The Moral Irrelevance of Biological Welfare

Chapter 6 considers what options are left for the biocentrist. It argues that if one is committed to biocentrism, one ought really be committed to what may be called teleocentrism, the view that all things that are teleologically organized have a welfare. The chapter explains why this view is false and so biocentrism is also false. It first argues that there are no grounds for accepting that the welfare of nonsentient organisms is morally significant while denying the significance of the same kind of welfare in nonorganisms, such as artifacts and biological collectives. In other words, if biocentrists wishes to maintain that nonsentient organisms are morally considerable, they must give up biocentrism in favor of teleocentrism. The chapter then argues that teleocentrism is to be rejected and that, on balance, the most justified position is one on which we simply accept that not all welfare matters.