both jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Based on a particular interpretation of state practice and international case law, recent legal literature argues that the two notions of proportionality are interrelated in that proportionality under jus in bello is included in the assessment of proportionality under jus ad bellum. This article seeks to refute such a position and, more generally, to clarify the relationship between the two notions of proportionality.The main argument of the article is in line with the traditional position regarding the relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. It is argued that, although sharing common features and being somewhat interconnected, the notions of proportionality provided under these two separate branches of international law remain independent of each other, mainly because of what is referred to in this article as the ‘general versus particular’ dichotomy, which characterises their relations. Proportionality under jus ad bellum is to be measured against the military operation as a whole, whereas proportionality under jus in bello is to be assessed against individual military attacks launched in the framework of this operation.This article nonetheless emphasises the risk of overlap between the assessments of the two notions of proportionality when the use of force involves only one or a few military operations. Indeed, in such situations, the ‘general versus particular’ dichotomy, which normally enables one to make a distinct assessment between the two notions of proportionality, is no longer applicable since it becomes impossible to distinguish between the military operation as a whole and the individual military attacks undertaken during this operation.


2015 ◽  
Vol 84 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
James A. Green ◽  
Christopher P.M. Waters

For self-defence actions to be lawful, they must be directed at military targets. The absolute prohibition on non-military targeting under the jus in bello is well known, but the jus ad bellum also limits the target selection of states conducting defensive operations. Restrictions on targeting form a key aspect of the customary international law criteria of necessity and proportionality. In most situations, the jus in bello will be the starting point for the definition of a military targeting rule. Yet it has been argued that there may be circumstances when the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello do not temporally or substantively overlap in situations of self-defence. In order to address any possible gaps in civilian protection, and to bring conceptual clarity to one particular dimension of the relationship between the two regimes, this article explores the independent sources of a military targeting rule. The aim is not to displace the jus in bello as the ‘lead’ regime on how targeting decisions must be made, or to undermine the traditional separation between the two ‘war law’ regimes. Rather, conceptual light is shed on a sometimes assumed but generally neglected dimension of the jus ad bellum’s necessity and proportionality criteria that may, in limited circumstances, have significance for our understanding of human protection during war.


Author(s):  
Daniel R. Brunstetter

Limited force—no-fly zones, limited strikes, Special Forces raids, and drones strikes outside “hot” battlefields—has been at the nexus of the moral and strategic debates about just war since the fall of the Berlin Wall but has remained largely under-theorized. The main premise of the book is that limited force is different than war in scope, strategic purpose, and ethical permissions and restraints. By revisiting the major wars animating contemporary just war scholarship (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, the drone “wars,” and Libya) and drawing insights from the just war tradition, this book teases out an ethical account of force-short-of-war. It covers the deliberation about whether to use limited force (jus ad vim), restraints that govern its use (jus in vi), when to stop (jus ex vi), and the after-use context (jus post vim). While these moral categories parallel to some extent their just war counterparts of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus post bellum, and jus ex bello, the book illustrates how they can be reimagined and recalibrated in a limited force context, while also introducing new specific to the dilemmas associated with escalation and risk. As the argument unfolds, the reader will be presented with a view of limited force as a moral alternative to war, exposed to a series of dilemmas that raise challenges regarding when and how limited force is used, and provided with a more precise and morally enriched vocabulary to talk about limited force and the responsibilities its use entails.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-45
Author(s):  
Sakinah Sakinah ◽  
Nur Aslami

This review is expected to be ableto dissect the procedure of promotion work through the combination of 7Ps implemented by PT. General Insurance Bumiputera Muda 1967 Medan is now ready to compete in the field, this exam uses a fascinating exploration technique. This inspection was led by an organization engaged in the protection sector, namely PT. Bumiputera Muda General Insurance 1967 Medan. The methods of collecting information from this examination are (perception), documentation and meetings. Information obtained from the consequences of essential information and optional information. The information checking strategy used is an enlightening investigation that clarifies the actual conditions that occur substantially and significantly and explains exploratory information. The side effect of this expressive review is that the agreement is shaky and will often diminish with each passing year at PT. Bumiputera Muda 1967 General Insurance Medan was caused by the absence of the largest 7P advertising mix job vacancy applied by PT. Bumiputera Muda General Insurance 1967 Medan. The job of assisting the promotion procedure through the 7P advertising blend carried out by PT. Bumiputera Muda 1967 General Insurance Medan from the part (goods) offered to be competitive in search and very good, in terms of value it can compete in search, part of the circulation channel (place) is still not ideal and there are still weaknesses, part of progress (forward) ) is still not ideal and still uses the old strategy, the individual point of view is very large, the cycle perspective is sufficient, the point of view of tangible evidence is still poor in times of serious market competition.


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