scholarly journals Decisions and coordination of retailer-led fresh produce supply chains under two-period dynamic pricing and portfolio contracts

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Yan ◽  
Liguo Han
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Price Change ◽  
Fresh Produce ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Option Contract ◽  
Agricultural Produce ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Second Period

Fresh agricultural produce is almost the staple food and necessity of people's daily diet all over the world. However, natural perishability and freshness affect the demand for fresh agricultural produce. Due to the change of freshness, the retailer has to adopt a multi-period dynamic pricing strategy to deal with unsold products. The research object of this paper is the retailer's two-echelon supply chain of fresh agricultural produce, and the aim is to achieve the optimal two-period coordination and ordering through options and wholesale contracts in the supply chain. In the case of two-period pricing, we find that the optimal wholesale order quantity increases with the decline of the price in the first period and tends to be stable with the decline of the price in the second period. In contrast, the price change in the first period has a greater impact on the retailer's optimal order quantity. The profits of both the retailer and the supplier increase significantly with the increase of the price in the first period, while the impact of the change of the price in the second period is not obvious. Meanwhile, decentralized decision-making can only be coordinated in the supply chain through the original option contract at the first-period price. In the second period, the cost-sharing contract is introduced to coordinate the supply chain, increase orders, and increase the profits of both the retailer and the supplier. These findings are of great significance for both the retailer and the supplier in the multi-period dynamic pricing of fresh produce under the option contract.

scholarly journals Coordination of Supply Chain with One Supplier and Two Competing Risk-Averse Retailers under an Option Contract

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rui Wang ◽  
Shiji Song ◽  
Cheng Wu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Conditional Value At Risk ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Pareto Optimum ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Option Contract ◽  
Optimal Order Quantity

This paper studies an option contract for coordinating a supply chain comprising one risk-neutral supplier and two risk-averse retailers engaged in promotion competition in the selling season. For a given option contract, in decentralized case, each risk-averse retailer decides the optimal order quantity and the promotion policy by maximizing the conditional value-at-risk of profit. Based on the retailers’ decision, the supplier derives the optimal production policy by maximizing expected profit. In centralized case, the optimal decision of the supply chain system is obtained. Based on the decentralized and centralized decision, we find the coordination conditions of the supply chain system, which can optimize the supply chain system profit and make the profits of the supply chain members achieve Pareto optimum. As for the subchain, we also find the coordination conditions, which generalize the results of the supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. Our analysis and numerical experiments show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium between two retailers, and the optimal order quantity of each retailer increases (decreases) with its own (competitor’s) promotion level.

scholarly journals Recent Advances in Reducing Food Losses in the Supply Chain of Fresh Agricultural Produce

Processes ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (11) ◽  
pp. 1431
Author(s):  
Daniel I. Onwude ◽  
Guangnan Chen ◽  
Nnanna Eke-emezie ◽  
Abraham Kabutey ◽  
Alfadhl Yahya Khaled ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Mathematical Models ◽  
Fruits And Vegetables ◽  
Emerging Technologies ◽  
Fresh Produce ◽  
Cold Chain ◽  
Quality Loss ◽  
Agricultural Produce ◽  
Digital Twins ◽  
Food Losses

Fruits and vegetables are highly nutritious agricultural produce with tremendous human health benefits. They are also highly perishable and as such are easily susceptible to spoilage, leading to a reduction in quality attributes and induced food loss. Cold chain technologies have over the years been employed to reduce the quality loss of fruits and vegetables from farm to fork. However, a high amount of losses (≈50%) still occur during the packaging, pre-cooling, transportation, and storage of these fresh agricultural produce. This study highlights the current state-of-the-art of various advanced tools employed to reducing the quality loss of fruits and vegetables during the packaging, storage, and transportation cold chain operations, including the application of imaging technology, spectroscopy, multi-sensors, electronic nose, radio frequency identification, printed sensors, acoustic impulse response, and mathematical models. It is shown that computer vision, hyperspectral imaging, multispectral imaging, spectroscopy, X-ray imaging, and mathematical models are well established in monitoring and optimizing process parameters that affect food quality attributes during cold chain operations. We also identified the Internet of Things (IoT) and virtual representation models of a particular fresh produce (digital twins) as emerging technologies that can help monitor and control the uncharted quality evolution during its postharvest life. These advances can help diagnose and take measures against potential problems affecting the quality of fresh produce in the supply chains. Plausible future pathways to further develop these emerging technologies and help in the significant reduction of food losses in the supply chain of fresh produce are discussed. Future research should be directed towards integrating IoT and digital twins for multiple shipments in order to intensify real-time monitoring of the cold chain environmental conditions, and the eventual optimization of the postharvest supply chains. This study gives promising insight towards the use of advanced technologies in reducing losses in the postharvest supply chain of fruits and vegetables.

scholarly journals The More Supply Chain Control Power, the Better? A Comparison among Four Kinds of Cooperation Models

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weihua Liu ◽  
Shuqing Wang ◽  
Donglei Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
The Other ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Control Power ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Optimal Value ◽  
Total Profit

This paper introduces the parameter of supply chain control power into existing supply chain coordination models and explores the impacts of control power on the profits of manufacturer, retailer, and the overall supply chain under four modes of decision-making, including the decentralized decision-making dominated by manufacturer, the decentralized decision-making dominated by retailer, centralized decision-making, and Nash negotiation decision-making. Some significant conclusions are obtained. Firstly, supply chain control power does have great impact on the supply chain profits. The profit of the whole supply chain with centralized decision-making is higher than those of the other three modes, while the overall profit of supply chain with decentralized decision-making is superior to the profit when retailer and manufacturer dominate the supply chain together. Secondly, with decentralized decision-making, for manufacturer and retailer, it is beneficial to gain the control powers of the supply chain; however, control power has an optimal value, not the bigger, the better. Thirdly, under certain circumstances, order quantity will increase and the wholesale price will decrease when control power is transferred from manufacturer to retailer. In this case, the total profit of supply chain dominated by retailer will be greater than that dominated by manufacturer.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions of a Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Uncertain Demand of Indirect Channel

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Gao ◽  
Xiong Wang ◽  
Qiuling Yang ◽  
Qin Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Impact

The dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain demand of an indirect channel is constructed. In this paper, we establish three pricing models under decentralized decision making, namely, the Nash game between the manufacturer and the retailer, the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, and the retailer-Stackelberg game, to investigate pricing decisions of the CLSC in which the manufacturer uses the direct channel and indirect channel to sell products and entrusts the retailer to collect the used products. We numerically analyze the impact of customer acceptance of the direct channel (θ) on pricing decisions and excepted profits of the CLSC. The results show that when the variableθchanges in a certain range, the wholesale price, retail price, and expected profits of the retailer all decrease whenθincreases, while the direct online sales price and manufacturer’s expected profits in the retailer-Stackelberg game all increase whenθincreases. However, the optimal recycling transfer price and optimal acquisition price of used product are unaffected byθ.

scholarly journals The Low-Carbon Supply Chain Coordination Problem with Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Wu ◽  
Yuxiang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Emission Abatement ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

In this paper, we study the supply chain coordination problem between a manufacturer and a retailer regarding consumers’ low-carbon preferences. The retailer considers the market demand to determine the order quantity; the manufacturer chooses how to reduce emissions according to the retailer’s order quantity. We consider four cases, including the non-emission abatement, the emission abatement of decentralized decision-making, the centralized decision-making and the retailer providing a cost-sharing contract. By comparing the four cases, we find that the case of a retailer providing a cost-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain, achieving a Pareto improvement for the manufacturer and retailer. In addition, we use the Rubinstein bargaining model to determine the cost-sharing ratio. Finally, numerical simulations are given to analyze the impact of the cost-sharing ratio on the equilibrium results, including the profit and the emission abatement level. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of the cost-sharing ratio and consumers’ low-carbon awareness on the profits of the members in the supply chain. We find that the equilibrium results, including the order quantity, the emission abatement level and the profits of the members in the supply chain under contract, are higher than the ones under centralized decision-making. The results show that in the higher low-carbon awareness market, retailers should formulate a reasonable cost-sharing ratio to achieve emission reduction coordination.

INFORMATION SHARING ACROSS MULTIPLE BUYERS IN A SUPPLY CHAIN

2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (01) ◽  
pp. 1240005 ◽  
Author(s):  
JIANGHUA WU ◽  
ANANTH IYER ◽  
PAUL V. PRECKEL ◽  
XIN ZHAI
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Partial Information ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Order Quantities ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Multiple Buyers ◽  
Second Period

We model the impact of information visibility in a two-level supply chain consisting of independent retailers who share upstream supply. The manufacturer supplies similar products to the two retailers and each retailer serves its independent end market. Retailers face one period of demand and satisfy the demand by ordering in the first period or back-ordering some of the demand and satisfying it in the second period. The wholesale price in the second period is decreasing in the total order size across the two retailers in the first period. This decrease in wholesale price captures the market learning effect of aggregate orders that has been extensively documented in empirical literature. We use a game-theoretic framework to investigate the ex-ante incentives for retailers to share their private demand information. We show that: (1) retailers have no incentives to share information about their private values when equilibrium order quantities are interior, i.e., the order size is between zero and the demand; (2) partial information sharing may be the equilibrium strategy for retailers when equilibrium order quantities are binding on the demand. Finally, numerical examples are provided for illustration. This paper thus identifies conditions under which different levels of information sharing may be the equilibrium outcomes in a supply chain.

scholarly journals Inventory and Pricing Decisions Under Wholesale Price Contract with Social Preferences

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuren Liu ◽  
Huina Chen ◽  
Lili Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Price Setting ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Other Regarding ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Other Regarding Preferences

AbstractThis paper introduces the other-regarding preferences coefficients and studies the impact of social preferences on supply chain performance in the price-setting newsvendor setting. It is assumed that the stochastic demand is multiplicative. The manufacturer and retailer play a Stackelberg game. We analyze the impact of the decision-maker’s social preferences on the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price, the retailer’s optimal retail price and order quantity, the supply chain member’s profits and utilities, and the supply chain system’s profits and utilities under three different cases that only the retailer, only the manufacturer and both are with social preferences. We show that a manufacturer, as a leader, should find a spiteful retailer, while a retailer, as a follower, should find a manufacturer with generous liability, to improve the entire supply chain. Finally, numerical examples are given to illustrate these results.

An optimal order quantity with shelf-refill trips from backroom for efficient store operations

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 967-984
Author(s):  
Anukal Chiralaksanakul ◽  
Vatcharapol Sukhotu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Type Model ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Shelf Space ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Cost Impact ◽  
Optimal Order Quantity ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of backroom storage in supply chain replenishment decision parameters: the order quantity based on the well-established economic order quantity (EOQ) model. Design/methodology/approach The authors develop an EOQ-type model to investigate the operational cost impact of the order quantity with backroom storage. Because of the discrete and discontinuous nature of the problem, a modification of an existing algorithm is applied to obtain an optimal order quantity. Numerical experiments derived from a leading retailer in Thailand are used to study the cost impact of the backroom. Findings The paper shows that the backroom storage will significantly affect the decision regarding the order quantity. If its effect is ignored, the cost increase can be as high as 30 per cent. The costs and operations of additional shelf-refill trips from the backroom must be carefully analyzed and included in the decisions of replenishment operations. Research limitations/implications The model is a simplified version of the actual replenishment process. Validation from a real-world setting should be used to confirm the results. There are many additional opportunities to further integrate other issues in this problem such as shelf space decisions or joint order quantity between vendors and retailers. Practical implications The insights gained from the model will help managers, both retailers and vendors or manufacturers, make better decisions with regard to the order quantity policy in the supply chain. Originality/value Problems with backroom storage have been qualitatively described in the literature in the past decade. This paper is an early attempt to develop a quantitative model to analytically study the cost impact of backroom on order quantity decisions.

scholarly journals The Impact of Advance Selling Strategies on a Three-Echelon Supply Chain in the Presence of Social Influence

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Qianyu Niu ◽  
Feng Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Influence ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
New Product ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Minimum Order ◽  
Advance Selling ◽  
Minimum Order Quantity ◽  
Selling Strategies ◽  
The Impact

As the quality of new products is ex-ante uncertain, social influence plays an important role in the diffusion of a new product. An important question is how to expand public knowledge about consumer experience with a new product by using promotion strategies. This paper discusses the impact of advance selling strategies on a three-echelon supply chain when upstream enterprises launch a new product facing strategic consumers under social influence. This problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game, and a two-advance-selling-discount model is presented. Furthermore, we consider the impact of advance purchase behavior on the financing strategy when the retailer places an advance order. Several results are obtained: (i) the consumers’ utility in the second period is increasing in the number of predecessors. (ii) Upstream enterprises will provide deeper advance selling discounts when consumers become more patient or predecessors have a greater influence on imitators. Moreover, the total demand will increase when the consumer’s discount factor decreases or the impact intensity of predecessors increases. However, high innovation levels will drive enterprises to set high advance selling discounts. We also obtain the condition under which the total demand increases quickly as the innovation level changes. (iii) The two-advance-selling-discount model yields Pareto-improved results compared with the case where there is no advance purchase, though it cannot coordinate the supply chain. Finally, we extend the model to analyze the two-advance-selling-discount model with a minimum order quantity constraining the precommitted order quantity, and we show this can allow the enterprises to increase their profits. We also determine a condition under which the upstream enterprises should put a constraint on the minimum order quantity.

scholarly journals The role of voucher sale in advance for a capital-constrained supply chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haijun Wang ◽  
Guanmei Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
The Impact

This paper studies voucher sale as an operational method to raise working capital for a supply chain, which consists of a supplier and a capital-constrained retailer. The retailer takes advantage of an online platform to sell vouchers and to get access to borrowing from a bank. By formulating a Stackelberg game model, we show the retailer's possible order quantities in the cases without and with bank loan and analyze the impact of voucher sale on the retailer's optimal choice of order quantity and the supplier's optimal wholesale price. We find that a smaller voucher's price induces the retailer to be more likely to order with loan from a bank while a larger voucher's value induces an order quantity with the loan more difficult to be repaid. In addition, if voucher's price is large, the supplier decides a wholesale price which leads the retailer not to borrow from a bank; and if voucher's price is small, the supplier's optimal decision is obtained by anticipating the retailer to borrow from a bank. We also analyze the impact of voucher sale in the presence of trade credit financing on the firms' decisions. The results show that the voucher's price should be small so that the retailer can repay the supplier if voucher's value is large; otherwise, the retailer either does not borrow from the supplier or may not repay the supplier. Besides, the supplier decides a wholesale price so that the retailer does not borrow or can repay the supplier, except that the voucher's value is large and the voucher's price is medium.

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