scholarly journals Do families shape corporate governance structures?

2009 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
María Sacristán Navarro ◽  
Silvia Gómez Ansón
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Family Firm ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Board Committees ◽  
Spanish Family ◽  
Open Question

AbstractThis paper provides empirical evidence of family firm corporate governance structures, by examining a set of corporate governance characteristics of 132 non-financial Spanish listed firms. Results show that family firm boards present differential characteristics and that different patterns of family ownership configurations do not affect family firm corporate governance structures. We find that Spanish family firm boards are smaller than those in non-family firms. Family firm directors own a larger fraction of firm shares and have longer Chairman tenure than non-family firms, and family firms use fewer voluntary board committees – such as nomination and remuneration committees and executive committees. Besides, family firm boards and committees are biased towards insiders. Whether these differential characteristics affect other minority non-family shareholders negatively remains an open question.

scholarly journals Do families shape corporate governance structures?

2009 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
María Sacristán Navarro ◽  
Silvia Gómez Ansón
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Family Firm ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Board Committees ◽  
Spanish Family ◽  
Open Question

AbstractThis paper provides empirical evidence of family firm corporate governance structures, by examining a set of corporate governance characteristics of 132 non-financial Spanish listed firms. Results show that family firm boards present differential characteristics and that different patterns of family ownership configurations do not affect family firm corporate governance structures. We find that Spanish family firm boards are smaller than those in non-family firms. Family firm directors own a larger fraction of firm shares and have longer Chairman tenure than non-family firms, and family firms use fewer voluntary board committees – such as nomination and remuneration committees and executive committees. Besides, family firm boards and committees are biased towards insiders. Whether these differential characteristics affect other minority non-family shareholders negatively remains an open question.

scholarly journals Contractual and relational family firm governance: Substitution or complementarity?

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 497-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
Virginia Bodolica ◽  
Martin Spraggon
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Conceptual Model ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Family Firm ◽  
Boundary Theory ◽  
Substitution Effects ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
Governance Arrangements ◽  
Firm Governance

In this paper we argue that substantial weaknesses in corporate governance structures may be responsible for the pervasive failure of family firms to survive into the next generation. Aiming to improve extant knowledge on governance of family-owned enterprises that might boost their prosperity and longevity, we advance an integrative conceptual model which builds on boundary theory premises and accounts for the interdependencies among multiple governance arrangements. In particular, we suggest that the choice of an optimal governance configuration is dependent upon the way family firms manage the boundaries between their family and business identities. By combining contractual and relational devices of family firm governance into a single study, our model seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate in the literature regarding the existence of substitution effects and complementarity between alternative governance mechanisms.

Effect of audit committee independence, board ethnicity and family ownership on earnings management in Malaysia

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wan Masliza Wan Mohammad ◽  
Shaista Wasiuzzaman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Panel Data Regression ◽  
Effect Theory ◽  
History Of

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of audit committee independence, board ethnicity and family ownership on earnings management in Malaysia. Design/methodology/approach The effect of audit committee independence, board ethnicity and family ownership on corporate governance is investigated via 1,206 firm-year observations between the fiscal years of 2004 and 2009 of Bursa Malaysia listed firms. Panel data regression analysis is used to analyze the relationship. Findings The findings of this study fail to associate the role of audit committee independence as proposed under RMCCG (2007) in curtailing earnings management activities, thus supporting the findings on power distance scores that power granted to the top management may result in less effective independent directors. Nonetheless, in support of the alignment effect theory, family ownership is found to reduce earnings management activities. The findings show that corporate governance is more effective in developing country family firms due to their long history of family reputation and the importance of institutional culture factors. Research limitations/implications This study focuses on board ethnicity, family ownership and its influence on earnings management. Originality/value This study offers insights into the importance of family institutional structures on corporate governance reforms in Malaysia as Malaysian family firms are mostly traditional firms that have built their reputation and strength in the industry for many generations.

scholarly journals Earnings Quality, Family Influence and Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence from Malaysia

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Wan Adibah Binti Wan Ismail
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Family Influence ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
And Control

<p>This study investigates whether family ownership and control, and corporate governance are associated with earnings quality, and whether family influence in firms weakens the association between corporate governance and earnings quality. This study uses a panel sample of 527 publicly traded firms over the period 2003-2008 from the Malaysia Stock Exchange (Bursa Malaysia). Identifying family firms as firms in which family members hold a significant portion of shares and possess control over the board of directors, this study finds that family firms have significantly higher earnings quality. The results remain unchanged, even after using alternative measures of earnings quality and family influence. This study also finds that the earnings quality of firms in Malaysia is positively associated with the size and independence of the audit committee and negatively associated with the size of the board of directors. However, these relationships exist only for nonfamily firms. These results on the corporate governance variables suggest that the effectiveness of corporate governance could be mediated by family influence. Using multivariate regressions that include interaction variables for corporate governance and family firms, the study finds that the relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality is mediated by family ownership and control. The result is consistent with the argument that the monitoring role of corporate governance reduces when there is substantial control by family owners in a firm. Overall, this study concludes that family ownership and control drives higher quality earnings for firms regardless of their corporate governance structure.</p>

scholarly journals Family presence and financial performance in large listed companies in India

2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 40-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rakesh Pandey ◽  
Dennis Taylor ◽  
Mahesh Joshi
Keyword(s):  
Financial Performance ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Multiple Linear Regression Model ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Business Practices ◽  
Family Presence ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Better Than

This study investigates the impacts of family presence and board independence on corporate financial performance in 131 large listed firms from India, an emerging economy dominated by the presence of large business groups having concentrated ownership. Family presence includes the extent of family ownership and appointment of family CEO and family chairperson. Employing a multiple linear regression model, this study first detects a positive relationship between family ownership and financial performance. Second, a negative relationship is found between family CEO and firm performance, indicating that family firms with non-family CEOs perform better than firms having family CEOs. Third, the proportion of Board outsiders ‟ (i.e. independent non-family directors) is found to have no significant relation to financial performance, thus challenging agency theory‟s need for independent monitoring in family firms to enhance performance. These results are interpreted in the context of historical Indian family business practices and modern changes.

Earnings Management and Corporate Governance in Family Firms

2019 ◽  
pp. 127-153
Author(s):  
Elisabete Vieira ◽  
Mara Madaleno
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Ownership Effect ◽  
And Control

Earnings management and corporate governance relationships are examined for a sample of 49 Portuguese listed firms considering an unbalanced panel for the period 2002-2017, using panel corrected standard errors models and considering the family ownership effect. Empirical findings reveal that there is a positive relationship between corporate board independence and earnings management and that the presence of women on board decreases earnings management practices. Results are consistent with the hypothesis that earnings management practices are lower in family firms than in non-family firms. Size, being audited by the Big 4 companies, return on assets, loss, and the existence of an audit committee on board influence positively earnings management, but leverage, age, and ownership control are negatively related to earnings management. Results indicate that further auditing and control is necessary for Portuguese listed companies leading to strict recommendations to be followed by policymakers regarding control of these firms.

Ownership and Operating Performance of Spanish Family IPO Firms

2020 ◽  
pp. 210-233
Author(s):  
Fuencisla Martínez Lobato ◽  
C. José García Martín ◽  
José Emilio Farinós Viñas
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Operating Performance ◽  
Operational Performance ◽  
The Family ◽  
Spanish Family ◽  
Public Offering ◽  
A Company

Previous studies have shown the existence of a relationship between the ownership structure of a company and its operational performance. In this context, the empirical evidence reveals that after an initial public offering (IPO), companies experience a decline in their operational performance. In this research, the authors investigate whether the characteristics of Spanish family firms led to a different operating behavior with respect to non-family companies when they go public through an IPO. The results show that the particularities of the family firm do not turn into significant differences in operational performance after the listing process.

scholarly journals Principal-Principal Conflicts and Socioemotional Wealth in Family Firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (10) ◽  
pp. 128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason See Toh Seong Kuan ◽  
Chin Fei Goh ◽  
Owee Kowang Tan ◽  
Norliza Mohd Salleh
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Family Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Family ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Governance Practice ◽  
Corporate Governance Practice ◽  
The Relationship

Corporate governance is the concern of all the parties throughout the world regarding their viability in order to ensure the sustainability of the firm. As the family firms are listed in the public exchange, there are different kind of the investors in the corporation produce the resolution that are opposing to each other. Moreover, the large capital that is injected by the institutional investor complicates the role played in the corporation that shapes the culture and philanthropy. The phenomenon leads to the complex relationship in one corporation due to the different types of interest. Board composition and board independence are stretched by numerous scholars regarding the core importance in the corporation. Executive compensation is another area of corporate governance that is widely discussed by the scholars regarding the relationship with the long-term firm performance. Therefore, this review paper will focus on the application of the Principal-principal Conflicts theory and Socio-Emotional Wealth theory to narrate the whole scenario of the governance practice in the family firm. Throughout the paper, current rigorous practice of the family firms will be deeply investigated to cover the deep insights of the current phenomenon. The meticulous review of this paper is able to synthesize the significance of these theories towards the general governance setting in the family firms. Eventually, the working paradigm of the family firm can be clearly justified with the rationale that is justified. At the end of the review, the two main theories are concluded to be equally essential to illustrate the corporate governance practice in family firms across the globe.

scholarly journals Agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms and performance of public listed family firms in Malaysia

2011 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 17-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Ibrahim ◽  
F. A. Samad
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Family Ownership ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Utilization Ratio ◽  
And Performance

We compare corporate governance and performance between family and non-family ownership of public listed companies in Malaysia from 1999 through 2005 measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. We also examine the governance mechanisms as a tool in monitoring agency costs based on asset utilization ratio and expense ratio as proxy for agency costs. We find that on average firm value is lower in family firms than non-family firms, while board size, independent director and duality have a significant impact on firm performance in family firms as compared to non-family firms. We also find that these governance mechanisms have significant impact on agency costs for both family and non-family firms.

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