Instant Agents, Minutelings, and Radical Reversals

2019 ◽  
pp. 40-80
Author(s):  
Alfred R. Mele
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Psychological Profiles ◽  
Externalist View

Thought experiments about three kinds of agent—instant agents, minutelings, and radically reversed agents—are used in developing the book’s argument for an externalist view of moral responsibility. Instant agents come into being all at once as adult agents with full psychological profiles. Minutelings are instant agents who live only for a minute and perform a morally significant action. Radically reversed agents come in two general kinds: morally wonderful agents who are given a despicable collection of values overnight by manipulators, and despicable agents who are given a morally wonderful collection of values overnight by manipulators.

Internalism and Externalism

2019 ◽  
pp. 13-39
Author(s):  
Alfred R. Mele
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Externalist View ◽  
Internal Condition ◽  
Personal Histories ◽  
Shed Light

Two general kinds of view about moral responsibility are discussed—internalism and externalism. An agent’s internal condition at a time may be defined as something specified by the collection of all psychological truths about the agent at the time that are silent on how he came to be as he is at that time. Internalists maintain that—at least in the case of direct moral responsibility—all that is needed to determine whether an agent is morally responsible for a pertinent action is to be found in his internal condition. Externalists disagree; they contend that agents’ personal histories can have a special bearing on moral responsibility. This disagreement is described and discussed. Various thought experiments are used to shed light on the disagreement and to start building a case for an externalist view.

Manipulated Agents

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred R. Mele
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Significant Role ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
The Other ◽  
Value Systems ◽  
Psychological State ◽  
Important Lesson ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Historical Difference

Thought experiments featuring manipulated agents and designed agents have played a significant role in the literature on moral responsibility. What can we learn from thought experiments of this kind about the nature of moral responsibility? That is this book’s primary question. An important lesson lies at the core of its answer: Moral responsibility for actions has a historical dimension of a certain kind. A pair of agents whose current nonhistorical properties are very similar and who perform deeds of the same kind may nevertheless be such that one is morally responsible for the deed whereas the other is not, and what makes the difference is a difference in how they came to be as they are at that time—that is, a historical difference. Imagine that each of these agents attempts to assassinate someone. Depending on the details of the cases, it may be that one of these agents is morally responsible for the attempt whereas the other is not, because one of them was manipulated in a certain way into being in the psychological state that issues in the behavior whereas the other agent came to be in that state under his own steam. A variety of thought experiments are considered. They include stories about agents whose value systems are radically altered by manipulators, vignettes featuring agents who are built from scratch, and scenarios in which agents magically come into being with full psychological profiles.

Must Compatibilists Be Internalists?

2019 ◽  
pp. 81-96
Author(s):  
Alfred R. Mele
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Original Design ◽  
Gary Watson

This chapter identifies three lines of thought that build bridges from compatibilism to internalism about moral responsibility and argues that all three are seriously defective. The three lines of thought are due to Richard Double, Harry Frankfurt, and Gary Watson. Thought experiments discussed include radical reversal stories and an original-design story in which a goddess creates a zygote and implants it in a certain woman at a certain time because she wants it to grow into a being who will perform a certain deed thirty years later. Differences between these two kinds of thought experiment are discussed.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Alfred R. Mele
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Robert Kane ◽  
Key Terms ◽  
Technical Terms

This chapter introduces the book’s central question: What can we learn about the nature of moral responsibility from thought experiments involving manipulation and related thought experiments featuring designed agents? Various alternative positions on that question are described, and some of the key terms of the discussion are defined, including compatibilism, determinism, incompatibilism, and libertarianism. Guidance is offered on how the author uses some other key terms, including free will, intuition, and moral responsibility. The technical terms internalism and externalism are introduced, and various kinds of internalism and externalism are distinguished. Work by Harry Frankfurt and Robert Kane is discussed to help set the stage for subsequent chapters.

Wrapping Things Up

2019 ◽  
pp. 122-144
Author(s):  
Alfred R. Mele
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Question And Answer ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Answer Format

This chapter addresses a range of issues, including the bearing of manipulation on the project of constructing an incompatibilist analysis of moral responsibility for actions, the difference between direct and indirect moral responsibility, the significance of reversal stories in which the change in an agent’s values is localized, and the author’s methodology in this book. A section that has a question-and-answer format answers questions about such things as the negative nature of the historical constraint on moral responsibility defended in this book, why extreme changes in agents’ values are featured in the book’s main thought experiments, and the author’s response to readers who do not share his intuitions about various thought experiments.

Bullet Biting and Beyond

2019 ◽  
pp. 97-121
Author(s):  
Alfred R. Mele
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Partial Answer ◽  
Original Design ◽  
Zygote Argument ◽  
Critical Attention ◽  
The Zygote Argument

Compatibilists who reject even the modest externalist theses defended thus far in this book seem to be stuck biting some extremely hard bullets. A question about bullet biting is this chapter’s focus. It is roughly this: When should compatibilists about moral responsibility bite the bullet in responding to stories used in arguments for incompatibilism about moral responsibility or in arguments for theses that typical compatibilists would reject? The question is clarified, and a partial answer is offered. Thought experiments discussed include radical reversal stories and original-design stories. John Fischer’s response to an argument based on an original-design story—the zygote argument—receives close critical attention.

scholarly journals Implanted Desires, Self-Formation, and Blame

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Talbert
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Personal History ◽  
Direct Bearing ◽  
Self Formation

Some theories of moral responsibility assert that whether a person is accountable for her behavior depends partly on facts about her personal history. Those who advocate such a “historicist” outlook often hold, for example, that people who unwillingly acquire morally corrupt dispositions are not blameworthy for the wrong actions that issue from these dispositions; this contention is frequently supported by thought experiments involving instances of forced psychological manipulation that seem to call responsibility into question. I argue here against the historicist perspective on moral responsibility and in favor of the conclusion that the process by which a person acquires values and dispositions is largely irrelevant to moral responsibility. While the thought experiments introduced by historicists raise perplexing questions about personal identity and involve clear instances of moral wrongs done to the manipulated subjects, neither of these considerations typically have a direct bearing on the question of moral responsibility. Rather, questions about moral responsibility in manipulation cases should be answered, I argue, by considering whether a manipulated agent is capable of expressing through her actions the objectionable attitudes that make blame appropriate in normal cases of wrongdoing.

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