A Replication of Stern, West, and Schmitt (2014) Indicates Less False Consensus Among Liberals Than Conservatives, But No False Uniqueness

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 197-202
Author(s):  
John C. Blanchar ◽  
Michael Alonzo ◽  
Christine Ayoh ◽  
Kali Blain ◽  
Leslie Espinoza ◽  
...  

Abstract. Stern, West, and Schmitt (2014) reported that liberals display truly false uniqueness in contrast to moderates and conservatives who display truly false consensus. We conducted a close, preregistered replication of Stern et al.’s (2014) research with a large sample ( N = 1,005). Liberals, moderates, and conservatives demonstrated the truly false consensus effect by overestimating ingroup consensus. False consensus was strongest among conservatives, followed by moderates, and weakest among liberals. However, liberals did score higher than moderates and conservatives on the need for uniqueness scale, which partially accounted for the difference in false consensus between liberals and conservatives. Overall, our data align with Stern et al.’s (2014) in demonstrating left-right ideological differences in the overestimation of ingroup consensus but fall short of illustrating a liberal illusion of uniqueness.

2021 ◽  
pp. 002224372199837
Author(s):  
Walter Herzog ◽  
Johannes D. Hattula ◽  
Darren W. Dahl

This research explores how marketing managers can avoid the so-called false consensus effect—the egocentric tendency to project personal preferences onto consumers. Two pilot studies were conducted to provide evidence for the managerial importance of this research question and to explore how marketing managers attempt to avoid false consensus effects in practice. The results suggest that the debiasing tactic most frequently used by marketers is to suppress their personal preferences when predicting consumer preferences. Four subsequent studies show that, ironically, this debiasing tactic can backfire and increase managers’ susceptibility to the false consensus effect. Specifically, the results suggest that these backfire effects are most likely to occur for managers with a low level of preference certainty. In contrast, the results imply that preference suppression does not backfire but instead decreases false consensus effects for managers with a high level of preference certainty. Finally, the studies explore the mechanism behind these results and show how managers can ultimately avoid false consensus effects—regardless of their level of preference certainty and without risking backfire effects.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 813-850 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jay Mardia ◽  
Jiantao Jiao ◽  
Ervin Tánczos ◽  
Robert D Nowak ◽  
Tsachy Weissman

Abstract We study concentration inequalities for the Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence between the empirical distribution and the true distribution. Applying a recursion technique, we improve over the method of types bound uniformly in all regimes of sample size $n$ and alphabet size $k$, and the improvement becomes more significant when $k$ is large. We discuss the applications of our results in obtaining tighter concentration inequalities for $L_1$ deviations of the empirical distribution from the true distribution, and the difference between concentration around the expectation or zero. We also obtain asymptotically tight bounds on the variance of the KL divergence between the empirical and true distribution, and demonstrate their quantitatively different behaviours between small and large sample sizes compared to the alphabet size.


1995 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark D. Alicke ◽  
Edward Largo

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