Bill Passage Speed in the US House: A Test of a Vote Buying Model of the Legislative Process

2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew J. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Legislative Process ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
The Us

Regulating Proxy Advisors Through Transparency: Pros and Cons of the EU Approach

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gaia Balp
Keyword(s):  
Status Quo ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
European Regulation ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Status ◽  
Pros And Cons ◽  
Proxy Advisors ◽  
Legal Constraints ◽  
The Eu

This article outlines potential pros and cons of a future European regulation of proxy advisory firms, as set forth in the Commission’s Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2007/36/EC. After summarizing criticisms concerning the proxy advisory industry, and findings regarding its de facto influence on investors’ voting conduct both in the US and in the European context, the article adverts to why the power of proxy advisors appears to be overestimated. Uncertainty on the status quo of the industry’s actual impact on key decisions in listed companies, as well as costs associated with a regulation, need to be considered for assessing the suitability of the rules drafted to ensure adequate levels of independence and quality of voting recommendations. While transparency rules may be preferred to stricter legal constraints or requirements in a first stage, possible shortcomings of the Draft Directive exist that may undermine its effectiveness. Analyzing the amendments to the Proposal adopted by the European Parliament, and the Council’s Presidency compromise text, may suggest a preferable approach as regards single rules still making their way through the European legislative process.

Einbindung von Expertise und externem Wissen in das Gesetzgebungsverfahren

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theresa Sophie Huber
Keyword(s):  
German Law ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
External Knowledge ◽  
The Us ◽  
Rules Of Procedure ◽  
German Bundestag ◽  
External Actors

The author describes the influence of external actors on the legislative process in Germany and the US. In particular, the benefit of external knowledge for the rational fulfillment of governmental tasks and the quality of legislation are emphasized. The thesis focuses on whether the US lobby register can be transferred into German law. The author expresses considerable constitutional concerns and questions the usefulness of such a register. The thesis concludes with proposals on how to amend the rules of procedure of the German Bundestag (GOBT) and the federal ministries (GGO).

scholarly journals Backward Induction in the Wild? Evidence from Sequential Voting in the US Senate

2018 ◽  
Vol 108 (7) ◽  
pp. 1971-2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jörg L. Spenkuch ◽  
B. Pablo Montagnes ◽  
Daniel B. Magleby
Keyword(s):  
Simple Model ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Alphabetical Order ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
The Us ◽  
In The Wild ◽  
Sequential Voting ◽  
Us Senate

In the US Senate, roll calls are held in alphabetical order. We document that senators early in the order are less likely to vote with the majority of their own party than those whose last name places them at the end of the alphabet. To speak to the mechanism behind this result, we develop a simple model of sequential voting, in which forward-looking senators rely on backward induction in order to free ride on their colleagues. Estimating our model structurally, we find that this form of strategic behavior is an important part of equilibrium play. We also consider, but ultimately dismiss, alternative explanations related to learning about common values and vote buying. (JEL D72, D82, D83)

Does Lobbying Affect Bill Advancement? Evidence from Three State Legislatures

2021 ◽  
pp. 106591292110124
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Butler ◽  
David R. Miller
Keyword(s):  
State Legislatures ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Agenda Control ◽  
Data Scarcity ◽  
Organized Interests ◽  
Using Data

Many studies consider the effect of lobbying on the behavior of individual legislators, but few studies demonstrate a relationship between lobbying and the ultimate dispositions of bills by the legislature. One challenge to establishing this latter relationship is data scarcity, as few legislatures systematically collect and publish information on organized interests’ lobbying activities on each bill. We provide new insights on lobbying by using data from Colorado, Nebraska, and Wisconsin that records the positions organized interests take on proposals in those states’ legislatures. We find that organized interests’ lobbying predicts outcomes, especially when lobbying is directed against a proposal. We also use our data to test whether lobbying succeeds by building support among legislators (i.e., vote buying) or by affecting a proposal’s advancement through the legislative process (i.e., agenda control). We find that lobbying does not buy the votes of legislators on the committees of jurisdiction for each bill, but lobbying does strongly predict what bills make it onto the agenda. Our findings contribute to ongoing discussions about money and politics, bias in representation, and legislator behavior.

Congress: The First Branch

Congress ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-36
Author(s):  
Benjamin Ginsberg ◽  
Kathryn Wagner Hill
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Minority Rights ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Us Congress ◽  
Popular Government ◽  
The Us

This chapter is an overview of the US Congress and its major functions of representation and legislation. It argues that many of the characteristics of Congress with which Americans are so impatient stem directly from the institution's democratic nature. The legislative process is complicated because a representative assembly must find ways of balancing minority rights and majority rule and develop mechanisms for reaching decisions while still allowing competing claims to be heard and taken into account. In short, Congress is slow to act, cumbersome in its procedures, and contentious in its discussions because it is a democratic decision-making body. Many who disparage Congress are, in effect if not intent, disparaging popular government.

scholarly journals Democracy and Multilateralism: The Case of Vote Buying in the UN General Assembly

2014 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Carter ◽  
Randall W. Stone
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
The Us ◽  
Un General Assembly ◽  
Voting Decisions ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Buying In ◽  
Quantities Of Interest

AbstractDemocracies are more supportive of US positions on important votes in the UN General Assembly than of nondemocracies. Is this because democracies share common perspectives, or does this pattern reflect coercion? Since 1985, US law has stipulated that the US State Department identify important votes and that aid disbursements reflect voting decisions. To unravel these alternative explanations, we introduce a strategic statistical model that allows us to estimate voting preferences, vulnerability to influence, and credibility of linkage, which are theoretical quantities of interest that are not directly observable. The results reject the hypothesis of shared democratic values: poor democracies have voting preferences that are more oppositional to US positions than autocracies, and they are more willing than autocracies to take symbolic stands that may cost them foreign aid. Democracies support US positions, however, because US aid linkages are more credible when directed toward democratic countries. Splitting the sample into Cold War and post–Cold War segments, we find that the end of the Cold War changed the way US linkage strategies treated allies and left- and right-leaning governments, but the effects of democracy remained constant.

Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees

1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (3) ◽  
pp. 797-820 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard L. Hall ◽  
Frank W. Wayman
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Solid Support ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Systematic Research ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Supporting Evidence ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Business Interests ◽  
Congressional Committees ◽  
Using Data

Over the last two decades institutional critics have increasingly charged that moneyed interests dominate the legislative process in Congress. Systematic research on campaign contributions and members' floor voting, however, provides little supporting evidence. We develop a view of the member-donor relationship that questions the theoretical underpinnings of the vote-buying hypothesis itself and suggests two alternative claims: (1) the effects of group expenditures are more likely to appear in committee than on the floor; and (2) the behavior most likely to be affected is members' legislative involvement, not their votes. In order to test this account, we specify a model of committee participation and estimate it using data from three House committees. In contrast to the substantial literature on contributions and roll calls, our analysis provides solid support for the importance of moneyed interests in the legislative process. We also find evidence that members are more responsive to organized business interests within their districts than to unorganized voters even when voters have strong preferences and the issue at stake is salient. Such findings suggest several important implications for our understanding of political money, interest groups, and the representativeness of legislative deliberations.

Vote Buying in the US Congress

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Matter ◽  
Paolo Roberti ◽  
Michaela Slotwinski
Keyword(s):  
Vote Buying ◽  
Us Congress ◽  
The Us ◽  
Buying In

Congress

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Ginsberg ◽  
Kathryn Wagner Hill
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Internal Structure ◽  
Congressional Elections ◽  
American People ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Democratic Institution ◽  
The Us

This accessible overview of the US Congress's past and present, introduces students to the country's most democratic institution. The book surveys Congressional elections, the internal structure of Congress, the legislative process, Congress and the president, and Congress and the courts. It offers a fresh approach to the First Branch grounded in a historical, positive frame. The book argues that many of the characteristics of Congress with which Americans are so impatient stem directly from the institution's democratic nature. It is slow to act, cumbersome in its procedures, and contentious in its discussions precisely because it is a democratic decision-making body. But complaints are also that it is seen as polarized and corrupt, serving lobbyists, special interests, and campaign contributors rather than the American people. The book concludes by considering whether these charges amount to a serious indictment of Congress, its members, and its procedures.

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