Perceptual Levels and Their Action-Theoretic Counterparts
Chapter 3 explains how perceptions are like actions in that some are, for a given perceiver at a given time, basic and others not. In neither case are the relevant by-relations—seeing x by seeing y and doing one thing by doing another—inferential. It is shown, however, that these points allow for our concepts and theories to influence perception. Several interpretations of theory-ladenness are described, and the chapter argues that perception itself is not inferential or, necessarily, theory-laden in depending on a theory or theoretical concepts. Our theories can influence what we perceive, particularly by leading us to see something as a theory says it is; but much as action constitutes a direct way in which, however complicated the causal underpinnings, we intervene in the world, perception constitutes a direct way in which, however long and complicated the causal conditions for it, the world intervenes in the mind.