Preference and Polarity: Epistemic Stance in Question Design

2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Heritage ◽  
Chase Wesley Raymond
Keyword(s):  
Dialogue ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stathis Psillos

ABSTRACTIn this paper, the key tenets of Anjan Chakravartty's book Scientific Ontology are critically discussed. After a brief presentation of the project of stance-based ontology (Section 2), I move on to criticize Chakravartty's account of metaphysical inference (Sections 2 and 3). Then, in Section 4, I take issue with Chakravartty's view that fundamental debates in metaphysics inevitably lead to irresolvable disagreement, while in Section 5, the concept of epistemic stance is scrutinized, noting that there are problems in Chakravartty's account of the rationality of stance-choice. Finally, Section 6 is about the implications of stance-based ontology for the scientific realism debate.


Multilingua ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-111
Author(s):  
Julia Sallabank

Abstract The Bailiwick of Guernsey is a small, semi-autonomous archipelago in the English Channel. Although it is a British Crown dependency and part of the British Isles, it has its own parliament and does not belong to the United Kingdom or the European Union. This unusual geopolitical situation means that the nation-state has little relevance. It is only recently that the indigenous former vernacular has been accorded any worth, at either grass-roots or government level: as its vitality declines (increasingly rapidly), its perceived value for individual and collective identification has grown. Although public opinion overtly supports indigenous language maintenance, and increasing its vitality is a stated aim (e.g., a government Language Commission was announced in 2012), effective top-down measures to increase the number and fluency of speakers appear to be low on the agenda. This article explores the implications of this socio-political background for language policy. It discusses language-related activities which reveal a lack of ideological clarification and strategic direction at all levels, compounded by issues of control, epistemic stance and language ownership.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 459
Author(s):  
Michela Ippolito ◽  
Donka F. Farkas

This paper deals with the non-temporal use of the future in Italian knownas ‘epistemic’ or ‘presumptive’ (PF) in declaratives and interrogatives. We firstdistinguish PF from epistemic necessity and possibility, as well as from weaknecessity modals, providing in the process the main empirical challenges PF raises.We then propose and justify a semantic account that treats PF as a special normalitymodal that involves a subjective likelihood component. Since in our account theprejacent (the proposition in the scope of the modal) is at issue, the use of PF triggersthe implicature that the speaker is not in a position to appeal to what she knows inorder to support her commitment to the prejacent. This, we claim, is the source ofthe intuition that PF is often used to offer a “guess” relative to the question underdiscussion (QUD).


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
William Rawleigh

The currently accepted scientonomic ontology includes two classes of epistemic elements – theories and methods. However, the ontology underlying the Encyclopedia of Scientonomy includes questions/topics as a basic element of its semantic structure. Ideally there should be no discrepancy between the accepted ontology of theoretical scientonomy and that of the Encyclopedia.  I argue that questions constitute a distinct class of epistemic elements as they are not reducible to other elements that undergo scientific change – theories or methods. I discuss and reject two attempts at reducing questions to either descriptive or normative theories. According to the descriptive-epistemic account, scientific questions can be logically reduced to descriptive propositions, while according to the normative-epistemic account, they can be reduced to normative propositions. I show that these interpretations are incapable of capturing the propositional content expressed by questions; any possible reduction is carried at the expense of losing the essential characteristic of questions. Further, I find that the attempts to reduce questions to theories introduce an infinite regress, where a theory is an attempt to answer a question, which is itself a theory which answers another question, ad infintum. Instead, I propose to incorporate the question-answer semantic structure from erotetic logic in which questions constitute a distinct class of elements irreducible to propositions. An acceptance of questions into scientonomic ontology as a separate class of epistemic elements suggests a new avenue of research into the mechanism of question acceptance and rejection, i.e. how epistemic communities come to accept certain questions as legitimate and others as illegitimate. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2018-0001]: Accept the following definition of question: Question ≡ a topic of inquiry. [Sciento-2018-0002]: Accept the ontology of epistemic elements with theories, methods, and questions as distinct epistemic elements. Reject the previously accepted ontology of epistemic elements. [Sciento-2018-0003]: Provided that modification [Sciento-2018-0002] is accepted, accept that the epistemic stance that can be taken by an epistemic agent towards a question is question acceptance (the opposite is unacceptance), defined as follows:  Question Acceptance ≡ a question is said to be accepted if it is taken as a legitimate topic of inquiry. [Sciento-2018-0004]: Provided that modifications [Sciento-2018-0002] and [Sciento-2018-0003] are accepted, accept the following question as legitimate topics of scientonomic inquiry:  Mechanism of Question Acceptance: How do questions become accepted as legitimate? What is the mechanism of question acceptance?  Indicators of Question Acceptance: What are the historical indicators of theory acceptance? How can observational scientonomists establish that such-and-such a question was accepted as a legitimate topic of inquiry by a certain epistemic agent at a certain time?


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Alonso Almeida ◽  
Margarita Mele-Marrero

This paper deals with authorial stance in prefatory material of Early Modern English manuals on women’s diseases. Publications on this field from between 1612 and 1699 constitute our corpus of study. Original digitalised texts have been analysed manually to identify and detect structures concerning authorial identity and stance, according to the model developed by Marín-Arrese (2009). This model for the identification of effective and epistemic stance strategies enables us to describe both the relationship between the authors and their texts and, more specifically, the power relationship between the writers and their audience. One of the most important conclusions of this study concerns the strategic use of stance markers to enhance the quality of these books and make them appropriate for a wide variety of readers.


Pragmatics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angeliki Alvanoudi

Abstract This conversation analytic study examines the linguistic resources for indexing epistemic stance in second position in question sequences in Greek conversation. It targets three formats for providing affirming/confirming answers to polar questions: unmarked and marked positive response tokens, and repetitions. It is shown that the three formats display different functional distributions. Unmarked response tokens do ‘simple’ answering, marked response tokens provide overt confirmations, and repetitional answers assert the respondent’s epistemic authority besides confirming the question’s proposition. Unmarked and marked response tokens accept the questioner’s epistemic stance, whereas repetitional answers may accept or resist the epistemic terms of the question, depending on the action being implemented by the question. This study sheds light on the organization of questioning and answering in Greek conversation and the role of epistemics in the design of polar answers.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia Marechal

Abstract In this paper I examine the moral psychology of the Phaedo and argue that the philosophical life in this dialogue is a temperate life, and that temperance consists in exercising epistemic discernment by actively withdrawing assent from incorrect evaluations the body inclines us to make. Philosophers deal with bodily affections by taking a correct epistemic stance. Exercising temperance thus understood is a necessary condition both for developing and strengthening rational capacities, and for fixing accurate beliefs about value. The purification philosophers strive for, and the purifying role of philosophy, should then be understood as a clarificatory act consisting in making one’s thoughts clear and withdrawing assent from erroneous evaluative content in our desires and pleasures. Along the way, I argue that philosophers must neither avoid situations and activities that cause bodily affections as much as possible, nor ignore or care little about them.


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