The Crime–Terror Nexus

Author(s):  
Katharine Petrich

The crime–terror nexus is the convergence of two types of disruptive nonstate group activities, crime and terrorism. The phrase can also be used to refer to cooperation between criminal and terrorist groups. When conceptualizing the crime–terror nexus, it’s helpful to categorize relationships in three ways. To achieve nexus status, groups either collaborate, combine, or convert. The most common presentation of nexus (or hybrid) groups is terrorist “conversion,” when a purely terrorist organization transitions into a more diversified model, rather than criminal groups moving toward political violence (though there are some notable exceptions) or two groups of different types “joining forces.” Responses to the crime–terror nexus have been uneven. Organized crime and terrorism research have traditionally been siloed from each other, with academics, policymakers, and law enforcement specializing in one or the other—an artificial divide that has become particularly problematic given the modern interconnectedness of political and economic systems wrought by globalization. Traditional security thinking is biased against crime–terror convergence because it emphasizes the difference in motivation between criminal and terrorist groups. Adherents have argued that any such relationships would be transactional and short-lived because criminal groups are interested in remaining out of the public eye, while terrorist groups are explicitly interested in drawing attention to themselves. However, this perspective misses both the potential benefits of diversified activities for violent nonstate groups, and the idea that groups can pursue a range of goals simultaneously across different levels of the organization. Notable exceptions to this institutional siloing include “deep web” and “dark networks” research, which have identified criminal–extremist relationships as relying on similar infrastructure and thus persisting over a longer time span. Both law enforcement and researchers should take their cue from this wholistic orientation. Siloing crime and terrorism from one another presents operational problems: while these groups and their activities may move easily between criminal and political violence, states often separate their law enforcement from their military and domestic security agencies, creating bureaucratic hurdles for effective disruption of hybrid groups. A small cadre of researchers, however, have begun to rectify these artificial disciplinary boundaries. Recent literature on the crime–terror nexus can be broadly categorized into four major buckets: the causes and enabling conditions that allow for such interactions, the spectrum of possible relationships, the ways that groups change as they move into the other’s area of operation, and the policy implications for melded groups. Drawing on work across criminology, sociology, political economy, history, and organizational behavior, in addition to political science, we can more effectively map and understand the contours of the crime–terror nexus. Criminally diversified terrorist groups are a distinct security threat because they are more adaptable, resilient, and entrenched than their traditionally resourced counterparts. Further, criminal activity may alter a group’s long-term political goals, making negotiated settlements and demobilization agreements more challenging. By including the crime–terror nexus in assessments, both academics and policymakers can make more accurate assessments of the contours of low-intensity and asymmetric warfare, leading to better policy outcomes, durable institution building, and increased protections for populations impacted by violent nonstate actors.

Author(s):  
Georgios A. Antonopoulos ◽  
Georgios Papanicolaou

‘Controlling and preventing organized crime’ discusses the types of policy and law enforcement approaches intended to address organized crime as an issue. The US became the first country to develop a comprehensive and wide-ranging response to the phenomenon of ‘organized crime’. Legislation introduced in the late 1960s gave prosecutors a new model based on patterns of criminal activity rather than specific offences. Alongside the new tools for prosecuting criminal groups, it increased the severity of sanctions against them. The US approach became the model for other countries. With organized crime being seen as an international issue new organizations have appeared to address it. But can organized crime ever be prevented?


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Bolton

This review examines evidence on criminal deforestation activity in Latin America (particularly, but not exclusively the Amazon) and draws from the literature on the lessons learned in combatting criminal deforestation activity. This review focuses on Brazil as representative of the overwhelming majority of literature on criminal activity in relation to deforestation in the Amazon. The literature notes that Illegal deforestation occurs largely through criminal networks as they have the capacity for coordination, processing, selling, and the deployment of armed men to protect operations. Bribery, corruption, and fraud are deeply ingrained in deforestation. Networks may bribe geoprocessing experts, police, and public officials. Members of the criminal groups may become council members, mayors, and state representatives. Land titles are fabricated and trading documentation fraudulent. The literature also notes some interventions to combat this criminal deforestation activity: monitoring and law enforcement; national systems for registry and monitoring; legal enforcement for compliance of environmental law; International agreements and action; and Involving indigenous communities in combatting deforestation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-106
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vladimirovna Rednikova

Throughout the world, modern environmental crime is characterized by the emergence of new forms of criminal behavior, improving ways of committing crimes and steadily increasing participation of organized criminal groups and communities in their commission. Nowadays, organized environmental crime along with environmental terrorism constitute a significant security threat. The distinctive features of organized environmental crime include: longevity and stability of a criminal organization, which in most cases effectively manages a complex of criminal activities from the organizational and economic point of view, and also has the ability to minimize the risks arising in this connection, long-term planning of activities, involving individuals and commercial structures, building criminal networks. Another characteristic feature is its focus on the market (including the illegal one). The organized groups often engage in criminal activities in various areas, committing environmental and economic and other types of crimes, while the corruption component is an integral feature of them. Organized transnational environmental crime carries out its activities in such key areas as illegal trade in rare and endangered species of wild fauna and flora and their derivatives, illegal logging and trade in illegal timber, illegal turnover of waste including illegal transportation, storage, discharge and burial, transboundary movement of hazardous waste, illegal fishing. Law enforcement and law enforcement agencies of various states pooling their efforts to curb ecologically criminal behavior, neutralizing all stages of the crime: planning, illegal extraction of resources, transportation, marketing, laundering of proceeds from crime play an important role in combating organized environmental crime. Eliminating the economic basis of the activities of criminal groups, reducing their profitability, is the key to success in combating it. Improvement of international legislation for development will create an integrated system of measures to counteract organized environmental crime at the level of individual states and ensure unification of national legislative systems in terms of terminology, compositions, and sanctions applied for the commission of environmental crimes by organized groups.


2021 ◽  
pp. 000276422110031
Author(s):  
Jennifer Sherman ◽  
Jennifer Schwartz

In this article, we provide an early glimpse into how the issues of public health and safety played out in the rural United States during the coronavirus pandemic, focusing on Washington State. We utilize a combination of news articles and press releases, sheriff’s department Facebook posts, publicly available jail data, courtroom observations, in-depth interviews with those who have been held in rural jails, and interviews with rural law enforcement staff to explore this theme. As elected officials, rural sheriffs are beholden to populations that include many who are suspicious of science, liberal agendas, and anything that might threaten what they see as individual freedom. At the same time, they expect local law enforcement to employ punitive measures to control perceived criminal activity in their communities. These communities are often tightly knit, cohesive, and isolated, with high levels of social support both for community members and local leaders, including sheriffs and law enforcement. This complex social context often puts rural sheriffs and law enforcement officers in difficult positions. Given the multiple cross-pressures that rural justice systems faced in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, we explore the circumstances in which they attempted to protect and advocate for the health and safety of both their incarcerated and their nonincarcerated populations. We find that certain characteristics of rural communities both help and hinder local law enforcement in efforts to combat the virus, but these characteristics typically favor informal norms of social control to govern community health. Thus, rural sheriff’s departments repeatedly chose strategies that limited their abilities to protect populations from the disease, in favor of appearing tough on crime and supportive of personal liberty.


Author(s):  
Clara Egger ◽  
Raul Magni-Berton

Abstract A recently published paper in this journal (Choi, 2021) establishes a statistical link between, on the one hand, Islamist terrorist campaigns – including terrorist attacks and online propaganda – and, on the other the growth of the Muslim population. The author explains this result by stating that successful campaigns lead some individuals to convert to Islam. In this commentary, we intend to reply to this article by focusing on the impact of terrorist attacks on religious conversion. We first show that Choi's results suffer from theoretical flaws – a failure to comprehensively unpack the link between violence and conversion – and methodological shortcomings – a focus on all terrorist groups over a period where Islamist attacks were rare. This leads us to replicate Choi's analysis by distinguishing Islamist and non-Islamist terror attacks on a more adequate timeframe. By doing so, we no longer find empirical support for the relationship between terror attacks and the growth of the Muslim population. However, our analyses suggest that such a hypothesis may hold but only in contexts where the level and intensity of political violence are high.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Kselman ◽  
Eleanor Neff Powell ◽  
Joshua A. Tucker

This paper develops a novel argument as to the conditions under which new political parties will form in democratic states. Our approach hinges on the manner in which politicians evaluate the policy implications of new party entry alongside considerations of incumbency for its own sake. We demonstrate that if candidates care sufficiently about policy outcomes, then the likelihood of party entry shouldincreasewith the effective number of status quo parties in the party system. This relationship weakens, and eventually disappears, as politicians’ emphasis on “office-seeking” motivations increases relative to their interest in public policy. We test these predictions with both aggregate electoral data in contemporary Europe and a data set on legislative volatility in Turkey, uncovering support for the argument that party system fragmentation should positively affect the likelihood of entry when policy-seeking motivations are relevant, but not otherwise.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (20) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
О. V. Tkachova

The study found that the features of modern transnational organized crime are: rapid adaptation to realities, instant response to changes and transformations in life and economy, the ability to improve and adjust the methods and tools used in activities; coordination; rationality; thoughtfulness and systematic actions; systematization; the desire to minimize potential risks and get the most profit and maximum profits. Such models of transnational organized crime as: corporate, trade unions, partnerships, ethnic, network are considered. Modern transnational criminal groups, regardless of model, have been shown to be “well-concealed, well-off criminal communities with a well-defined internal structure, distribution of spheres of influence and functions, and extensive interregional or international ties. It is emphasized that now transnational crime is turning into cybercrime. This is made possible by the fact that it is easier to hide criminal activity on the Internet, anonymity is ensured, and it is possible to act uncontrollably, which, in turn, guarantees security for criminal activity


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Gilbert ◽  
Georgina Heydon

Nation states increasingly apply electronic surveillance techniques to combat serious and organised crime after broadening and deepening their national security agendas. Covertly obtained recordings from telephone interception and listening devices of conversations related to suspected criminal activity in Languages Other Than English (LOTE) frequently contain jargon and/or code words. Community translators and interpreters are routinely called upon to transcribe intercepted conversations into English for evidentiary purposes. This paper examines the language capabilities of community translators and interpreters undertaking this work for law enforcement agencies in the Australian state of Victoria. Using data collected during the observation of public court trials, this paper presents a detailed analysis of Vietnamese-to-English translated transcripts submitted as evidence by the Prosecution in drug-related criminal cases. The data analysis reveals that translated transcripts presented for use as evidence in drug-related trials contain frequent and significant errors. However, these discrepancies are difficult to detect in the complex environment of a court trial without the expert skills of an independent discourse analyst fluent in both languages involved. As a result, trials tend to proceed without the reliability of the translated transcript being adequately tested.


2022 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsten Nettles ◽  
Cameron Ford ◽  
Paola A. Prada-Tiedemann

The early detection and location of firearm threats is critical to the success of any law enforcement operation to prevent a mass shooting event or illegal transport of weapons. Prevention tactics such as firearm detection canines have been at the front line of security tools to combat this national security threat. Firearm detection canines go through rigorous training regimens to achieve reliability in the detection of firearms as their target odor source. Currently, there is no scientific foundation as to the chemical odor signature emitted from the actual firearm device that could aid in increased and more efficient canine training and performance protocols or a better understanding of the chemistry of firearm-related odorants for better source identification. This study provides a novel method application of solid phase microextraction-gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (SPME-GC-MS) as a rapid system for the evaluation of odor profiles from firearm devices (loaded and unloaded). Samples included magazines (n = 30) and firearms (n = 15) acquired from the local law enforcement shooting range. Headspace analysis depicted five frequently occurring compounds across sample matrices including aldehydes such as nonanal, decanal, octanal and hydrocarbons tetradecane and tridecane. Statistical analysis via principal component analysis (PCA) highlighted a preliminary clustering differentiating unloaded firearms from both loaded/unloaded magazines and loaded firearm devices. These results highlight potential odor signature differences associated with different firearm components. The understanding of key odorants above a firearm will have an impact on national security efforts, thereby enhancing training regimens to better prepare canine teams for current threats in our communities.


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