Unleashed dialogue or captured by politics? The impact of judicial independence on national higher courts’ cooperation with the CJEU

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Juan A. Mayoral ◽  
Marlene Wind
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Independence ◽  
The Impact

Ideology and Strategy among Politicians: The Case of Judicial Independence

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dror Brenner ◽  
Alon Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Investigation ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Impact

AbstractPoliticians act strategically. In the face of competition they modify their decisions in order to restrict the latitude of their potential successors. On the other hand, politicians have ideological preferences that also affect their decisions. The literature, however, has neglected to fully explore the interaction between these two considerations. This work offers such an analysis, using an empirical investigation of judicial independence as an example. We show that when the interaction between ideological considerations and strategic ones is accounted for, the impact of political competition on the level of judicial independence that politicians prefer – may in fact be opposite to the traditional wisdom.

scholarly journals Judicial Self-Government and Judicial Independence: the Political Capture of the General Council of the Judiciary in Spain

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (7) ◽  
pp. 1769-1800 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aida Torres Pérez
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
General Council ◽  
The Political ◽  
Public Confidence ◽  
The Impact

AbstractThe General Council of the Judiciary is the main institution of judicial self-government in Spain. It was established to ensure the external independence of the judiciary, and in particular the independence of the judiciary vis-à-vis the executive branch of government. To what extent does the Judicial Council manage to fulfill its goal? First, the evolution of the Judicial Council will be presented in order to understand the principal reforms and reasons behind its creation. Next, the impact of the Judicial Council upon judicial independence, as well as accountability, transparency, and public confidence will be critically examined in order to assess its contribution to judicial legitimacy. In the end, it will be argued that the politicization of the Judicial Council has hindered it from protecting judicial independence from partisan interests, and has contributed to undermining public confidence in the judiciary.

Recovering Lost Ground

2018 ◽  
pp. 31-44
Author(s):  
A.K. Ganguli
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Judicial Appointments ◽  
Academic Scholarship ◽  
The Impact

The impact of the excesses of the Emergency was felt long after it was officially terminated. This essay uncovers how the Emergency impacted judicial appointments. The author discusses how the 1980s have been characterized, in the judgment in the NJAC Case, as a decade where judicial independence was imperilled due to executive interference in the matter of appointments. The author sets the record straight by shedding light on the 1980s, particularly pertaining to the judgment in SP Gupta v. Union of India (1981 Supp SCC 87) (First Judges’ Case). In this essay, the author puts up a defence of this judgment, which is largely seen in academic scholarship as a genuflection of the judges before the executive. With the help of anecdotal examples, this essay tries to untangle the case of the curious eighties, making the larger point that it is a decade not amenable to easy typifying.

scholarly journals The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Government in Poland: On Judicial Reform Reversing Democratic Transition

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (7) ◽  
pp. 1839-1870 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Śledzińska-Simon
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Judicial Reform ◽  
National Council ◽  
Court Administration ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Impact

AbstractThis article argues that the establishment of the National Council of the Judiciary in 1989 and the empowerment of the general assemblies of court judges gave rise to the idea of judicial self-government in Poland. This very idea of self-government, implying that judges hold important decision-making or veto powers on matters concerning the judiciary, was regarded as a precondition of the separation of powers and judicial independence, neither of which existed under Communist rule. However, the package of laws introduced in 2017 marks the end of judicial self-government as we know it. Not only did it undermine the independence of the National Council of the Judiciary by altering the mode of electing its judicial members, but it also concentrated the power over the judiciary in the hands of the executive branch, allowing for, inter alia, the exchange of key positions in court administration and the reconfiguration of the Supreme Court. This article examines the impact of this “reform” on such values as independence, accountability, and transparency. Investigating the role of judicial self-government in ensuring the principle of separation of powers and democracy, the article concludes with an assessment of the early consequences of the introduced changes for the Polish judiciary.

scholarly journals Judicial Independence in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Myth or Reality?

2012 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-214
Author(s):  
Roger-Claude Liwanga
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Republic ◽  
Democratic Republic Of Congo ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
The Other ◽  
Republic Of Congo ◽  
Supreme Council ◽  
The Status ◽  
Democratic Elections ◽  
The Impact

AbstractSoon after the first democratic elections were organized in 2006, the Democratic Republic of Congo engaged in a series of juridical reforms to ensure that the judiciary is free from interference from the other branches of government: the legislature and the executive. Accordingly, Law No 06/020 of 2006 on the Status of Magistrates and Law No 08/013 of 2008 on the Organization and Functioning of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary were enacted. This article examines judicial independence in the Democratic Republic of Congo today, and assesses the impact of the newly adopted legislation by comparing it with the preceding statutory provisions on the functioning of the judiciary. Do the laws on the status of magistrates and on the organization and functioning of the supreme council of the judiciary, as recently enacted, effectively strengthen the independence of the judiciary?

The Best Laid Schemes … Gang Aft A-gley: Judicial Reform in Latin America – Evidence from Costa Rica

2004 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 507-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRUCE M. WILSON ◽  
JUAN CARLOS RODRÍGUEZ CORDERO ◽  
ROGER HANDBERG
Keyword(s):  
Costa Rica ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Free Market ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Judicial Reform ◽  
Supreme Court Justice ◽  
Personal Liberty ◽  
Market Economic ◽  
The Impact

‘Judicial independence is a means to a strong judicial institution, which is a means to personal liberty and prosperity.’ United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen G. Breyer.Starting in the 1980s, and accelerating through the 1990s, international financial institutions (IFIs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and development agencies funnelled considerable resources into judicial reform and rule of law programmes in virtually every Latin American and Caribbean country. The assumption was that reformed court systems would foster free market economic development strategies. This article examines the impact of two frequently advocated aspects of judicial reform, judicial access and judicial independence, on economic policy making in Costa Rica. We argue that there is a potentially significant disjuncture between the sponsors' expectations of the judicial reforms' economic impact and the observed outcomes.

To Reform or to Retain? Politicians’ Incentives to Clean Up Corrupt Courts in Hybrid Regimes

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 500-530
Author(s):  
Ketevan Bolkvadze
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Independence ◽  
Process Tracing ◽  
Political Control ◽  
Hybrid Regimes ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Political Fragmentation ◽  
Judicial Corruption ◽  
Entry Points ◽  
The Impact

This article offers a novel take on the problem of judicial independence in nondemocracies. Some scholars hold that political fragmentation leads to more judicial independence; others argue that it leads to less independence in nondemocracies. These studies have focused on judicial politicization and neglected judicial corruption. Using a process-tracing controlled comparison of reforms in Georgia and Moldova, I investigate the impact of political fragmentation on judicial corruption. I argue that politicians in less fragmented regimes, as in Georgia, have stronger incentives to reform corrupt courts, and utilize anticorruption measures for establishing long-term political control. In more fragmented regimes, as in Moldova, politicians have stronger incentives to resist anticorruption measures and instead utilize corrupt courts for short-term private gains. These findings suggest that political fragmentation in hybrid regimes can propel politicians to delegate neither more, nor less power to courts, but instead to use distinct avenues, or “entry-points,” to influence judicial outcomes.

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