Non-Hermitian topology in rock–paper–scissors games

AbstractNon-Hermitian topology is a recent hot topic in condensed matters. In this paper, we propose a novel platform drawing interdisciplinary attention: rock–paper–scissors (RPS) cycles described by the evolutionary game theory. Specifically, we demonstrate the emergence of an exceptional point and a skin effect by analyzing topological properties of their payoff matrix. Furthermore, we discover striking dynamical properties in an RPS chain: the directive propagation of the population density in the bulk and the enhancement of the population density only around the right edge. Our results open new avenues of the non-Hermitian topology and the evolutionary game theory.

Download Full-text

A Study of Taxi Service Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Journal of Advanced Transportation ◽

10.1155/2019/8607942 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 2019 ◽

pp. 1-17

Author(s):

Zhu Bai ◽

Mingxia Huang ◽

Shuai Bian ◽

Huandong Wu

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Evolutionary Game Theory ◽

Mode Choice ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Payoff Matrix ◽

Game Model ◽

Stable States ◽

Taxi Service ◽

Service Mode ◽

The Impact

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.

Download Full-text

An Analysis of Quality Liability Insurance for Prefabricated Components Using Evolutionary Game Theory

Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering ◽

10.1139/cjce-2020-0012 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Yan Liu ◽

Chenyao Lv ◽

Hong Xian Li ◽

Yan Li ◽

Zhen Lei ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Evolutionary Game Theory ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Payoff Matrix ◽

Liability Insurance ◽

Insurance Companies ◽

Social Benefits ◽

Simulation Calculation ◽

The Government

Managing quality risks of prefabricated components is one of the challenges for prefabricated construction. The Quality Liability Insurance for Prefabricated Components (QLIPC) is an effective approach to transfer such risks; however, limited research has been conducted regarding the development of QLIPC. This study introduces an Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT)-based approach incorporating decisions from both the government and insurance companies. In the EGT model, a payoff matrix under disparate strategies is constructed, and the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) are deduced. The simulation calculation is then carried out by MATLAB using sample virtual data to demonstrate the analysis. The results show that the government should act as the game promoter because the QLIPC can reduce governance cost and has significant social benefits. This research contributes a theoretical framework to analyze the QLIPC development using the EGT theory, and it could help the government to make long-term strategies for developing the QLIPC market.

Download Full-text

Evolving Ecological Social Dilemmas: A Spatial Individual-Based Model for the Evolution of Cooperation with a Minimal Number of Parameters

Research Letters in Ecology ◽

10.1155/2007/18636 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 2007 ◽

pp. 1-5

Author(s):

H. Fort

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Natural Selection ◽

Evolutionary Game Theory ◽

Spatial Model ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Social Dilemmas ◽

Payoff Matrix ◽

Evolution Of Cooperation ◽

Full Version ◽

Payoff Matrices

Cooperation, both intraspecific and interspecific, is a well-documented phenomenon in nature that is not well understood. Evolutionary game theory is a powerful tool to approach this problem. However, it has important limitations. First, very often it is not obvious which game is more appropriate to use. Second, in general, identical payoff matrices are assumed for all players, a situation that is highly unlikely in nature. Third, slight changes in these payoff values can dramatically alter the outcomes. Here, I use an evolutionary spatial model in which players do not have a universal payoff matrix, so no payoff parameters are required. Instead, each is equipped with random values for the payoffs, fulfilling the constraints that define the game(s). These payoff matrices evolve by natural selection. Two versions of this model are studied. First is a simpler one, with just one evolving payoff. Second is the “full” version, with all the four payoffs evolving. The fraction of cooperator agents converges in both versions to nonzero values. In the case of the full version, the initial heterogeneity disappears and the selected game is the “Stag Hunt.”

Download Full-text