Violence, Periodization and Definition of the Cultural Revolution: A Case Study of Two Deaths by the Red Guards, by Joshua Zhang and James D. Wright. Leiden: Brill, 2018. v+279 pp. US$156.00 (cloth).

2019 ◽  
Vol 82 ◽  
pp. 145-147
Author(s):  
Fei Yan
Modern Italy ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
R.J.B. Bosworth

SummaryThis article uses Venice as a case study of the ‘cultural revolution’ urged by some historians as a feature of the totalitarianizing ambition of the Fascist regime. But Bosworth finds a Venice which, though plainly affected by Fascism, nonetheless preserved much that was its own and much that expressed a continuity with the liberal era before 1922 and the liberal democratic one after 1945. He shows that many of the rhythms of Venetian life moved in ways which were different from those of political history, and argues that such differences ensured that Fascism scarcely instituted an all-controlling and completely alienating totalitarian society, at least in this Italian city.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (8) ◽  
pp. 346-366
Author(s):  
V. V. Bondareva

The article analyzes the first years of “the cultural revolution” in China (1966—1967), characterized by high revolutionary activity of students and school youth, organized into groups of “red guards”, who were distinguished in their actions by extreme cruelty and fanaticism. From this point of view, the destructive actions of the red guards, which were of a terrorist and mass nature, highlight the main direction of their revolutionary strike, which was inflicted on the party and state apparatus of China. Mao Zedong is presented as the initiator of a mass movement of red guards who used monstrous terrorist methods to fight his opposition and all, from their point of view, not enough politically conscious elements. The hongweibing movement, considered as an instrument of Mao Zedong’s struggle with the opposition, allows to reveal in the course of research the personal qualities of a leader who, in the name of establishing his own cult, was not afraid to deliberately plunge the entire country into mass and deeply disorderly turmoil. The detailed description of Mao Zedong’s personal attitude to what is happening, based on documentary sources, reveals the deeply dictatorial and anti-democratic nature of his power, which was asserted in the first years of “the cultural revolution” with the help of the red guards movement.


1979 ◽  
Vol 77 ◽  
pp. 50-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Yung Lee

This paper analyses Mao's revolutionary strategy as revealed in the Cultural Revolution. Defined as an analysis of ends and means, strategy stands between objective reality and action, linking one event to another in a chain of social causation. Since one's attitudes and ideology influence one's definition of the situation and one's selection of means and goals, these subjective elements constitute a large part of any strategy. This study of Mao's strategy therefore raises the following questions: what was Mao's role in the Cultural Revolution; what faults did he attribute to the pre-Cultural Revolution Chinese political system; what were his objectives in the Cultural Revolution; how did he actually lead themovement; and was there any discernible pattern in his leadership?Mao's Role in the Cultural RevolutionThe Cultural Revolution was certainly one of the most complex political events in the entire history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It involved a large segmentof the general population and all ruling groups, both the government and the Party, from the Central Committee down to Party branches in the schools and factories. Moreover, a wide varietyof issues were raised, discussed and debated: broad ideological and political questions and more specific questions of economic, cultural and educational policy. To complicate matters further, the mass movement lasted more than two years, passing through a number of different stages. At each stage, new political groups emerged, leading groups changed, and tactics shifted, only to produce a new configuration in the next stage. Each stage, therefore, exhibited its ownunique features in terms of the dominant actors, issues and coalitions, and each stage forced the individual actor to reconsider his choice of tactics and coalition partners.


2009 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kemper

AbstractThe article examines the growing radicalization of the Marxist anti-Islamic discourse in the USSR as a case-study of "Soviet Orientalism". To which of Marx's five socio-economic formations should Muslim society be assigned? During the relatively pluralistic period of the New Economic Policy (1921-1927) Marxist scholars offered various answers. Many argued that Islam emerged from the trading community of Mecca and was trade-capitalist by nature (M. Reisner, E. Beliaev, L. Klimovich). Others held that Islam reflected the interests of the agriculturalists of Medina (M. Tomara), or of the Bedouin nomads (V. Ditiakin, S. Asfendiarov); and some even detected communist elements in Islam (Z. and D. Navshirvanov). All authors found support in the Qur'ān and works of Western Orientalists. By the late 1920s Marx' and Engels' scattered statements on Islam became central in the discourse, and in 1930 Liutsian Klimovich rejected the Qur'ān altogether by arguing that the book, as well as Muhammad himself, were mere inventions of later times. By the end of the Cultural Revolution (1929-1931) it was finally "established" that Islam was "feudal" in character, and critical studies of Islam became impossible for decades. The "feudal" interpretation legitimized the Soviet attack on Islam and Muslim societies at that time; but also many of the Marxist writers on Islam perished in Stalin's Terror. We suggest that the harsh polemics the authors directed against each other in the discourse contributed to their later repression. By lending itself to the interests of the totalitarian state, Soviet Marxist Islamology committed suicide—the ultimate form of "Orientalism".


Author(s):  
Bazar D. Tsybenov Tsybenov ◽  
◽  
Tsyden S. Ochirov ◽  

Introduction. Peculiarities of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ in China’s national regions remain a poorly studied issue in modern Oriental studies. In this regard, Hulunbuir league of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region had been a strategically important and geopolitically significant region of the country. This territory bordered on the Mongolian People’s Republic and the USSR, therefore the central government of China considered its population potentially dangerous and marginal. The People’s Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia had two party factions in Hulunbuir league: the ‘unification’ faction, and the ‘justice’ one. The Maoists viewed the ‘Mongol Unification’ faction of the People’s Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia as a particularly dangerous, separatist trend. Goals. The paper aims to examine the political events and facts that took place in Hulunbuir league in 1965–1968. Objectives. Chronologically, the first objective is to examine the ideological and political campaigns —struggle against the ‘Four Olds’, and the ‘Four Purges’ — as a prehistory to the ‘Cultural Revolution’. The second objective is to analyze the cardinal changes that took place in the leadership of the party committee and local authorities in 1966–1968. The third problem studied deals with repressive activities of the Red Guards and Zaofan in Hulunbuir league, their division into two fighting camps. The fourth objective is to examine the creation of the aimag revolutionary committee and its activities in 1968. Materials. The work analyzes three collections of official documents published in the PRC. The information thereof is supplemented with materials from works by Russian and foreign authors. The article provides a comparative analysis of events and facts, translates some terms from Mongolian and Chinese. Results. The introducing part the paper examines a prehistory of the ‘Cultural Revolution’, the ideological and political campaigns. Its main part studies the events of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ in the region. In July of 1966, a special working group arrived in Hailar on behalf of the CPC Northern Bureau. Members of this group were cadre Party workers from Hubei and Shanxi provinces. In September of 1966, Party Committee Secretary of Hulunbuir league Qi Junshan and Deputy Secretary Zhargal were dismissed from their posts. Red Guards appeared in Hulunbuir in August of 1966 and began organizing ‘struggle meetings’. They actively recruited local Mongolian youth. In 1967, the Red Guards in Hulunbuir split into two opposing factions. They were confronting each other and for a while forgot about ‘class enemies’. Activities of the Red Guards were out of control of the regional authorities, and the situation needed stabilization. In March of 1967, the State Council and the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China decided to create a military council in Hulunbuir league, also referred to as ‘the first line to contain the Revolution and stimulate production’. On December 20, 1967, a revolutionary committee was formed in Hailar. In March of 1968, Shangmin, a loyal follower of Mao Zedong, became the leader of the revolutionary committee. Making false accusations, he intensified repressions against members of the ‘Mongol Unification’ faction. Conclusions. Political events in Hulunbuir league in 1965–1968 were directly related to the situation in the whole autonomous region and country. Repressions against members of the ‘Mongol Unification’ faction were a distinctive feature of the repressive policy in the region. Still, the appointments of cadre Party workers from central provinces are a poorly understood issue. So, the ‘Cultural Revolution’ in this territory of Inner Mongolia obviously has local features that require further scientific research.


1980 ◽  
Vol 84 ◽  
pp. 641-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Knight

Despite the flood of Mao's previously unknown works released by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, no pre-liberation versions of his “celebrated philosophical essays” On Contradiction and On Practice came to light from that source. This gap in the Red Guard material may have been viewed as significant, confirming suspicions held by some that there were in fact no pre-liberation versions of these essays, and showing more conclusively the mendacity of the Chinese claim that they were originally written in 1937. Arthur Cohen, perhaps the most vociferous critic of Mao's “originality” as philosopher, argued in 1964 that both essays had been written in the period 1950 to 1952, and that the Chinese claim “appears to be fraudulent.” Doolin and Golas also contest the Chinese claim that On Contradiction was written by Mao in 1937. In both cases, the motivation for this falsification of the date of composition is interpreted as being the desire to backdate Mao's status as a Marxist theoretician to the early Yan'an period. Schram and Wittfogel, however, have both accepted the possibility that On Contradiction and On Practice could have been written in 1937, while not denying that the 1950 and 1952 texts could represent heavily revised versions of earlier pieces. Schram, in fact, has argued that Mao's Lecture Notes on Dialectical Materialism, On Practice and On Contradiction belonged to “a single intellectual enterprise, namely Mao's attempt to come to terms with the philosophical basis of Marxism from the time he was first exposed to it in July 1936 until the Japanese attack of September 1937 turned his attention to more practical things.”


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