Prioritarianism

2019 ◽  
pp. 44-53
Author(s):  
Torbjörn Tännsjö
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Moral Claim ◽  
Weighted Sum ◽  
Entire Life ◽  
Absolute Priority ◽  
Moral Importance ◽  
Definite Time ◽  
Special Weight ◽  
What Matters

The rationale behind prioritarianism is the idea that suffering has a special moral importance. This means that a person who momentarily suffers has a special moral claim for improvement of her hedonic situation. It is the other way around with happiness. Prioritarianism is seen as a possible amendment to utilitarianism. Since suffering takes place at a definite time, momentary suffering, not suffering within an entire life, is what matters, according to prioritarianism. While the maximin/leximin theory gives absolute priority to those who are worst off prioritarinism presents a more nuanced view. Some special weight is given to an amount of happiness/unhappiness depending on where it falls, on a happy or on a miserable moment. There are many ideas, however, about how to specify the exact weight which should be given to an instant of happiness/unhappiness depending on where it appears on the hedonistic scale. This means that prioritarianism presents us with a family of theories rather than with one theory in particular. They all agree on the claim, however, that what should be maximized is a weighted sum of happiness rather than the sum total of happiness.

Intimacy as Transgression and the Problem of Freedom

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 18
Author(s):  
Kym Maclaren
Keyword(s):  
Intimate Relationships ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
Public Institutions ◽  
The Other ◽  
Social Forces ◽  
Critical Insight ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
What Matters

“To consent to love or be loved,” said Merleau-Ponty, “is to consent also to influence someone else, to decide to a certain extent on behalf of the other.” This essay explicates that idea through a meditation on intimacy. I propose, first, that, on Merleau-Ponty’s account, we are always transgressing into each other’s experience, whether we are strangers or familiars; I call this “ontological intimacy.” Concrete experiences of intimacy are based upon this ontological intimacy, and can take place at two levels: (1) at-this-moment (such that we can experience intimacy even with strangers, by sharing a momentary but extra-ordinary mutual recognition) and (2) in shared interpersonal institutions, or habitual, enduring, and co-enacted visions of who we are, how to live, and what matters. Through particular examples of dynamics within these layers of intimacy (drawing upon work by Berne and by Russon), I claim that we are always, inevitably, imposing an “unfreedom” upon our intimate others. Freedom, then, can only develop from within and by virtue of this “unfreedom.” Thus, what distinguishes empowering or emancipating relationships from oppressive ones is not the removal of transgressive normative social forces; it is rather the particular character of those transgressive forces. Some transgressions upon others’ experience—some forms of “unfreedom”—will tend to promote freedom; others will tend to hinder it. This amounts to a call for promoting agency and freedom not only through critical analysis of public institutions, practices and discourses, but also through critical insight into and transformation of our most private and intimate relationships.

Setting Health-Care Priorities

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torbjörn Tännsjö
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Health Care ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Life Extension ◽  
Weighted Sum ◽  
Absolute Priority ◽  
Abstract Thought

The three most promising theories of distributive ethics are presented: Utilitarianism, with or without a prioritarian amendment. The maximin/leximin theory. Egalitarianism. Utilitarianism urges us to maximize the sum-total of happiness. When prioritarianism is added to utilitarianism we are instead urged to maximize a weighted sum of happiness, where happiness weighs less the happier you are and unhappiness weighs more the more miserable you are. The maximin/leximin theory urges us to give absolute priority to those who are worst off. Egalitarianism gives us two goals: to maximize happiness but also to level out differences with regard to happiness between persons. All of these theories are justifiable. In abstract thought experiments they conflict. When applied in real life they converge in an unexpected manner: more resources should be directed to mental health and less to marginal life extension. It is doubtful if the desired change will take place, however. What gets in its way is human irrationality.

scholarly journals A.R. MENGS TRA ROMA E MADRID: LE INQUIETUDINI DEL PITTORE FILOSOFO SULL’ISTITUZIONE ACCADEMICA NELLA SECONDA METÀ DEL XVIII SECOLO.

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-50
Author(s):  
Noemi Cinelli
Keyword(s):  
18Th Century ◽  
Fine Arts ◽  
Ancient Greece ◽  
The Other ◽  
Art Theory ◽  
Entire Life ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
San Fernando

It is difficult to frame Anton Raphael Mengs in a specific stylistic movement nowadays that the chronological divisions and the consequent definitions of the art of the Enlightenment are going to be more and more controversial. Because of his eclectic and cosmopolitan activity, his ideas about Ideal Beauty spread across the countries affected by the apprehensions and hopes related to the 18th century. The bohemian painter dedicated his entire life to the study of ancient art; his marble collection of the statues from the great Italian collections interested the artists coming to the Eternal City, and he consecrates esthetic models of different epochs. Mengs never get away from these models – Ancient Greece, Raffaello Sanzio, Tiziano Vecellio, Antonio Correggio. His presence in Spain was favored by propitious circumstances: the coronation of an erudite, educate king, lover of Fine Arts, Charles III of Spain, a king so intimately close to the painter to guarantee him his protection in the difficult relation between Mengs and the San Fernando Academy of Fine Arts in Madrid. The relation between the Institution and the Bohemian get complicated because of the different ideas about the organization of the academy and the education of the students. Because of the little original sources, several matters have not been resolved, for example the issue about the false ancient fresco of Jupiter and Ganymede, or the controversy about the Peña case, that brought to the final breakup between the artist and the consiliarios in San Fernando Institution. Mengs focused his attention in an even worse matter about the direction of the academy: concretely, which competences had to have the consiliarios and which the teachers. When Mengs asked to be accepted in the academy, he undoubtedly thought that the Institution was structured as the other great one in which he took part in Italy, San Luca National Academy in Rome. Within Mengs’ proposals to raise the level of the Academy in Madrid there was the institution of anatomy and surgery teachings, which intent was to revolutionize the concept of painters and sculptors. In spite of the difficulties that the first painter of Charles III had during his stay in San Fernando, his acting had a fundamental role in developing the Art Theory and particularly in the European artists’ training.

The developmental stages of Caligus elongatus von Nordmann, 1832 (Copepoda: Caligidae)

1996 ◽  
Vol 74 (8) ◽  
pp. 1459-1478 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Piasecki
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Developmental Stages ◽  
The Other ◽  
Lepeophtheirus Salmonis ◽  
Fish Parasite ◽  
Entire Life ◽  
Entire Life Cycle ◽  
Louse Species

The morphology of all developmental stages of the fish parasite Caligus elongatus (Copepoda; Caligidae) is described. The entire life cycle consists of 8 stages: 2 nauplii, 1 copepodid, 4 chalimi, and adults. A preadult stage does not occur as it does in some other caligids. In this respect C. elongatus differs substantially from the other major sea louse species, Lepeophtheirus salmonis, which has two preadult stages.

Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons

1988 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis McKerlie
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
The Other ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Moral View ◽  
Moral Importance ◽  
Separateness Of Persons

Different people live different lives. Each life consists of experiences that are not shared with the other lives. These facts are sometimes referred to as the ‘separateness of persons.’ Some writers have appealed to the separateness of persons to support or to criticize moral views. John Rawls thinks that the separateness of persons supports egalitarianism, while Robert Nozick believes that it supports a rights view. I will call the claim that the separateness of persons counts in favor of a particular moral view the ‘positive connection.’ Both these writers think that utilitarianism is objectionable because it ignores the moral importance of the separateness of persons. I will call the claim that the separateness of persons counts against a moral view the ‘negative connection.’In this paper I will discuss several different attempts at explaining the connection between the separateness of persons and specific moral views. I will begin by describing how egalitarianism, unlike utilitarianism, treats individual lives as morally important units. I will discuss the kind of egalitarianism that aims at equality, but the same points could be made about egalitarian views that give priority to helping the worst off or require that everyone should receive at least a specified minimum share of resources or happiness.

F.H. Bradley: An Unpublished Note on Christian Morality

1983 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon Kendal
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Clear Understanding ◽  
Christian Belief ◽  
Moral View ◽  
Christian Morality ◽  
Moral Importance ◽  
Unpublished Note

At some time between 1907 and 1912, probably very much nearer the earlier date, Bradley produced the first draft of an article on Christian morality. He did this in response to criticism that his moral ideas were anti-Christian. This charge was based mainly on the content of two articles that he published during 1894 in the International Journal of Ethics, one called ‘Some Remarks on Punishment’ and the other ‘The Limits of Individual and National Self-Sacrifice’. In these Bradley had maintained that the conventional ‘Christian’ belief in the sacredness of life undermined any sensible approach to punishment and any clear understanding of the moral importance of self-assertion (in contrast to self-sacrifice). It encouraged a squeamishness about retribution and ‘social surgery’. It devalued proper human ends and interests, and the rights and duties founded on them. There was needed ‘a correction of our moral view, and a return to a non-Christian and perhaps a Hellenic ideal’, one that would recognize the unlimited right of the moral organism (i.e. virtually the state) to dispose of its members and to use force internationally in defence of right. Bradley pulled no punches and had this to say about the self-styled ‘Christian’ party:

scholarly journals Three Conceptions of Group-Based Reasons

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-127
Author(s):  
Christopher Woodard
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Group Agency ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
Relevant Group ◽  
Relevant Pattern ◽  
What Matters

AbstractGroup-based reasons are reasons to play one’s part in some pattern of action that the members of some group could perform, because of the good features of the pattern. This paper discusses three broad conceptions of such reasons. According to the agency-first conception, there are no group-based reasons in cases where the relevant group is not or would not be itself an agent. According to the behaviour-first conception, what matters is that the other members of the group would play their parts in the relevant pattern, not whether they would have the cooperative intentional states constitutive of group agency in doing so. This paper argues against these conceptions and in favour of the powers-first conception, according to which what matters is that the members of the group have practically relevant powers.

Intimacy as Transgression and the Problem of Freedom

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 23
Author(s):  
Kym Maclaren
Keyword(s):  
Intimate Relationships ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
Public Institutions ◽  
The Other ◽  
Social Forces ◽  
Critical Insight ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
What Matters

“To consent to love or be loved,” said Merleau-Ponty, “is to consent also to influence someone else, to decide to a certain extent on behalf of the other.” This essay explicates that idea through a meditation on intimacy. I propose, first, that, on Merleau-Ponty’s account, we are always transgressing into each other’s experience, whether we are strangers or familiars; I call this “ontological intimacy.” Concrete experiences of intimacy are based upon this ontological intimacy, and can take place at two levels: (1) at-this-moment (such that we can experience intimacy even with strangers, by sharing a momentary but extra-ordinary mutual recognition) and (2) in shared interpersonal institutions, or habitual, enduring, and co-enacted visions of who we are, how to live, and what matters. Through particular examples of dynamics within these layers of intimacy (drawing upon work by Berne and by Russon), I claim that we are always, inevitably, imposing an “unfreedom” upon our intimate others. Freedom, then, can only develop from within and by virtue of this “unfreedom.” Thus, what distinguishes empowering or emancipating relationships from oppressive ones is not the removal of transgressive normative social forces; it is rather the particular character of those transgressive forces. Some transgressions upon others’ experience—some forms of “unfreedom”—will tend to promote freedom; others will tend to hinder it. This amounts to a call for promoting agency and freedom not only through critical analysis of public institutions, practices and discourses, but also through critical insight into and transformation of our most private and intimate relationships.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
E. Tory Higgins
Keyword(s):  
Sense Of Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Shared Reality ◽  
Human Motivation ◽  
Everyday Lives ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
Common Interests ◽  
The One ◽  
What Matters

What makes us human? Why do humans deal with the world in the ways that we do? The usual answer is that it is our intelligence. When it comes to intelligence, we believe we are special. When it comes to motivation, we believe we are basically the same as other animals. But human motivation is also special. This book describes why human motivation is special and how it makes us who we are. Humans want to experience that their feelings, beliefs, and concerns are shared by others. They want to experience that what matters to them about the world—what objects, events, and issues are worthy of attention—also matters to other people. And what humans share with others is what they experience to be real. It is a shared reality. Our shared reality motivation defines who we are. It is the best of us and the worst of us. On the one hand, our shared realities connect us to close others, create common interests, and make life meaningful. They become the truth about what to feel and what to believe. On the other hand, because of this, we distrust, and even fear, the members of any other group who have different shared realities. For better and worse, our shared realities profoundly affect our everyday lives: how we feel, what we know, our attitudes and opinions, our sense of self, what we strive for and how we strive, and how we get along with others.

On Messick and Naturalism: A Rejoinder to Fort

2000 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 735-742
Author(s):  
Edwin M. Hartman
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary History ◽  
Good Practice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ethical Naturalism ◽  
Rational Deliberation ◽  
Bright Line ◽  
Moral Communities ◽  
Moral Importance ◽  
Moral Philosophers ◽  
Moral Facts

Professor Fort (1999) imagines a dispute over the moral importance of certain facts, with David Messick and himself on one side and Donna Wood and me on the other. He has identified an important issue—ethical naturalism—but that issue is not a point of disagreement between Messick and me.Fort has some interesting ideas about how Messick’s views might help in creating organizations that are moral communities. Beyond noting that those ideas constitute the most important part of his essay and merit consideration, I shall not comment on them.Moral philosophers who are naturalists—I am one—hold that there is no bright line between ought-statements and is-statements and that empirical facts have implications for moral facts. So, for example, that a certain practice helps a community survive is a strong sort of reason for claiming that it is a morally good practice, other things being equal. But most naturalists do not claim that any practice that has arisen by virtue of evolution is ipso facto a morally good practice even if it does serve some purpose. Nor does ethical naturalism have a characteristic view of the extent to which our evolutionary history, as opposed to our rational deliberation, determines what we do.

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