Control

2021 ◽  
pp. 122-148
Author(s):  
Ann Whittle

This chapter begins relating the rather abstract issues considered so far to the issue of moral responsibility. It introduces the notion of guidance control in the first section, before examining some influential analyses that have been offered of this form of control. In particular, the chapter examines both reasons-sensitivity and hierarchical analyses of this notion. It is argued that there is reason to be sceptical of the claim that such analyses can offer an adequate account independent of considerations regarding abilities to do otherwise. This discussion, in addition to a counterexample offered, challenges the view that we can cleanly divorce the concepts of regulative and guidance control as is often proposed. The chapter ends by sketching an alternative, unified ability analysis of control, which combines elements associated with both regulative and guidance analyses of control.

2021 ◽  
pp. 83-116
Author(s):  
J. Adam Carter

If intellectualism about knowledge-how is true (and so, if knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that), then to the extent that we need an autonomy condition on know-how, it will be (simply) an autonomy condition on know-that: a condition on propositional knowledge-apt belief. However, the anti-intellectualist—according to whom know-how is fundamentally dispositional rather than propositional—would need an entirely different story here––one that places an autonomy-related restriction not on propositional-knowledge-apt belief but, instead, on know-how-apt dispositions. Chapter 4 develops exactly this kind of restriction, by cobbling together some ideas about know-how and virtue epistemology with recent thinking in the moral responsibility literature about freedom, responsibility, and manipulation. The proposal is that one is in a state of knowing how to do something, φ‎, only if one has the skill to φ‎ successfully with guidance control, and one’s φ‎-ing exhibits guidance control (and furthermore, manifests know-how) only if one’s φ‎-ing is caused by a reasons-responsive mechanism that one owns. Unsurprisingly, the devil is in these details—and this chapter aims to spell them out in a way that rules out certain kinds of radical performance enhancing cases while not ruling out that, say, one knows how to do a maths problem when one’s performance is just mildly boosted by Adderall.


2019 ◽  
pp. 108-126
Author(s):  
Ivan L. Lyubimov

This paper examines the evolution of academic and applied approaches to analyze the problem of economic growth since the mid-XX century. For quite an extended period of time, these views were corresponding to universalist economic policies taking no adequate account of particularities and limitations that a certain catching-up economy embodied. New approaches analyzing the problems of economic growth, on the contrary, individualize growth diagnostics, structural transformation and the organization of reforms processes for the emerging economies. We argue that individualist approaches might be potentially more effective than the universalist ones for solving the problem of slow economic growth.


DeKaVe ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arief Agung Suwasono

Television is a medium that delivers meaning through various type of text television conveys information that promotes moral responsibility and social solidarity. In spite of the fact that television is one of capitalism product, its programs can generate social commitment and solidarity reflecting human moral values.Keyword : Television, Fetisme


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Beebe

If a person requires a tissue donation in order to survive, many philosophers argue that whatever moral responsibility a biological relative may have to donate to the person in need will be grounded at least partially, if not entirely, in the biological relations the potential donor bears to the recipient. Such views tend to ignore the role played by a potential donor’s unique ability to help the person in need and the perceived burden of the donation type in underwriting such judgments. If, for example, a sperm donor is judged to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue to a child conceived with his sperm, we argue that such judgments will largely be grounded in the presumed unique ability of the sperm donor to help the child due to the compatibility of his tissues with those of the recipient. In this paper, we report the results of two main studies and three supplementary studies designed to investigate the comparative roles that biological relatedness, unique ability to help, and donation burden play in generating judgments of moral responsibility in tissue donation cases. We found that the primary factor driving individuals’ judgments about the moral responsibility of a potential donor to donate tissue to someone in need was the degree to which a donor was in a unique ability to help. We observed no significant role for biological relatedness as such. Biologically related individuals were deemed to have a significant moral responsibility to donate tissue only when they are one of a small number of people who have a relatively unique capacity to help. We also found that people are less inclined to think individuals have a moral responsibility to donate tissue when the donation is more costly to make. We bring these results into dialogue with contemporary disputes concerning the ethics of tissue donation.


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