Open-economy Central Banking: Explaining Australia's Recommitment to Central Bank Independence

2001 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 459-480 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Bell
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Open Economy ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence

scholarly journals Central Bank Independence, Transparency and Accountability Indexes: a Survey

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florin Cornel Dumiter
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Aggregate Index ◽  
Central Bank Transparency ◽  
Considerable Impact ◽  
High Degree ◽  
Transparency And Accountability

Abstract Recently, the remarkable trend upon central bank independence and the efficient monetary policy were seriously highlighted in the monetary economics field. Starting from 1990s’ central bank independence was at the core of policy making and central banking problems, because of the widespread economical, political, personal and budgetary autonomy of the central bank. Nowadays, we can observe an increasing trend upon central bank transparency, for evaluating more accurate the central bank’s performances by the wide public, mass-media and financial markets. Consequently, a central bank must encompass a high degree of accountability and responsibility, because of the final liability in case of failure. In this paper we present, analyze and assess the construction of the most important indices regarding central bank independence, transparency and accountability in a chronological manner, presenting also the advantages and disadvantages of these indices related to actual practices of central banks. Moreover, we analyze the analytical results of the empirical testing of these indices with a considerable impact upon the developed and developing country group. In regard with the empirical results of different authors, we suggest the importance and the necessity for constructing an aggregate index for measuring central bank independence, transparency and accountability, based on de jure stipulations and the actual practices of the central banks.

Central Bank Independence and European Central Banking Institution-Building

1996 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-76
Author(s):  
Miriam L. Campanella
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Institution Building ◽  
European Central ◽  
Banking Institution

Abstract L’indipendenza della banca centrale dal governo viene considerata da molti studiosi come un requisito per il mantenimento della stabilità dei prezzi e per la lotta all’inflazione. L’articolo introduce la recente letteratura sull’indipendenza della banca centrale, mostrandone anche un apporto esplicativo nel caso del processo di costruzione della banca centrale europea.Benché l’indipendenza della banca centrale europea sia prevista da un articolo del Trattato di Maastricht, ci sono alcune critiche contro questa impostazione, sia perché si sostiene che l’indipendenza non sarebbe sufficiente per aumentare la credibilità, sia perché si ritiene che mantenere un basso livello di inflazione non sia di beneficio alia crescita economica.In conclusione, l’A. afferma, in accordo con gli studi sull’indipendenza della banca centrale, che in un mondo caratterizzato dalla mobilità dei capitali e dalla globalizzazione, la creazione di un ambiente finanziario stabile debba essere ritenuto uno dei più importanti fattori per la credibilità delle banche centrali.

Central Bank Independence

2021 ◽  
pp. 39-67
Author(s):  
Patrick Njoroge ◽  
Désiré Kanga ◽  
Victor Murinde
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
First Century ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
Key Issues ◽  
Personal Accountability

The chapter covers central bank independence broadly and makes use of rich literature to bring out key issues on central bank independence from the inception of central banking in 1668 to the twenty-first century. The chapter identifies four measures of central bank independence mainly focusing on legal characteristics. The findings of the study point to benefits associated with independence of central banks, including management of inflation. Also, it is found that delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank increases debt sustainability and fosters fiscal discipline. It is noted that central bank independence needs to be reconciled with the requirements of institutional and personal accountability of the governors. Further, the financial regulation role should be strengthened in the mandates of central banks as the objective of price stability does not necessarily foster financial stability.

scholarly journals On the impossibility of central bank independence: four decades of time- (and intellectual) inconsistency

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A Hartwell
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Institutional Analysis ◽  
Financial System ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Time Inconsistency ◽  
Fortieth Anniversary

Abstract The intellectual justification for modern central banking, time-inconsistency, celebrated its fortieth anniversary in 2017 alongside the Cambridge Journal of Economics. However, the key progeny of the time-inconsistency literature, central bank independence, has fundamental flaws that have been thus far neglected in mainstream research. In the first instance, the argument for independence relies on a utilitarian rather than institutional analysis, one that neglects the genesis of central banks and their relation to other institutions within a country. Second, central bank independence neglects the complex interdependencies of the global monetary and financial system. Applying an institutional lens to the concept of central bank independence, I conclude that ‘independence’ fails under the reality of globalization as much as it does in a domestic context. With central banks reliant on all manner of political institutions, they are never really independent operationally or in terms of policy.

scholarly journals Financial crisis and central bank independence and governance (CBIG) in the Asia Pacific.

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amirul Ahsan
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Positive Relation ◽  
Crisis Period ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the impact of financial crisis on central bank independence and governance in 36 Asia Pacific countries. It constructs a unique CBIG index for fifteen years (1991-2005); which has an overall index and six sub-indices covering all the necessary aspects of central banking operations. These indices are ranked first to measure the relative positions of the central banks and then statistically tested their relationship with inflation, economic growth and financial crisis of 1997. It applies a panel data pooled regression model and finds a robust negative relation of CBIG with inflation; moderate positive relation with economic growth; and CBIG in post crisis period is significantly different from the pre-crisis period.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions

2002 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 693-723 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Bernhard ◽  
J. Lawrence Broz ◽  
William Roberts Clark
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Open Economy ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Exchange Rate Regime ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Time Inconsistency ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
Exchange Rate Arrangements

In recent decades, countries have experimented with a variety of monetary institutions, including alternative exchange-rate arrangements and different levels of central bank independence. Political economists have analyzed the choice of these institutions, emphasizing their role in resolving both the time-inconsistency problem and dilemmas created by an open economy. This “first-generation” work, however, suffers from a central limitation: it studies exchange-rate regimes and central bank institutions in isolation from one another without investigating how one monetary institution affects the costs and benefits of the other. By contrast, the contributors to this volume analyze the choice of exchange-rate regime and central bank independence together and, in so doing, present a “second generation” of research on the determinants of monetary institutions. The articles incorporate both economic and political factors in explaining the choice of monetary institutions, investigating how political institutions, democratic processes, political party competition, and interest group pressures affect the balance between economic and distributional policy objectives.

Reflections on Central Banking

2021 ◽  
pp. 15-38
Author(s):  
Patrick Njoroge ◽  
Victor Murinde
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Exchange Rate Regime ◽  
Bank Regulation ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Policy And Practice ◽  
Peer Monitoring ◽  
Rich Countries

This chapter seeks to code the milestones on the epic journey of central banking from the initial conditions, through the transition, to modern policy and practice today, in a global context and Kenyan perspective. It is argued that although developments in economic theory, evidence, and policy have entrenched the robustness of central banking today, some unresolved issues persist: the issue of central bank independence; exchange rate regime outcomes in natural resource rich countries; bank regulation is still at the crossroads; the challenges presented by globalization and convergence of banking systems are real. The chapter concludes with a futurology of central banking: the future of bank regulation cannot ignore peer monitoring and market discipline; the primary mandate of central banks should be price stability but with some flexibility to respond to extraordinary circumstances; and central bank independence (personnel, financial, and policy independence) is critical for modern central banks.

Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Roberts Clark ◽  
Mark Hallerberg
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Open Economy ◽  
Capital Mobility ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Mobile Capital ◽  
The Exchange Rate ◽  
Monetary And Fiscal Policy

The literature on global integration and national policy autonomy often ignores a central result from open economy macroeconomics: Capital mobility constrains monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed and fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible. Similarly, examinations of the electoral determinants of monetary and fiscal policy typically ignore international pressures altogether. We develop a formal model to analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policymakers under various exchange rate regimes and the degrees of central bank independence. We test the model using data from OECD countries. We find evidence that preelectoral monetary expansions occur only when the exchange rate is flexible and central bank independence is low; preelectoral fiscal expansions occur when the exchange rate is fixed. We then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources of macroeconomic policy and for the conduct of fiscal policy after economic and monetary union in Europe.

Federalism and Central bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957–92

1998 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susanne Lohmann
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
The Status ◽  
Veto Points ◽  
German Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bankers

Two channels of political control allow elected politicians to influence monetary policy. First, political threats to the status, structure, or very existence of the central bank may force central bankers to comply with politically motivated demands on monetary policy. Second, politicians may use their powers of appointment to ensure diat central bank appointees share their electoral and party-political goals. This paper derives the monetary policy outcomes obtained as a function of me degree of central bank independence (zero, partial, or full) and central bankers' types (partisans or technocrats).Based on a case study of the 1957 and 1992 institutional changes to the German central banking system and a regression analysis covering the period in between, the author argues that the formal independence of the system is protected by its embeddedness in the institutions of German federalism and by the federalist components of its decentralized organizational structure. The behavioral independence of the German central bank fluctuates over time with the party control of federalist veto points. The Bundesbank is staffed with nonpartisan technocrats who are partially insulated from political pressures.

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