7 Horizontal Cooperation Agreements

Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas

This chapter focuses on horizontal cooperation agreements. Horizontal cooperation agreements are agreements that are entered into by undertakings operating at the same stage of the value chain in order to achieve a variety of efficiencies. While these agreements are generally pro-competitive, they may, however, raise anticompetitive concerns. Under EU law, horizontal cooperation agreements are generally not considered to be agreements that have as their object the restriction of competition, although there may be exceptions. Indeed, as these cooperation agreements may adversely affect the parameters of competition, competition law has taken an interest in them. Cooperation agreements are typically caught by Article 101(1) TFEU. Nevertheless, horizontal cooperation agreements that trigger anticompetitive effects, but generate efficiencies as well, can be exempted under Article 101(3) TFEU.

Author(s):  
Wojciech Paweł SZYDŁO

Aim: The paper discusses cases in which a refusal by an energy enterprise to connect other enterprises to the network is treated as a prohibited abuse of the enterprise's dominant position and, equally, will represent behavior prohibited by art. 12 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and by art. 9 par. 2 item 2 of the Competition and Consumer Protection Law as well as legal consequences of such refusal. It is important to pinpoint such cases since the EU sectoral regulation does not provide for obligating any undertakings which manage and operate oil pipelines to enter into contracts with other undertakings such as contracts on connecting into their network or contracts on providing crude oil transfer services. Conditions for accessing oil pipelines and selling their transfer capacities are determined by the owners of the networks: private oil companies in the countries across which the pipelines are routed. These conditions are not governed by the EU law.  Furthermore, the very obligation of connecting other entities to own network by energy undertakings operating in the oil transfer sector in Poland will only arise from generally applicable provisions of the Polish competition law.  Design / Research methods: The purpose of the paper has been reached by conducting a doctrinal analysis of relevant provisions of Polish and EU law and an analysis of guidelines issued by the EU governing bodies. Furthermore, the research included the functional analysis method which analyses how law works in practice. Conclusions / findings: The deliberations show that a refusal to access the network will be a manifestation of a prohibited abuse of a dominant position and will be a prohibited action always when the dominant's action is harmful in terms of the allocation effectiveness. It will be particularly harmful when delivery of goods or services objectively required for effective competition on a lower level market, a discriminatory refusal which leads to elimination of an effective competition on the consequent market, a refusal leading to unfair treatment of consumers and an unjustified refusal. Originality / value of the article: The paper discusses the prerequisites which trigger the obligation to connect entities to own network by energy undertakings operating in the oil transfer sector. The obligation has a material impact on the operations of the oil transmitting undertakings, in particular on those who dominate the market. The regulatory bodies in the competition sector may classify a refusal of access to own network by other enterprises as a prohibited abuse of the dominant position, exposing such undertakings to financial consequences.Implications of the research: The research results presented in the paper may be used in decisions issued by the President of the OCCP and in judgement of Polish civil courts and EU courts. This may cause a significant change in the approach to classifying prohibited practices to prohibited behavior which represent abuse of the dominant position. The deliberations may also prompt the Polish and EU legislator to continue works on the legislation.


Author(s):  
Wijckmans Frank ◽  
Tuytschaever Filip

This chapter explains the term ‘vertical agreements’ and what it covers. It addresses a number of general issues that are relevant to the EU competition law treatment of vertical agreements in general. It describes the implementation and the (public and private) enforcement of Article 101 TFEU before and after the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003. The chapter provides the historical background of both Regulation 330/2010 and Regulation 461/2010. In particular, it devotes specific attention to the nature and legal and practical consequences of soft EU competition law (in the form of notices, guidelines, etc) as opposed to hard EU competition law (provisions of primary and secondary EU law).


Author(s):  
Rodger Barry ◽  
Ferro Miguel Sousa ◽  
Marcos Francisco

This chapter explains the contents and goals of the Antitrust Damages Directive (Directive 2014/104/EU), the corollary of the EU’s policy towards the promotion and facilitation of private enforcement of competition law. It first traces the evolution in EU competition law enforcement and policy that led to the adoption of the Directive before considering the goals of the Directive in more detail, namely to provide rules for the effective compensation of victims of antitrust infringements and to harmonize some rules concerning damages claims. It then examines the Directive’s legal basis under EU Law as well as substantive provisions, including those relating to compensatory principles, quantification of harm, and consensual dispute resolution. The chapter goes on to highlight neglected issues, limitations, and inherent biases regarding the scope and nature of the Directive’s rules and concludes with an analysis of issues arising from implementation of the Directive in Member States.


Author(s):  
Sandra Marco Colino

This chapter focuses on the current interaction between European Union and UK law. EU law is currently a source of UK law. However, the relationship between the two regimes is expected to change in the future as a consequence of the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 stipulates that the European Communities Act 1972 will be ‘repealed on exit day’, which would be 29 March 2019 provided that the two-year period since Article 50 TEU was triggered is not extended. Once the European Communities Act 1972 has been repealed, EU law will cease to be a source of UK law. No major immediate changes to the national competition legislation are to be expected, but future reforms could distance the UK system from the EU rules.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 154-171
Author(s):  
Samet Caliskan ◽  
Saliha Oner

It is a highly advocated view that a competition law with sanctions targeting individuals would achieve a greater deterrent impact than one that does not. Having introduced individual sanctions does not, however, guarantee that a market would have less anticompetitive conduct, because these sanctions are effective only insofar as they are severely implemented on wrongdoing individuals. UK competition law is one example of this issue because cases where individuals have been targeted and punished are significantly fewer than the authorities expected, in spite of it being more than 15 years since individual sanctions were introduced amidst high expectations. This article examines the individual sanctions of competition law in the UK and Turkey. It argues that Turkey is on the right path by departing from the way in which EU law enforces the rules of competition law, and is moving closer to UK law. However, it is argued that further steps should be cautiously considered to avoid the same issues which UK competition law is currently experiencing, as there are serious doubts that the latter has achieved the desired deterrent effect.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-220
Author(s):  
Ioannis Lianos ◽  
Alina Velias ◽  
Dmitry Katalevsky ◽  
George Ovchinnikov

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 86-89
Author(s):  
Chris Owen

The status of legal advice provided by lawyers being protected by privilege in EU competition investigations has been the subject of much legal scrutiny in the past two decades. This article provides a recap of the current legal position in EU law, analyses how that position might change for UK qualified lawyers post-Brexit and also considers the position of advice provided by EEA qualified lawyers in English proceedings post-Brexit.


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